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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES IN 
STATES WITH LOW INTERNAL CAPACITY: A STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, 
IRAQ AND SUDAN 
 
Güler, Arzu 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ali Bilgiç 
 
May 2013 
 
Nearly one out of the six states in the world is regarded with low internal capacity 
by the Failed State Index 2012. However, having a priori assumption on states’ 
internal capacity to take decisions and implement them within their own states, 
scholarly attention has been given to the factors that shape states’ behaviors 
towards international regimes, mainly discussing under what conditions states will 
comply with them. Thus, the literature on international regimes neglected to study 
the effectiveness of international regimes in the states with low internal capacity. 
This dissertation deals with the research question of how the presence of states 
with low internal capacity creates implications for the effectiveness of 
 iv 
international regimes and how regimes’ institutions can operate in such states to 
increase regime effectiveness. I examine this research question through 
quantitative and qualitative analyses and with a specific reference to the 4Rs 
activities of the international refugee regime in three refugee producing countries, 
namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. I argue that international refugee regime was 
not effective in these countries and I propose six tentative principles to UNHCR 
and its implementing partners to increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime in refugee producing countries with low internal capacity: providing 
civilian security, overcoming socio-cultural and religious conservatism, increasing 
government capacity and willingness to cooperate with international community, 
building trust among local people towards international community and increasing 
their support for regime activities.  
 
Keywords: International regimes, regime effectiveness, international refugee 
regime, UNHCR, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
İÇ KAPASİTESİ DÜŞÜK ÜLKELERDE ULUSLARARASI 
REJİMLERİN ETKİNLİĞİ: AFGANİSTAN, IRAK VE SUDAN 
ÜZERİNDEN BİR ULUSLARARASI MÜLTECİ REJİMİ 
ÇALIŞMASI 
 
Güler, Arzu 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Bilgiç 
 
Mayıs 2013 
 
Başarısız Devletler Endeksi 2012 verilerine göre, neredeyse her altı devletten biri 
iç kapasitesi düşük ülke olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ancak yazında, devletlerin 
karar alma ve aldıkları kararları kendi ülkelerinde uygulama kapasiteleri ile ilgili 
öncül bir varsayım olduğu için; akademik ilgi, devletlerin uluslararası rejimlere 
karşı davranışlarını hangi etkenlerin şekillendirdiğine, özellikle de devletlerin 
hangi şartlar altında uluslararası rejimlerle uyumlu hareket ettiğine odaklanmıştır. 
Dolayısıyla uluslararası rejim yazını, uluslararası rejimlerin iç kapasitesi düşük 
ülkelerdeki etkinliğini ihmal etmiştir. Bu çalışma iç kapasitesi düşük ülkelerin, 
uluslararası rejimlerin etkinliğini nasıl etkilediği ve rejim kurumlarının bu 
 vi 
ülkelerde rejim etkinliğini arttırmak için nasıl faaliyet gösterebileceği araştırma 
sorusunu ele almaktadır. Çalışma bu araştırma sorusunu, nicel ve nitel analizler 
çerçevesinde uluslararası mülteci rejiminin mülteci üreten üç ülkedeki 
(Afganistan, Irak ve Sudan) 4R faaliyetleri ile incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada, 
uluslararası mülteci rejiminin bu ülkelerde etkin olmadığı iddia edilmekte ve 
UNHCR ve uygulama ortaklarının mülteci üreten iç kapasitesi düşük ülkelerde 
rejim etkinliğini arttırabilmesi için altı muhtemel prensip önermektedir: sivil 
güvenliğin sağlanması, sosyo-kültürel ve dini muhafazakârlığın aşılması, 
hükümetin uluslararası toplum ile işbirliği kapasitesinin ve istekliliğinin 
arttırılması, toplumda uluslararası topluma karşı güven tesis edilmesi ve toplumun 
rejim faaliyetlerine desteğinin arttırılması.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası rejimler, rejim etkinliği, uluslararası mülteci 
rejimi, BMMYK, Afganistan, Irak, Sudan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Nearly one out of the six states in the world is regarded as countries with 
internal capacity in terms of their political, social and economic indicators.
1
 
Though they might have relatively high capacities in terms of economic or 
military capacities, they generally do not have the capacity to provide internal 
security and essential public services to their citizens. They are also mostly 
corrupted and lack the authority and governance capacity within its borders. 
Having a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity to take decisions and 
implement them within their own states, scholarly attention has been given to the 
factors that shape states’ behaviors towards international regimes, mainly 
discussing under what conditions states will comply with them. In other words, the 
literature on international regimes neglected to study the effectiveness of 
international regimes in the states with low internal capacity.  
The literature on international regimes focuses on the factors that shape 
states’ behaviors towards international regimes, mainly discussing under what 
conditions, why and how states establish international regimes and comply with 
them. However both the mainstream literature, namely realist, neoliberal and 
                                                 
1
 The Failed State Index (2012: 4-5) examines 192 countries and 33 countries among them are 
listed in the categories of “very high alert”, “high alert” and “alert”.  
 2 
constructivist schools of thought and its critiques have a priori assumption on 
states’ capacity to comply with international regimes. This priori assumption in 
the literature results in neglecting to study the effectiveness of international 
regimes in the countries with low internal capacity. Accordingly, the literature 
fails to provide incentives to regimes’ institutions to increase regime effectiveness 
in such countries. Since the beginning of the 1990s, international refugee regime 
increased its activities in refugee producing counties with low internal capacity 
due to its strategy of prevention and solution. Examining the literature on 
international refugee regime in particular shows that this literature mainly focuses 
on the normative discussion of whether and under what conditions United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should involve in activities in 
refugee producing countries. However it neglects an effectiveness-centric focus, 
discussing how UNHCR can increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime in such countries. Given the gaps in the literature on international regimes 
in general and on international refugee regime in particular, the research question 
of this study is: “How does the presence of states with low internal capacity create 
implications for the effectiveness of international regimes and how can regimes’ 
institutions operate in such states to increase regime effectiveness? This research 
question will be answered with a specific reference to the effectiveness of 
international refugee regime and UNHCR 4Rs
2
 activities in three refugee 
producing countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan.  
This study is an attempt to generate findings for regimes’ institutions to 
increase the regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. This 
                                                 
2
 4Rs are the the short term for the activities of Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction. 
 3 
introductory chapter provides a brief summary of the literature on international 
regimes, the theoretical framework of the study, its theoretical contribution to the 
literature and limitations of the study. Then it gives a brief outline of the study and 
introduce its research design. 
 
 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Realist school of thought considers international regimes with a minimal 
influence on states’ behavior. According to realists, international regimes do not 
shape their behaviors independent from states’ power considerations, given the 
anarchical system. Hence, it is assumed that states give priority to their national 
interests over functions of institutions in case of conflict (Morgenthau, 1948). 
Neorealists also argue that cooperation takes seldom place between states and 
international regimes because of the feeling of insecurity among states at the 
system level (Waltz, 1979). Criticizing neorealists assumptions on the importance 
of states’ power capabilities in shaping their relations with international regimes, 
neo-classical realists emphasize the importance of the choices taken by actual 
political leaders and elites as a unit level characteristic to shape state policies 
towards international regimes (Rose, 1998; Taliaferro, 2006). 
Different from realist school of thought, neoliberals believe more in the 
potential role of international regimes to shape states’ behavior. According to 
them, international regimes can constrain states’ behaviors and states comply with 
international regimes but only under restrictive conditions, namely as long as their 
 4 
interest are realized. (Hasenclever, 1996; Keohane, 1993) Constructivists argue 
that norms and interests shape states’ behaviors and they are subject to change, 
particularly by shared norms and values. Thus, international regimes can play an 
important role to change state norms and interests, when they are in conflict with 
the functions of their institutions. (Onuf, 1998; Hopf, 1998; Wendt, 1992 
There are also critiques towards the mainstream literature on international 
regimes. Strange (1982) criticizes the state-centredness of the literature, arguing 
the importance of transnational authorities such as industrial cartels and 
professional associations. Young (1999) criticizes the conservative bias that 
regimes do only operate in society of states. Instead, according to him, global civil 
society as a second social system, can affect the effectiveness of international 
regimes. Haggard and Simmons (1987) stress the importance of domestic 
structures and processes on state relations with international regimes, arguing that 
states are not unified actors. 
This study uses two theoretical arguments from the literature, summarized 
above, as its theoretical framework. First, the study derives from the argument of 
neoclassical realism that unit level characteristics are determinant in regime 
effectiveness. Being inspired from their focus on the choice of political leaders 
and elites, the study argues that unit level characteristics, defined as social 
consitions within state, nature of the relations between government and 
international community
3
 and perceptions of the local people in international 
                                                 
3
 While UNHCR conducts 4Rs activities in collaboration with various actors, the concept of 
international community is used in this study in a very broad sense. The definition of international 
community in the study includes the following actors: UN agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF 
and UNDP, internatonal NGOs such as Norwegian Refugee Council and IOM, donor states and 
international security missions such as UN and AU peace missions.  
 5 
community, play a role in shaping the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime.  
Second, the study takes a constructivist stance and assumes a possibility of 
change in norms, ideas and beliefs of the government officials and local people. 
Thus, this study argues that it is possible to increase regime effectiveness by 
changing the unit level characteristic, when they hinder the regime effectiveness, 
mostly through information campaigns, trust-building activities and awareness 
campaigns. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 
Regarding the theoretical contributions of the study to the literature on 
international regimes, three contributions are projected. First, this study adopts a 
neoclassical realist perspective on the importance of unit level characteristics on 
the states’ relations with international regimes. Neoclassical realists define unit 
level characteristics as the choices of political leaders and elites. This study 
extends the content of unit level characteristics to include social consitions within 
state, nature of the relations between government and international community and 
perceptions of the local people in international community. According to the 
study, when these unit level characteristics support and cooperate with the 
activities of regimes’ institutions, the effectiveness of international regimes is 
likely to increase. Thus, the study contributes to the neoclassical realist school of 
thought by extending its definition of unit level characteristics. 
 6 
Second, this study finds out that policy decisions of political leaders and 
elites can also be shaped by their ethnic and religious affiliations and by their 
individual interests. Haggard and Simmons (1987) argue that the choices of 
political leaders and elites can be shaped by domestic and political variables. 
Thus, the study contributes to the literature on neoclassical realism by including 
priority of ethnic and religious affiliations and individual interests in addition to 
domestic and political variables in shaping policy decisions of political leaders and 
elites. 
Third, having a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity, neorealists 
assume that states do not have security problems within their own borders. They 
rather focus on the feeling of insecurity among states at the system level, which 
can restrain states to cooperate with international regimes. The study finds out that 
the feeling of insecurity is one of the common characteristics of countries with low 
internal capacity. The study argues that the feeling of insecurity at the state level 
can also hinder the effectiveness of international reigmes, in addition the the 
feeling of insecurity among states. 
 
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
There are several limitations for the research strategy of this dissertation. 
First, there can be differences among policies, interests and mandates of the 
members of international community, namely the UN agencies, international 
NGOs and their national partners, donor states and international security missions. 
 7 
They can also be involved in different stages of the 4Rs activities. However, this 
study treats international community as a single body for the sake of analysis. 
Thus, the study does not single out among the members of international 
community in its analysis of the effectiveness of international regimes.  
The second limitation, related with the first one, is that the study assumes 
in theory the neutral character of international community, though it might not be 
so practice. The study defines neutrality as possessing good will of providing 
stability to restore order. In examining the implications of case studies to increase 
regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity, distrust among local 
people and government officials in international community is identified. To 
increase people’s support and government cooperation with the activities of 
international community, several suggestions are proposed in the tentative 
principles. Thus, the study does not question the impartial and neutral character of 
international community to increase regime effectiveness. Here, questioning its 
neutrality character is neither the aim of the study nor feasible given the 
differences between the members of international community, as pointed out in 
the first limitation. 
Third, there are also countries of asylum with low internal capacity, 
particularly in Africa there are several countries, which are both refugee producing 
and asylum countries at the same time. However the aim of this dissertation is to 
provide tentative principles to increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime in countries with low internal capacity through examining regimes 4Rs 
activities within. While, 4Rs activities of international refugee regime aim to 
prevent reoccurrence of new mass flows and provide voluntary repatriation as a 
 8 
durable solution in refugee producing countries, the study selects out its case 
studies among refugee producing countries. 
Fourth, making observations and conducting personal interviews in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan could improve the quality of the case studies. Thus, 
this study regards the absence of field research as a limitation, particularly in the 
qualitative analysis of the cases. The social conditions, relations with the 
government and perceptions of the local people could be examined in a broader 
sense when I could have the chance of doing field works. Fortunately, rich sources 
of field reports, surveys, articles, books, media sources and interview reports 
conducted mainly by UN agencies and various NGOs are available and this 
limitation does not create serious problems on the quality of research. 
Last, this dissertation examines international refugee regime as an 
international regime, dealing mostly with countries with low internal capacity 
since 1990s. Thus, it is an attempt to provide specific insights for this particular 
regime. It can have general implications for the effectiveness of international 
regimes in such countries and can contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on 
increasing regime effectiveness in general. However, the study does not have any 
claim that its findings can have validity for international regimes in general. 
Recalling a priori assumption of the literature on international regimes and 
the lack of effectiveness-centric focus in the literature on international refugee 
regime, this study still contributes to the literature despite its limitations. Because 
it seeks to analyze how the presence of states with low internal capacity creates 
implications for the effectiveness of international regimes and how regimes’ 
 9 
institutions can operate in states with low internal capacity to increase regime 
effectiveness. 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 2 conducts a literature review on international regimes in general 
and international refugee regime in particular. The chapter first examines the 
arguments of three schools of thought, namely realist, neoliberal and constructivist 
traditions, on states’ relations with international regimes and states’ compliance 
with the regimes’s basic norms and rules. The problematique identified in this part 
is that both the mainstream literature and its critiques have a priori assumption on 
states’ internal capacity to comply with international regimes. The chapter, 
second, examines the literature on international refugee regime and UNHCR 
activities in refugee producing countries. The problematique identified in this part 
is lack of an effectiveness-centris focus on discussing under what conditions 
international refugee regime can increase its effectiveness in such countries.  
Chapter 3 explores first, international refugee regime under temporary 
agencies and under UNHCR agency including the expansion of its mandate and 
people of concern. It then examines the environment, in which the regime 
operated in the beginning the 1990s. It concludes that during the time, states 
become more reluctant to offer asylum, particularly to the refugees from the Third 
World, and it resulted in major protracted refugee crises. As being unable to 
provide protection and solution to refugees in a sufficient manner, UNHCR 
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adopted voluntary repatriation as the most preferred durable solution and 
increased its activities in countries of origin. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
UNHCR introduced its proactive and homeland oriented understanding of 
prevention and solution to increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime. Complementary to this strategy, in 2002, UNHCR introduced the 4Rs 
approach. The last part evaluates this 4Rs approach in detail by examining the 
strategy of prevention and solution, the inter-linked relationship of protection, 
solution and prevention, conceptual framework and purpose of the 4Rs approach 
and the interagency collaboration within 4Rs activities.  
Chapter 4 questions the effectiveness of 4Rs activities and conditions to 
increase regime effectiveness in Afghanistan through quantitative and qualitative 
analyses. It first gives a brief introduction of the political and social structures in 
Afghanistan to provide the background information for the country’s political and 
social fabric. Second, it examines the history of Afghanistan from the beginning of 
20th century until present to understand the roots of Afghanistan’s low internal 
capacity and of the forced displacement in the country. Third, it examines the 4Rs 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners
4
 in Afghanistan. It then, 
questions the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan between 
2002-2011 through quantitative analysis. The last part conducts a qualitative 
analysis to identify the principles by which UNHCR and its implementing partners 
can operate to increase the regime effectiveness. 
                                                 
4
 While 4Rs activities are beyond the scope and capacity of one agency, it requires an interagency 
collaboration.  Accordingly, UNHCR has implementing partners to conduct 4Rs activities. These 
partners are mostly among the UN agencies and international and national NGOs. In this study, the 
concepts of “UNHCR and its impelementing partners” and “international community” are used 
interchangebly.   
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Chapter 5 questions the effectiveness of 4Rs activities and conditions to 
increase regime effectiveness in Iraq through quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
The chapter, first, gives a brief introduction of political and social structures in 
Iraq and then examine the history of Iraq to understand the roots of Iraq’s low 
internal capacity and of the forced displacement waves in the country. Third, it 
examines the 4Rs activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners in Iraq. 
Then it questions the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq between 
2003-2011 through quantitative analysis. The last part conducts a qualitative 
analysis to identify the principles by which UNHCR and its implementing partners 
can operate to increase the regime effectiveness. 
Chapter 5 questions the effectiveness of 4Rs activities and conditions to 
increase regime effectiveness in Sudan through quantitative and qualitative 
analyses. It, first, gives a brief introduction of political and social structures in 
Sudan and then examines the history of Sudan to understand both the roots of 
Sudan’s low internal capacity and reasons of the forced displacement in the 
country. Third, it examines the 4Rs activities of UNHCR and its implementing 
partners in Sudan. Then it questions the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime in Sudan between 2003-2011 through quantitative analysis. The last part 
conducts a qualitative analysis to identify the principles by which UNHCR and its 
implementing partners can operate to increase the regime effectiveness. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the findigs of the study and identifies tentative 
principles. It first illustrates the theoretical and empirical findings. Then, based on 
the findings in the case studies, it proposes six tentative principles for international 
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community to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. Last, some suggestions for future researches are made. 
Countries with low internal capacity do not have the capacity to ensure the 
security within its borders and can not provide essential basic services to its 
citizens. Their governments are mostly corrupted and lack the authority and 
governance capacity within their stae. Given these characteristics, the discussions 
of the literature on international regimes, mainly on the factors that can lead states 
to cooperate with international regimes, become invalid in such countries. Thus, 
countries with low internal capacity deserve a scholarly attention for the 
effectiveness of international regimes. Giving this scholarly attention, this study is 
an attempt to examine the implications of the presence of such countries for the 
effectiveness of international regimes and to generate findings for regimes’ 
institutions to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. Considering this aim, the next part of the chapter introduces the research 
design of the study.  
 
 
1.5 Research Design 
 
This part seeks to explain the research design of the study, first to question 
the effectiveness of international refugee regime in countries with low internal 
capacity, and second, to examine the conditions to increase regime effectiveness 
in such states. The study defines regime effectiveness as the ability of regimes’ 
institutions to fulfill their mandates. It defines internal capacity as the ability of 
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states to comply with international regimes through making decisions and 
implementing them within their own states. 
This study aims to generate findings of relevance beyond the individual 
cases. Therefore, the study will use case study method and conduct its analyses 
through three cases. The case study method will allow the study to shape the 
research design in a flexible sense, in terms of data gathering and anlysis of the 
subject matter (Fidel, 1984). This part, first, explain the criteria for the case 
selection. It, then explain how to measure the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime by its quantitative criteria. Last, it explain the qualitative analysis 
to examine the conditions to increase regime effectivenes in countries with low 
internal capacity. 
 
 
1.5.1 Criteria for Case Selection 
 
The study applies three criteria to select the cases. According to the first 
criterion, cases should be among top refugee producing countries by the end of 
2011. The reason for selecting the top refugee producing countries with 4Rs 
activities is to ensure that they have low internal capacity. Second, UNHCR and 
its implementing partners should conduct 4Rs activities in the cases. Last, cases 
are selected according to the data availability both for the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses.  
According to the UNHCR Global Trends 2011 report (2011a: 14), the first 
four top refugee countries by the end of 2011 are as following: Afghanistan with 
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2,664,400 refugees, Iraq with 1,428,300 refugees, Somalia with 1,077,000 and 
Sudan with 500,000. These countries are also aamong the top ten in the list of the 
Failed States Index 2012. Somalia is in the first, Sudan is in the third, Afghanistan 
is in the six and Iraq is in the ninth place of the Failed States Index 2012. Based on 
the data availability, Sudan is selected instead of Somalia. Accordingly, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan
5
 are identified as the cases of this study. 
 
 
1.5.2 Quantitative Analysis 
 
Effectiveness of the international refugee regime is measured by the ability 
of UNHCR’s fulfillment of its mandate. UNHCR, as being the agency of 
international refugee regime, has the goals of promoting durable solutions for 
refugees and providing protection to them. Within this framework, UNHCR 
developed its strategy of prevention and solution to fulfill its goals. Thus, UNHCR 
aims to provide repatriations as a durable solution and to prevent the reoccurrence 
of new mass flows through 4Rs activities in countries of origin to increase the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 South Sudan gained independence on June 9, 2011. In the study, South Sudan is considered as a 
part of Sudan until mid-2011.  
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1.5.2.1 Sustainability of Reintegration 
 
Voluntary repatriation, return of the refugees on their countries of origin on 
voluntary bases, is one of the three durable solutions. The ultimate aim of 
facilitating or promoting mass repatriations is to provide their sustainability of 
their reintegration. When reintegration is not sustainable, the phenomenon of 
back-flows can be witnessed in repatriation operations (UNHCR, 2003a: para.20). 
Thus, UNHCR considers 4Rs activities as a tool for returnee (UNHCR, 2004b: 
25). UNHCR argues that “voluntary repatriation is not a durable solution in the 
absence of the returnees' reintegration into the local community” (UNHCR, 
1996a: §6.1). Being equated with the achievement of sustainable return, 
reintegration is defined as “the ability of returning refugees to secure the political 
and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity” (Macrae, 
1999: 3).  
This study attempts to measure sustainability of reintegration by UNHCR’s 
own criteria. Indicators for the legal, political, economic and social reintegration 
are selected out from Practical Guide to the Systematic Use of Standards & 
Indicators in UNHCR Operations (2006), considering their role on capacity 
building. Indicators for measuring reintegration are as following: 
Legal integration: Do all returnees have access to individual identity 
documentation without discrimination? Are all returnees allowed to vote? Are 
there reports of security incidents towards returnees? 
Economic integration: Percentage of returnees (of working age) 
employed or engaged in income generating activities. 
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Social integration / health
6
: Do returnees have access to emergency and 
primary health care services without discrimination? 
Social integration / water: Percentage of families with improved water 
supply at an adequate level of service. 
Social integration / shelter: Percentage of returnees living in adequate 
dwellings. 
Social integration / education: Percentage of Returnee Area school aged 
population living within reasonable distance from primary school. 
To identify reintegration process as sustainable, UNHCR’s own standards 
will be used. According to UNHCR, standards for legal, economic and social 
reintegration should be 100%, covering the whole returnee population (UNHCR, 
2006). If reintegration process reaches to UNHCR standards, sustainability of 
reintegration will be identified as YES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 This indicator serves to identify if the legal gaps with regard to access to emergency and primary 
health care by returnees and it is answered by the Standard of YES/NO. This study, however, uses 
the standard of this indicator as 100%. 
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Table 1: Sample for the reintegration process of returnees 
 
  
 Indicator Standard 
Measurement 
in standard 
Value 
Measurement 
in value 
Access to 
rights  
Individual 
identity 
documentation 
YES 
 
1 
  
Allowed to vote YES 1   
Reports of 
security 
incidents 
NO 1   
Access to 
employment 
opportunities 
Returnees with 
regular 
employment 
100% 1   
Access to 
social 
services 
Shelter 100% 1   
Health 100% 1   
Education 100% 1   
Water supply 100% 1   
Total   8   
 
Reintegration 
process: 
 
Time frame for the analysis is determined by the beginning of 4Rs 
activities in each case and the latest available statistical data. Accordingly, the 
period that is covered for Afghanistan is identified as 2002-2011, for Iraq 2003-
2011 and for Sudan 2005-2011. 
Regarding the data evaluation, there are some points to be clarified. First, 
the standard values will be measured as 0 or 1 for their contribution to the total 
standard value for the reintegration process. Then, values will be calculated based 
on measurement in standard and each measurement in value will be summed up 
and calculated in percentage. While, based on available data, it is not feasible to 
distinguish partly or fully reintegration processes, this measurement will provide 
level of reintegration including both partly and fully reintegrated returnees. 
Second, if the datum has small uncertainties, it will be rounded off (e.g. 19.6% 
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will be accepted as 20%). In case of failing to find a certain answer to the 5
th
 
question, total number of shelters provided by UNHCR will be multiplied with 6 
as being the average number of households in a shelter, as will be the case in the 
analysis of Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2008b: 4). And then percentage of returnees 
living in adequate dwellings will be calculated based on the total number of 
returnees. The possibility of returnees having shelter on their own capacity or 
through other channels will be disregarded.  
Third, there can be some refugee groups among returnees, who return 
spontaneously (return by refugees’ own means) along with organized repatriation 
programs. However, all returnees regardless of the character of their movements 
will be included into the assessment of effectiveness because of the practical 
difficulty of separating groups affected by returnee assistance programs. In 
practice, spontaneous returnees can also return to the same areas of returnees 
assisted by UNHCR and benefit from the last 3Rs. Fourth, the concept of returnee 
can cover both refugee returnees and IDP returnees since UNHCR aims to prevent 
further displacements in both of the groups through the 4Rs activities. Thus, in 
case of unavailability of separate data on refugee returnees, mixed data on refugee 
and IDP returnees can be accepted. Fifth, when it is known that there is not a 
distinguishing difference between returnees and local population in terms of 
access to basic services, the general data can be accepted also valid for the 
returnee population, as will be the case in the analysis of Sudan. Last, since it is 
not the aim of this study is to find out the local differences in terms of the 
reintegration process, different reintegration processes at rural and urban areas will 
not be assessed. The study will measure the second goal of UNHCR within the 
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framework of strategy of prevention and solution by the numbers of asylum-
seekers and IDPs during the years examined. 
 
 
1.5.2.2 Prevention of New Flows 
 
As being the second goal of UNHCR’s strategy of prevention and solution, 
the study will question whether occurrence of new flows has been prevented or not 
will be examined in numbers. With this aim, the number of asylum-seekers and 
refugees originating from each case, in the time of 4Rs activities begin, will be 
compared to the number of asylum-seekers in 2011. Thus, the general pattern of 
asylum seekers and IDPs will be found to indicate whether the numbers of asylum 
seekers and IDPs in cases have declined or not. If there is a considerable decline in 
the numbers of asylum seekers and IDPs by the end of 2011 in comparison with 
the numbers at the first year of 4Rs activities in each case, prevention of new 
flows will be indicated as YES.  
 
Table 2: Sample for the effectivenes of international refugee regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cases 
Sustainability 
of repatriation 
 (Y/N) 
Prevention 
of new 
flows 
(Y/N) 
Effectiveness 
 
Afghanistan    
Iraq    
Sudan    
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Since effectiveness is a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing 
proposition (Young, 1992: 163), degree of regime effectiveness in the cases will 
be identified as ‘not effective’, ‘partly effective’ and ‘fully effective’. In the 
quantitative assessment of regime effectiveness, repatriation as a durable solution 
and prevention of new flows will be examined for each case study. If both of them 
are found as YES, then regime will be accepted as fully effective in each case 
study. If one of them is signed as NO, regime will be regarded as partly effective. 
If both of them are found as NO, regime will be regarded as not effective. 
 
 
1.5.3 Qualitative Analysis 
 
This study aims to propose tentative principles for international community 
to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. While 
this aim goes beyond the limits of qualitative analysis, the study conducts a 
qualitative analysis to identify conditions to increase regime effectiveness. 
Qualitative analysis can help to interpret and better understand the implications of 
qualitative analysis through identifying intangible factors. It is especially effective 
in obtaining specific information on the values, perceptions, behaviors and social 
contexts of particular populations. (Family Health International: 1).  
The study develops socio-political and socio-cultural catergorization for its 
qualitative analysis: 
- The relationship between social conditions within state and 4Rs 
activities 
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- The nature of the relationship between government and 
international community 
- Perceptions of the local people in international community  
The study defines these categorizations as unit level characteristics within 
states. It assumes that when these unit level characteristics support and cooperate 
with the activities of regimes’ institutions, the effectiveness of international 
regimes is likely to increase.  
The first categorization questions the main social conditions in cases that 
lead local people cooperate with or resist 4Rs activities. Identifying these 
conditions will enable the study to provide suggestions to shape them in 
accordance with the regime activities. The second categorization examines nature 
of the relations between governments and international community to identify 
factors that shape this bilateral relationship. The aim, here, is to provide incentives 
to international community to increase the cooperative nature of the relations with 
the government. The last categorization examines how 4Rs activities are perceived 
by local people and aims to identify the factors that shape their perceptions. This 
will enable the study to make suggestions to international community to increase 
people’s support for their activities. In sum, this qualitative analysis aims to 
provide incentives to UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase regime 
effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. 
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1.5.4 Collected Data  
 
Almost once per year, UNHCR conducts random surveys, gathers data 
from local authorities, government sources, makes observations and field 
monitoring to provide answers to the indicators above based on its Standards and 
Indicators Reports. However, UNHCR does not share the Individual Standards 
and Indicators Reports. Thus, quantiative and qualitative data collection requires 
an extraction from various sources. In terms of this sources, first, UNHCR reports, 
published on the UNHCR website, will be traced. The dissertation will also use 
end-year statistics of the latest available data. Second, the study will conduct 
online interviews, where possible. Last, it will use field reports, surveys, articles, 
news and interviews, conducted by various NGOs, such as Refugees International, 
IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council. The study will mainly use news from 
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), while it provides detailed 
insights both for quantitative and qualitative analyses in the case studies. As being 
the humanitarian news and analysis service from the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN news is regarded as a confidential 
field source. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
 
In the introduction chapter of the study, the main research question and the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Research design of the study was also 
identified in the previous chapter, explaining how to analyze the research question 
through quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
This chapter conducts a literature review on international regimes in 
general and international refugee regime in particular. It, hereby, aims to identify 
the contribution of the thesis for the literature on international regimes. The 
chapter first examines the arguments of three schools of thought, namely realist, 
neoliberal and constructivist traditions on states’ relations with international 
regimes and states’ compliance with the regimes’s basic norms and rules. The 
problematique identified in this part is that both the mainstream literature and its 
critiques have a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity to comply with 
international regimes. Since international refugee regime and UNHCR as its 
agency operate in countries with low internal capacity to increase regime 
effectiveness, the chapter will second examine the literature on international 
refugee regime and UNHCR activities in refugee producing countries. The 
literature on UNHCR activities in refugee producing countries is identified to have 
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a normative focus, discussing whether and to what extent UNHCR should involve 
in activities in countries of origin. However it lacks an effectiveness-centric focus 
on discussing under what conditions international refugee regime can increase its 
effectiveness in such countries.  
 
 
2.1 Literature Review on International Regimes 
 
The literature review on international regimes examines realist, neoliberal 
and constructivist schools of thought and criticisims to this mainstream literature. 
This review finds out that the literature focuses mainly on the reasons for regime 
formation and states’ compliance with regimes’ basic norms and principles. 
Positions within the literature differ only on the underlying factors that shape 
states’ relations with international regimes. On the one hand, realists address 
relative gain considerations and distribution of capabilities as the main reasons for 
states’ compliance and neoliberals address calculation of interests through an 
absolute gains perspective. On the other hand, constructivists argue shared ideas, 
beliefs and values as reasons for states’ compliance with international regimes. 
The problematique identified in the literature is a priori assumption on states’ 
internal capacity to comply with international regimes. There are also critiques 
towards this mainstream literature, which emphasize that states are not unitary 
actors but rather they are complex collective entities. According to the critics, at 
the system level, there are transnational authorities such as industrial cartels and 
professional associations and a growing global civil society of non-state actors 
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such as interests groups and corporations in addition to society of states. In 
addition to the systemic level, domestic structures and process can be equally 
important to shape state behavior towards international regimes at the state level.  
 
 
2.1.1 Realist School of Thought 
 
The literature on realist school of thought is examined to identify their 
arguments on states’ policy behaviors on international regimes and their related 
institutions. Realist theory defines state interests in terms of power. According to 
them, states are in a Hobbesian state of nature and they should protect themselves 
from external threats on their own. This logic of self-help leads states inevitably to 
focus on survival and to regard international politics from the lenses of power 
politics. Thus, according to realists, states consider their relative gains by 
calculating their own gains in comparison with the gains of other states. In return, 
such considerations prevent them to cooperate with each other given the ‘realities’ 
of the self-help system. In other words, realist school of thought assumes that 
states, as being primary actors of international politics, establish international 
regimes and comply with them according to their power consideration and 
distribution of capabilities. As Krasner (1983:5) points out, realists do not believe 
that international regimes can matter and shape states’ behaviors independent from 
states’ power considerations. 
 Morgenthau emphasizes priority of national interests over the functions of 
international organizations and its agencies. He argues that in case of conflict 
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between the national interests and the operation of such agencies, “national 
interest wins out over the international objective” (Morgenthau, 1948: 509). In the 
analysis of effectiveness of international refugee regime in refugee proıducing 
countries with low internal capacity, the study finds out that there can also be 
priority of individual interests or sectarian interests over national ones. 
Mearsheimer (1994-95:12) further argues that institutions are reflections of the 
distribution of power in the international system and they are mainly based on the 
interest calculations of great powers. As will be examined in Chapter 6, the 
Sudanese government’s perception in the international community reflects 
Mearsheimer’s point of view. The Sudanese government also regards the presence 
of international security missions and international NGOs as a threat to its 
sovereignty, arguing that great powers want to recolonize Sudan. Accordingly, the 
UN agencies and NGOs do not have a visible influence on the policies of the 
Sudanese government. Concentrating on the assessment of the major international 
relations theories that employ institutions as a core concept, namely liberal 
institutionalism, collective security and critical theory, Mearsheimer (1994-95: 7) 
examines the importance of institutions in international politics with a specific 
focus on their role of pushing states away from war and promote peace. He 
concludes that institutions have only a minimal influence on states’ behaviors.  
Realist school of thought includes several variations within itself, namely 
the hegemonic stability theory, neorealism and neoclassical realism. The 
hegemonic stability theory argues that a regime in a given issue area is created by 
a hegemon and will only maintain as long as the hegemon preserves its power. It 
is assumed that other states are persuaded or pressured by the hegemon to comply 
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with the regime. Thus, as Snidal (1985: 581-82) points out, the theory presents 
two conclusions. The first one is that the presence of a hegemon provides 
leadership for the emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas and 
smaller states gain even more without paying no costs but fully benefiting from 
the regimes. The second one is that a dominant state will enforce a stable global 
order for its own benefit and weaker members would be under a coercive 
leadership. According to the hegemonic stability theory, regimes decline when the 
power distribution shifts away from the predominant actors. The presence of a 
hegemon can stabilize the international system by sharing majority of costs of 
providing public goods and by permitting other states to free ride. Thus, support of 
a hegemon within a given issue area can avoid the decline of collective action and 
thereby create and maintain international regimes. (Hasenclever, et.al. 1997: 87-
90) Hegemonic stability theory is criticized, arguing that international regimes can 
not be public goods, providing benefits for all members. Second, it is argued that 
cooperation among a small number of great powers can theoretically substitute for 
a single hegemonic power in stimulating emergence of a regime (Hasenclever and 
et.al., 1997: 95-100). 
Hegemonic stability theory is applied to the international monetary system, 
arguing that international regimes operate sommothly and in stability only when 
dominated by a sigle and exceptionally powerful national economy. For example, 
instability of the interwar gold-exchange standard is ascribed to the absence of a 
hegemonic power. Likely, the maintenance of the Bretten Wood System until 
1971 is attributed to the singular power of the United States (U.S.) in the post-war 
world. (Eichengreen, 1989) Different from the hegemonic stability theory, 
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neorealists argue that anarchy determines inter-state behaviors and states’ relations 
with international regimes, rather than the presence or absence of a hegemon in a 
given issue area. Regarding the neorealist assumptions on distribution of 
capabilities, Waltz (1979:118) argues that states’ behaviors on regimes are based 
on their power capabilities within the anarchical system. Because political system 
is self-help and state behavior varies more with differences of power rather than 
unit level characteristics. Thus, state behaviors are influenced by systemic 
constraints rather than unit level characteristics such as political systems and 
cultural-historical backgrounds. He argues that ordering principles of the 
international system, which is anarchy, forces states to perform the same function 
regardless of their capacity. Hence, anarchy leads states to maintain a measure of 
independence and to compete with each other to survive. Cooperation takes 
seldom place because of the feeling of insecurity and relative gain concerns, 
created by the self-help system. Thus, neorealism seems to be optimistic neither 
for the formation of international regimes nor states’ compliance with them. As 
will be illustrated in the cases, the study finds out that in addition to the feeling of 
insecurity at the system level, insecurity among local people at the state level also 
affects the effectiveness of international regimes through diminishing people’s 
compliance with the regime activities. The feeling of insecurity among 
international community, operating within a state also hinders the effectiveness of 
their activities. 
As being a theory of international politics, neorealism does not examine 
states’ behavior in great detail, but instead includes some general assumptions 
about their motivations. That’s why Rose (1998: 146) terms the school of realism, 
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which gives also importance to the intervening variables at the unit level to shape 
states’ behaviors, as neoclassical realism. According to him, neoclassical realism 
still argues that states’ place in the international system and their relative power 
capabilities are the most important factors to shape states’ foreign policy 
behaviors. However, the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is 
indirect and complex, being translated through choices of actual political leaders 
and elites. So their perceptions in the relative power matter and those leaders and 
elites do not always have complete freedom in shaping their policies as they wish, 
being contrained both by the systemic forces and by the relations with their 
socities. (Rose, 1998: 147) In other words, neoclassical realism posits that relative 
distribution of material power shapes the parameters of states’ foreign policy 
behaviors. However these systemic forces can only influence states’ foreign 
policies through leaders’ perceptions and calculations of relative power and 
prestige (Taliaferro: 2006). Thus, Taliaferro argues that unit level characteristics 
are determinant for the effect of systemic forces on state behaviors. This 
dissertation also argues the importance of the unit level characteristics on the 
effectiveness of international regimes and defines them as the social conditions, 
nature of the relations between governments and international community and 
people’s perceptions.  
In sum, realist school of thought mainly focuses on factors that shape 
states’ behaviors towards international regimes. It defines interests in terms of 
power and argues that as being rational and unitary actors, states shape their 
foreign policy behaviors according to their relative gain concerns. Thus, realists 
ground their arguments on power considerations and distribution of capabilities. In 
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their arguments, they take states’ internal capacity as given, arguing that they 
have the capacity to comply with international regimes’ basic norms and 
principles, when they wish to do so. The next part will examine the neoliberal 
school of thought to question their arguments on international regimes. 
 
 
2.1.2 Neoliberal School of Thought 
 
Like realist, neoliberals also regard state as the main actors and the 
characteristic of the international system as anarchic (Keohane and Martin, 
1995:50). Contrary to neorealists, neoliberals define state interests in terms of 
absolute gains rather than relative gains. In other words, it is assumed that each 
state seeks to maximize its own gain, being less concerned with the gains of other 
states. Thus, it is argued that states are more prone to cooperative behaviors than it 
is assumed in realist explanation. That’s why they argue that international regimes 
and international institutions can mitigate anarchy and constrain state behavior and 
facilitate cooperation despite the absence of international political authority.  
Being optimistic, neoliberals argue that international regimes increase the 
possibility of inter-state cooperation through playing an essential role in 
overcoming the barriers of self-help system and collective action problems. They 
increase the possibility of issue-linkage, enhance transparency and diminish costs 
of international cooperation (Wallender, 2000; Sterling-Folker, 2006a; Martin, 
2007). Keohane (1984) introduces a functional theory of international regimes, 
questioning reasons of states’ comply with international regimes even after the 
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conditions that facilitated regime formation have disappeared. This functional 
theory is mainly a response to hegemonic stability theory, arguing that 
continuation of hegemony is not necessarily essential for regime maintenance 
(Keohane, 1984: 85). He offers two lines of argument to explain state compliance 
with regimes. The first one is the value given to regimes by states. States believe 
that regimes are difficult to construct and their rules should be obeyed to prevent 
their breakdown (Keohane, 1984: 88). The second line of argument is that regimes 
create incentives for compliance by linking issues to one another. Throughout 
issue-linkage, violation in one issue-area would affect other actions in other issue 
areas (Keohane, 1984: 103). 
Regimes facilitate international cooperation, through states’ calculations of 
gains (Keohane, 1984:26). As long as their interests are realized, states comply 
with regimes or engage in inter-state cooperation (Hasenclever, 1996:183; 
Keohane, 1993: 29-30). Because state interests constitute the main reasons for 
states’ cooperation with regimes. In other words, neoliberal regime theory argues 
that regimes can have an impact on related behavior and outcomes but only under 
restrictive conditions. When state policies are already consistent with regime rules 
or they are advantaged to states, international regimes can become an intervening 
variable and serve as a source of influence for states and increase their capabilities 
(Krasner, 1982: 5). As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, the neoliberal argument on 
states’ compliance with regimes as long as their interests are realized is proved to 
be right in the evolution of international refugee regime. 
In sum, neoliberal school of thought focuses mainly on regimes’ role in 
facilitating inter-state cooperation and questions under what conditions states 
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comply with international regimes. It defines calculation of state interests from an 
absolute gain perspective and thus, is more optimistic than realists regarding 
states’ compliance with regimes. Thus, it might be argued that neoliberals have 
also a priori assumption, such as realists do, on states’ internal capacities to 
comply with regimes basic norms and principles. In other words, the literature on 
neoliberal school of thought seems not to have an emphasis on the possibility of 
states’ low internal capacities to shape their policies according to their interests. 
The next part will examine the third school of thought on the study of international 
regimes, namely constructivism. 
 
 
2.1.3 Constructivist School of Thought  
 
Different from realist and neoliberal schools of thought, constructivists do 
not take state interests and unit level characteristics such as leaders’ perceptions as 
given. They mainly argue that state policies are shaped by shared norms and 
values and they are subject to change. These norms and values can lead states to 
comply with international regimes’ basic norms and principles. According to 
constructivists, social and political world is the product of people’s ideas. Thus, 
anarchical state system is not an objective reality outside and subject to change. 
Since anarchy is not inevitable, self-help and power politics considerations are 
also not constant. They argue that shared ideas, beliefs and values create a social 
structure and behaviors of agents are shaped by this social structure (Onuf, 1998; 
Hopf, 1998; Wendt, 1992; 1995; Mercer, 1995). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
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define norms as shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate behavior 
and regard them as the source of stability and order in the international system.  
They argue that states can adopt new norms for domestic political reasons, mainly 
as a response to international pressure, not to be shamed as non-conformist by the 
international community. Arguing that social conditions and people’s perceptions 
are also important for the effectiveness of international regimes, the study admits 
the constructivist point of view in shaping beliefs and ideas. 
Thus, constructivists scholars argue that being constrained by shared norms 
and values, states comply with international regimes can increase. Because shared 
norms and values have an effect of socialization by transforming state interests 
and identities and leading them to internalize new roles or community norms. 
Hence, as Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) argue, international institutions can 
change states’ norms and perceptions to increase their cooperation with 
international regimes. Examining international institutions in Europe, Checkel 
(2005) also concludes that they have an effect of socialization by transforming 
state interests and identities and by leading them to internalize new roles or 
community norms. 
In addition to norms, states’ interests that shape their foreign policy 
behaviors can change through complex interdependence and issue-linkage (Haas
7
, 
1980). Thus, it is possible to change state interests in the way that would lead 
states to comply with international regimes. Haas mainly criticizes hegemonic 
stability theory for its explanation on state behavior, namely role of the hegemonic 
states with their exceptional power in the formation and maintenance of 
                                                 
7
 Since Peter M. Haas does not take state interest as constant and argues the possibility of change 
based on perception and cognition, he is included into the constructivist school of though in this 
literature review. 
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international regimes. As Keohane, Haas (1980: 359) argues that a world with 
complex interdependence and issue-linkage leads variations in state interests 
through creating a possibility for states to adopt new goals. In other words, 
complex interdependence and issue-linkage create possibility for states to adopt 
new goals. Such a possibility with opportunity costs would change the definition 
of state interests, almost independently from the structure of international power. 
Thus, Haas (1980: 360) admits that state differentials and hierarchy among states 
are important but still argues that complex interdependence and issue-linkage can 
inspire alternative calculations for states. 
In sum, unlike realists and neoliberals, constructivist school of thought 
does not take state interest and leaders’ perceptions as given and believes in the 
power of international regimes to create a society of states or a social structure 
through shared ideas, beliefs and values. However, similar to realist and neoliberal 
schools of thought, constructivists focus on reasons for states’ compliance. They 
only differ from realists and neoliberals in terms of their explanations. Realists 
address relative gain considerations and distribution of capabilities as main 
reasons for states’ compliance while neoliberals address calculation of interests 
through an absolute gains perspective. Differently, constructivists argue shared 
ideas, beliefs and values as reasons for states’ compliance. However, similar to the 
literature on realist and neoliberal schools of thought, the literature on 
constructivist school of thought has also a priori assumption on states’ internal 
capacities to comply with international regimes without questioning their capacity 
to shape policies based on teir ideas, beliefs and norms. In the literature, there are 
also critiques towards the realist, neoliberal and constructivist schools of thought. 
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It is important to examine these critics to find out whether they criticize the 
mainstream literature above in terms of their a priori assumption on states’ 
internal capacity. Thus, the next part will examine the critiques in the literature on 
international regimes by mainly concentrating on their state-centric focus and 
treatment of states as unitary actors.  
 
 
2.1.4 Critiques towards the mainstream literature 
 
One of the first critiques towards international regime studies comes from 
Susan Strange in the beginning of the 1980s. She criticizes the study of regimes as 
being “narrow-minded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of 
wider reality” (Strange, 1982:479). In her critiques, she argues that “state-
centeredness” of the literature constrains the study of international political 
economy by the self-imposed limits of the state-centered paradigm (1982:491-93). 
Because she argues that regime studies neglect some types of transnational 
authorities such as industrial cartels and professional associations. According to 
her, these authorities can shape state behavior towards each other and international 
regimes by being determinant on their political trends within states. Young also 
supports Strange’s critique on the state-centric focus of the literature. He (1999:8-
9) defines this state-centris focus as a “conservative bias” for regime theory. 
According to him, regime theory fails to confront developments in international 
and transnational affairs. He argues that “international regimes do not operate in a 
social vacuum” and there is a growing global civil society including various non-
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state actors like interest groups, professional associations and corporations. Thus, 
a second social system is emerging, in which international regimes operate, in 
addition to society of states. As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, financial support 
of the Ford Foundation to UNHCR activities in the absence of the U.S. support in 
the first half of the 1950s is an example for Young’s global civil society argument.  
Haggard and Simmons (1987:492,499) criticize the mainstream literature 
on their treatment of states as unified actors but different from Strange and Young, 
they emphasize the importance of domestic structure and processes on the states’ 
foreign policy instead of factors at the system level. They criticize the decisive 
role, given to international structure, disregarding domestic political variables 
(1987:501). It might be argued that Haggard and Simmon gives importance to the 
unit level characteristics, similar to the neoclassical realists. While the latter 
focuses on the chocice of actual political leaders and elites, the former one 
emphasize the importance of domestic political variables. Another study that 
focuses on the importance of domestic politics argues that domestic constituencies 
can influence national compliance. Dai (2005) shows the influence of electoral 
leverage and informational status of domestic constituencies on the governments’ 
compliance decision. In her model, states comply with regimes due to the pressure 
of powerful domestic constituencies. Thus, government’s compliance policy is 
primarily based on competing domestic interests mainly as a result of the electoral 
accountability in the democratic governments. Thus she (p.388) argues that there 
are domestic sources of enforcement to make states comply with international 
agreements and international institutions can use these sources to influence states’ 
behavior. Puchala and Hopkins (1982: 247) also focus on the domestic politics, 
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namely the role of non-state actors such as elites. They argue that bureaucrats 
units or individuals can also create and maintain regimes. Though they still define 
main actors of regimes as states but emphasize the importance of set of elites to 
create and maintain regimes.  
Though, the above critiques are mainly towards the realist and neoliberal 
arguments, Legro criticizes constructivist emphasis on the role of norms in 
shaping state behavior. He (1997: 34) argues that norms do indeed matter but do 
not necessarily matter in the way it is argued. Thus, constructivist studies can 
sometimes become biased toward the norm that is studied. According to him, the 
norms studied are already effective norms that would have obvious positive 
consequences to shape state behaviors. However it is equally important to examine 
why some norms are not effective in shaping or enabling particular identities, 
interests, belief or actions. Similarly, Florini criticizes constructivist studied not to 
provide a theoretical understanding for why one norm rather than another becomes 
institutionalized. She (1996: 367) argues that norms govern much state behavior 
and questions why some norms are effective in shaping state behavior while others 
are not. She introduces an explanation of natural selection. Accordingly, norms are 
in competition with other norms for time and attention and are subjected to natural 
selection.  
In sum, critiques towards the realist and neoliberal literature argue that 
states are not unitary actors but rather they are complex collective entities, given 
the various international and domestic actors that can influence states’ policies. 
Critiques towards the constructivist school of thought mainly focus on studying 
and understanding of norm effectiveness. However it is found out that critiques 
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towards the mainstream literature do not question whether states have the capacity 
to shape their policies and comply with international regimes. Both the 
mainstream literature, namely realist, neoliberal and costructivist schools of 
thought and the critiques focus on the factors that shape states’ behaviors towards 
international regimes. They all seem to have a priori assumption on states’ 
capacity to comply with international regimes, once their behaviors are shaped 
either by power considerations, interest calculations, norm and values or the 
pressure from global or domestic actors.  This taken for grantedness prevents the 
studies of international regimes to question states’ internal capacity to comply 
with regimes. This gap results in neglecting to study how the presence of states 
with low internal capacity affect the effectiveness of international regimes and 
how regimes’ institutions operate in states with low internal capacity to increase 
regime effectiveness. The literature review on international regimes in general 
identified the problematique in the literature, namely the presence of a priori 
assumption on states’ internal capacity.  
 As being operated in countries with low internal capacity, the literature on 
international refugee regime needs also be reviewed to question whether it 
provides an answer to the research question of the study. Thus, the next part will 
examine the literature on international refugee regime and UNHCR activities, as 
its lead agency. Given the activities of international refugee regime in countries 
with low internal capacity, this part seeks to question how this literature deals 
with such states.  
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2.2 Literature Review on International Refugee Regime and UNHCR 
Activities 
 
The literature on UNHCR activities in countries of origin with low internal 
capacity mainly focus on a normative discussion, questioning whether and to what 
extent international refugee regime should be involved in such countries. One 
strand of the literature has a root causes approach, justifying the humanitarian 
intervention and discussing UNHCR’s increasing involvement in refugee 
producing countries to prevent the reoccurrence of new mass flows. Other strand 
of the literature has several critiques towards the literature on root causes 
approach. 
 
 
2.2.1  Root Causes Approach 
 
The literature on root causes approach discusses whether intervention, 
including humanitarian one, to states’ internal sovereigny can be justified in case 
of their low internal capacity to protect its own citizens. This root causes approach 
advocates the diminishing importance of internal sovereignty in case of 
governments’ inability or unwillingness to protect its own citizens (Loescher, 
1993; Abramowitz, 1994; Weiner, 1995). It is argued that since the root causes of 
refugee flows are not only humanitarian, but chronic insecurities, their political 
causes should be dealt militarily (Loescher, 1993; Schmeidl, Jenkins, 1998; Clark 
2004; Loescher, Milner, 2005). Therefore, if necessary, humanitarian intervention 
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can also be one of the assets for prevention of new refugee flows (Drüke 1990; 
Gilbert 1997; Davies, Gurr, 1998; Van Walvaren 1998). Dowty and Loescher 
(1996: 44-45) advocates the necessity of “hard forms of intervention” including 
military action when there are internal conflicts, accompanied with widespread 
violations of human rights. Their reasoning is based on spillover effects of 
refugees in destabilizing neighboring countries and thus in national security 
interests of states. Thus, they argue that intervention to prevent refugee flows may 
be justified on security grounds.  
The literature also questions to what extent and under what conditions 
UNHCR should involve in refugee producing countries. In the literature, UNHR’s 
involvement in activities in refugee producing countries is mainly discussed 
regarding its involvement with IDP protection. Lanz (2008) argues that as being a 
humanitarian organization, UNHCR should act based on the humanitarian 
necessity rather than rigid normative criteria and should extend its people of 
concern to include IDPs. In the literature, there are also pluralist views. Phuong 
(2004) admits Lanz’s position but with caution. According to her, UNHCR should 
still continue its activities relating to IDPs through focusing on protection 
activities in post-conflict situations, especially in clear linkages with refugee 
repatriation, for which it has experience and expertise. But she warns that UNHCR 
should not be given full responsibility for IDPs since it may lead UNHCR to 
become an agency for ‘populations in need’ and create serious operational 
problems. It is also argued that UNHCR’s direct engagement in activities in 
refugee producing countries during conflict and post-conflict situations would 
overstretch the regime to its limit and prevent it to concentrate on its original 
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humanitarian protection role (Loescher, 1994; 2000; 2001a; 2003; Zolberg and 
Benda, 2001). 
Such reservations are widely accepted in literature, arguing that UNHCR 
should not have the sole responsibility for the IDP protection and an inter-agency 
collaboration is needed for responsibility sharing (Bagshaw, 2005; Weiss and 
Korn, 2006). Betts (2009: 93) suggests that both the country of origin and the 
country of asylum need to promote initiatives, engaging the donor and 
resettlement countries. Because according to him, “UNHCR did not have to 
provide all of the political momentum for the initiative in isolation”. Loescher 
(1994:369) also argues that UNCHR needs an inter-agency cooperation “including 
development agencies, human rights networks, peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution mechanisms and traditional relief organizations”. Once the emergency 
relief phase is over, a more effective inter-agency planning is needed, through 
which UNDP would fill the gap between immediate assistance and long-term 
development. 
In sum, the literature on root causes approach mainly discuss whether and 
to what extent UNHCR should involve in solution, protection and prevention 
activities in refugee producing countries. The next part will examine the critiques 
towards this literature, questioning whether they deal with countries with low 
internal capacity from a perspective to discuss how to increase regime 
effectiveness in such countries. 
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2.2.2 Critiques towards the Mainstream Literature 
 
There are three main critiques towards this mainstream literature on 
international refugee regime and UNHCR activities. First, humanitarian 
interventions and diminishing importance of internal sovereignty are criticized in 
terms of their potential manipulative use. Second, UNHCR’s mandate of 
prevention and solution through its involvement in refugee producing countries is 
criticized because of the risk of UNHCR’ politicization as a non-politic 
humanitarian agency. Last, 4Rs activities are seen as an attempt to restore state-
citizen relations and thereby protect international state system instead of refugees. 
The first critique reminds that humanitarian intervention and 4Rs activities 
under the framework of strategy of prevention and solution have the risks of being 
manipulated by powerful states, mainly by countries of asylum. Criticizing the 
potential manipulative use of humanitarian intervention, Castles (2003: 17-18) 
considers global migration crisis as one facet of the crisis in North-South relations. 
He argues that humanitarian actions and military interventions into the country of 
origins should not be treated as neutral. Instead they have the aim of adopting 
northern economic structures, political institutions and value systems that fit the 
interests of the North. Duffield (2001) also disagrees with the benefits of the 
humanitarian and development assistance and argues that they serve the Northern 
hegemonic strategy to transform and subordinate the South and rather than 
resolving the underlying causes of the conflict. Betts (2009:134) also argues that 
humanitarianism and development assistance have been motivated by North’s self-
interests, but still accepts the humanitarian and development assistance “as the 
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best available means to prevent human sufferings in the short run”. Bellamy 
(2009: 118) warns that Responsibility to Protect (R2P) could not be used to 
legalize unilateral interventionist governments and ill-defined concepts of 
prevention and intervention can create the problem of abuse for armed 
intervention. So he argues that R2P “should be seen less as a normative 
vocabulary that can catalyze action, and more as a policy agenda in need of 
implementation” (2010: 144). 
Regarding 4Rs activities, it is widely believed in the literature that 
repatriation as the main choice of solution by UNHCR resulted in erosion of 
asylum as an institution of international protection and in erosion of the principle 
of non-refoulement causing returnees to become IDPs (Chimni, 1998; 2000; Tjore, 
1998; Loescher 2001a; Lui, 2002; Castles, 2003; Schmeidl, Maley, 2008). Stein 
and Cunly (1994:28) argue that UNHCR’s strategy on repatriation as the most 
preferred durable solution diminishes the consideration of other durable solutions. 
It leads to protracted refugee situations in closed camps and restricted settlements 
with the only option to return and involuntary repatriations to ongoing conflicts. 
Frelick (1992) criticizes the concept of preventive protection in the case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovinia and argues that this concept is prone to misinterpretation and 
manipulation by governments. Barutciski (1996) argues that in-country activities 
are unlikely to prevent root causes of refugee flows. Instead, these activities can be 
used by asylum states to contain potential refugee flows and to deny their right of 
asylum. According to him (2002: 367-70), UNHCR intervention in the conflict 
zones opens ways for other forms of intervention so that UNHCR needs to take a 
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less ambitious and more modest role that reduces the chance of external 
manipulation. 
The second critique is UNHCR’s lack of firm institutional and legal basis 
for in-country activities and IDP protection due to its non-political and 
humanitarian nature (Loescher, 1994). Goodwin-Gil (1999) also admits this 
position, arguing that UNHCR’s non-political and neutral nature do not allow the 
protection of persons within their own country and such politicized and conflict-
ridden situations have the risk of jeopardizing UNHCR’s independence, neutrality 
and impartiality. As will be shown in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4, 5, and 
6, case studies seem to prove his concern on the impairment of neutral and 
impartial character of international community due to the increasing increasing 
activities in country of origin.  
In terms of the last critique, it is argued that the 4Rs approach is an attempt 
to restore states with low internal capacities into the state system. Keely (1996: 
1057-58) argues that forced migration, caused by the lack of their state’s normal 
protection, means a serious failure of the state system. He regards repatriation as 
an attempt to regain state-citizen relationship. International refugee regime 
protects the international system of states, which is threatened when states fail to 
fulfill their proper roles. Gallagher (1994: 429) treats the concept of durable 
solutions “in the light of restoring or maintaining permanent relationships between 
individuals and states”. McDowell and Van Hear (2006: 154) criticize returns for 
legitimizing new democratic regimes which are of great strategic importance to 
the UN donors and many Western states. Thus, the 4Rs approach addresses the 
political and institutional challenges that refugees pose to the state system rather 
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than the problems of refugees to create a secure life. According to them (2006: 
176), 4Rs approach is shaped according to a neo-liberal reform agenda, especially 
through the involvement of powerful institution such as the World Bank. Similarly 
Haddad (2003: 9) argues that “if we assume that the international system asks that 
all individuals belong to a state, refugee regime can be seen as an attempt to make 
refugees into ‘quasi-citizens’ ”. In other words, according to her, any attempts at 
refugee protection serve to the interests of national and international security 
instead of refugees. 
Both the literature on root causes approach and its critique deal with 
countries with low internal capacity in terms of discussing whether and to what 
extent UNHCR should involve in activities in such countries.  The literature 
focuses mainly on UNHCR’s role in refugee producing countries and the content 
of its activities. It questions humanitarian intervention to refugee producing 
countries despite internal sovereignty and the extent of UNHCR’s mandate, 
especially towards IDPs. Critiques towards this mainstream literature question 
similarly whether UNHCR activities in refugee producing countries result in 
serving national interests of potential countries of asylum and in restoring state 
system. In other words, adopting a normative focus on whether and to what extent 
UNHCR should increase its activities in refugee producing countries, the literature 
on international refugee regime and UNHCR activities mainly lacks discussions 
how UNHCR can operate to increase regime effectiveness. Though UNHCR has 
already increased its involvement within refugee producing countries under the 
framework of the strategy of prevention and solution, the literature does not 
discuss how UNHCR can operate to increase the effectiveness of international 
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refugee regime in such countries. This dissertation aims to develop tentative 
principles to increase regime effectiveness in the presence of states with low 
internal capacities. To do this, it will question relations between historical 
conditions of the state and UNHCR activities, the structure of the relationship 
between government and local administrations and UNHCR and people’s 
understanding of UNHCR and 4Rs activities in three refugee producing countries, 
namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan.  
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The literature review on international regimes and UNHCR activities in 
refugee producing countries aimed to identify the problematique in the literature 
and to make clear in what way this dissertation would contribute to the literature 
on international regimes. The first part of the literature review examined the 
literature on international regimes, focusing mainly on states’ relations with 
international regimes and state compliance with the regimes’ basic norms and 
principles. This part included regime approaches of the realist, neoliberal and 
constructivist schools of thought and critiques towards this mainstream literature. 
Concentrating on the factors that shape states’ policies, the literature mainly 
discussed in what conditions, why and how states can establish international 
regimes and comply with them. However both mainstream literature and its 
critique seem to have a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity to comply 
with international regimes. This gap results in neglecting to study how the 
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presence of states with low internal capacity affect the effectiveness of 
international regimes and how regimes’ institutions operate in states with low 
internal capacity to increase regime effectiveness.  
Since international refugee regime and UNHCR as its agency operate in 
countries with low internal capacity to increase regime effectiveness, the chapter 
also reviews the literature on international refugee regime and UNHCR activities 
in such countries. This part includes the mainstream literature and critiques 
towards this literature. However, this literature also seems not to deal with such 
countries from an effectiveness-centric focus. It insread has a normative 
discussion on whether and to what extent UNHCR should involve in activities in 
refugee producing countries. It mainly focuses on UNHCR’s role in refugee 
producing countries and the content of its activities. Thus, this study aims to 
question, first, whether international refugee regime is effective in three case 
studies, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, and second, to examine the 
conditions to increase regime effectiveness in such states. In other words, this 
dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on international regimes through 
developing tentative principles on how to increase regime effectiveness in states 
with low internal capacity.  
The next chapter will analyze the evolution of international refugee regime 
and examine 4Rs activities within the framework of its strategy of prevention and 
solution. This chapter will first seek to examine how UNHCR’s mandate is 
extended to the countries with low internal capacity both in geographical terms 
and the scope of its activities. It will then analyze the underlying logic of the 
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UNHCR’s strategy and 4Rs activities in terms of their final aim of increasing the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME 
AND UNHCR’s 4Rs APPROACH 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, the literature on international regimes in general and on 
international refugee regime in particular was reviewed to identify the contribution 
of the study to this literature. It found out that the literature on international 
regimes, namely realist, neoliberal and constructivist schools of thought and their 
critiques mainly focuses on the factors that shape states’ policies towards 
international regimes. Thus, it has a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity 
to comply with the regimes, once they decided to do so. Being operated also in 
countries with low internal capacity, the literature on international refugee regime 
and UNHCR activities was also studied to question how it deals with such 
countries. This review also found out that it mainly has a normative focus on 
whether and mainly UNHCR should involve in activities in refugee producing 
countries. However, lacking an effectiveness-centric focus, it does not question 
how the effectiveness of international refugee regime can be increased in such 
countries. Thus, this dissertation aims to question the effectiveness of international 
regimes in countries with low internal capacity and the conditions to increase their 
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effectiveness with a specific reference to international refugee regime activities in 
three refugee producing countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. 
In order to understand the scope and underlying logic of UNHCR activities 
in refugee producing countries, the study examines the evolution of international 
refugee regime and its 4Rs activities, namely Repatriation, Reintegration, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, within the framework of its strategy of 
prevention and solution. 
The first part of the chapter will explore international refugee regime under 
temporary agencies and under UNHCR agency including the expansion of its 
mandate and people of concern. The second part will examine the environment, in 
which the regime operated in the beginning the 1990s. It concludes that states 
become more reluctant to offer asylum, particularly to the refugees from the Third 
World, and it resulted in major protracted refugee crises. As being unable to 
provide protection and solution to refugees in a sufficient manner, UNHCR 
adopted voluntary repatriation as the most preferred durable solution and 
increased its activities in countries of origin. In the beginning of 1990s, the 
UNHCR introduced its proactive and homeland oriented understanding of 
prevention and solution to deal with the global refugee problem in a more 
effective way. Complementary to this strategy, in 2002, UNHCR introduced the 
4Rs approach (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) as 
an attempt for capacity building through interagency collaboration. Thus, the last 
part will be dedicated to evaluate 4Rs approach in detail. It will first examine the 
strategy of prevention and solution as the foundation stone of the 4Rs approach 
with the aim of understanding its underlying logic. Once the strategy is examined, 
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including its dual purpose of prevention and solution and inter-linked relationship 
of protection, solution and prevention, conceptual framework and purpose of the 
4Rs approach will be explained. Last, interagency collaboration, which is regarded 
as necessary for the implementation of 4Rs approach, will be examined.  
 The chapter first argues that UNHCR strategy of prevention and solution 
and 4Rs approach in countries of origin own their roots in the evolution of 
international refugee regime and extension of UNHCR mandate. Second, the shift 
in the understanding of UNHCR’s preferred durable solution in the beginning of 
the 1990s led the development of strategy of prevention, together with the 
increasing activities in countries with low internal capacity. This shift resulted in a 
change within the understanding of the regime’s effectiveness, mainly from a 
reactive response in countries of asylum to proactive policies in countries of 
origin.  In sum, 4Rs activities, conducted mainly in countries with low internal 
capacity, are an attempt to increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime through providing sustainability of repatriations and preventing the 
reoccurrence of mass refugee flows.  
 
 
3.1 Evolution of International Refugee Regime 
 
International refugee regime has evolved from temporary agencies with 
limited mandates to a world-wide refugee organization with a competence of 
mandate for all actual or potential refugees without any geographical or time 
limitation. Thus, it might be argued that necessary conditions for UNHCR such as 
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the extension of its geographical scope and mandate, to be able to involve in 
refugee producing countries, were evolved together with the evolution of 
international refugee regime. This part seeks to examine the evolution process of 
international refugee regime from temporary agencies to UNHCR as its global 
agency. It also seeks to explore how international refugee regime comes to the 
point of operating in countries with low internal capacity despite its limited 
mandate and geographical scope at the beginning. 
 
 
3.1.1 The Regime under Temporary Agencies 
 
Refugee affairs began to be regulated internationally only in the aftermath 
of World War I, though mass refugee movements have occupied the agenda of 
international relations long before 1920s, In the period between 1918-22, nearly 
1,5 million Russian refugees fled from the Bolshevik revolution, the civil war and 
great famine in 1921. In 1923, nearly 320,000 Armenians sought asylum in the 
Middle East, Balkans and Europe. There was also a refugee group of 300,000 
people including Turks, Assyrians, and Christians (Holborn, 1975: 4). After the 
Greek and Turkish population exchange at the aftermath of the War of 
Independence, refugee flows continued with Jewish refugees from Germany and 
with the people displaced during World War II. In other words, refugees became 
heavy burdens for the post-war states and required to be dealt by international 
cooperation (Künçek, 1997: 16). Until UNHCR was established in 1951, there 
were organizations and agencies responsible for refugees with a limited mandate 
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and of short duration. These organizations and agencies were the High 
Commission for Refugees, the Nansen International Office for Refugees, the High 
Commission for Refugees from Germany, the High Commission for All Refugees, 
the Intergovernmental Commission for Refugees (IGCR), UN Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) and Preparatory Commission of International 
Refugee Organization (IRO). 
 In 1921, the High Commission for Refugees was established by the 
League of Nations (LofN) under the direction of Fridtjof Nansen (1921-1930) 
from Norway. The mandate of the first High Commissioner for Refugees first 
covered Russian refugees and then it was extended to include Armenian refugees 
and Greek and Turkish refugees. The High Commission provided material 
assistance and legal and political protection to refugees. In 1929, it was brought 
for one year under the direction of the Secretariat of the LofN. In 1930, with the 
death of Dr. Nansen, it was replaced by the Nansen International Office for 
Refugees under the LofN. Thus, in practice, the High Commission for Refugees 
was abandoned. The new Office was established for 10 years. According to 
Künçek (1997: 29), it was a sign of states’ concerns on the problem of refugees, 
believing that it would not last in the short-term.  
Since Germany did not permit the Nansen Office to assist refugees from 
Germany, in 1933, the LofN created the High Commissioner for Refugees from 
Germany with the mandate of negotiating with the host government for 
resettlements and emigration plans. Its mission was solely based on technical 
issues such as questions of work permits and travel documents rather than 
stressing the political dimension of the refugee problem (Loescher, 1993: 43). In 
 54 
1938, the Office’s mandate was expanded to assist also Austrian refugees fleeing 
from the Nazis. In 1938, both offices were dissolved and a new agency for 
refugees, the High Commissioner for All Refugees under the LofN was 
established and continued to provide both material and administrative assistance 
and legal and political protection to refugees until it was terminated in 1946.  
In 1938, the IGCR was created at the Evian Conference outside the LofN 
structure to negotiate with Germany on Jewish migration. The aim was the same 
as in 1938, namely assisting refugees originating from Germany and Austria. Its 
mandate was to assist them by integrating them locally or resettling them in a third 
country of asylum. In case of resettling, the IGCR was responsible for the 
resettlement process. (Salomon, 1990:160) There were three main reasons to 
answer the termination of the IGCR in 1947. First, the problem, with which IGCR 
dealt, namely Nazi pressure on Jews, was regarded as temporary. Second, since 
German government had not recognized the IGCR, it was, in practice, not possible 
for it to operate in an effective and coordinated manner. Last, primary concern of 
the IGCR and also of the LofN was the security threats posed by Germany, Italy 
and United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) rather than concerns on refugees. 
(Künçek, 1997: 39-40) 
In November 1943, the UNRRA was established to provide relief to the 
persons displaced during World War II. Since its main mission was to provide 
assistance for people in post-war countries, it focused on promoting and 
overseeing repatriation movements. Thus, the UNRRA was a temporary 
emergency assistance agency to assist displaced persons, not specifically to 
refugees. It was also not authorized to assist citizens of former enemy states. 
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(Carlin, 1989: 10) As a result of the U.S. initiatives, the UNRRA was financially 
blocked in 1947 and the same year the IRO was established.  It was established for 
3 years with broader authority. Its policy was based on three durable solutions 
with the aim of normalizing the lives of refugees: Providing voluntary repatriation 
of refugees, resettlement in a third country or local integration in the host 
community. The IRO treated repatriation as the most preferred durable solution. 
(Salomon, 1990: 162). 
The IRO was scheduled to be dissolved in 1951 and the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) decided to establish the UNHCR as of 1 January 1951 
with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland (UNGA, 1949: Sect. A, para.1, 12). The 
UNGA adopted its Statute on 14 December 1950. The Office
8
 was established as a 
temporary agency with 3 years mandate and the UNGA would review “whether 
the Office should be continued beyond 31 December 1953” (UNGA, 1950: 
para.5). Until 2003, the Office’s mandate was extended every five years. Finally in 
2003, UNGA removed the time limitation and decided to “continue the Office 
until the refugee problem is solved” (UNGA, 2004, para.9). 
 In sum, since the interwar period, international refugee regime had 
temporary agencies with specific mandates. The fulfillment of its mandate, namely 
its degree of effectiveness was accordingly limited with the geographical scope 
and activities of these temporary agencies. Until 2003, UNHCR was also a 
temporary agency, though its mandate was extended regularly. At the beginning, it 
was a global agency, by only being mandated for a particular group of refugees in 
a given geographical limitation. The next part will examine the evolving mandate 
and geographical scope of UNHCR activities. The extension of international 
                                                 
8
 In the study, ‘UNHCR’ and ‘the Office’ will be used interchangeably.  
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refugee regime under UNHCR agency also created the necessary ground for its 
increasing activities in refugee producing countries in the beginning of 1990s. 
 
 
3.1.2 The Regime under UNHCR 
 
During the Cold War, UNHCR’s people of concern extended from a very 
limited definition of refugees to non-conventional refugees and people in refugee-
like situations. And its scope of mandate also extended from Europe to the Third 
World through introducing and further stretching the good offices approach. Thus, 
throughout decades, UNHCR’s mandate evolved both in terms of its people of 
concern and its regional scope in line with the humanitarian and political 
considerations of the Cold War period and in a way prepared the agency for its 
strategy of prevention and solution in the 1990s. 
 
 
3.1.2.1 Extension of its people of concern  
 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the 1951 
Convention) defines refugees as any person, who  
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
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unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNGA, 
1951: Article I. A(2)).  
 
In 1967, the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the 1967 
Protocol) extended UNHCR’s people of concern9 by removing the time limitation 
(Article I.2)
10
. According to Loescher (2001b: 124), the most important effect of 
the 1967 Protocol was that it brought the 1951 Convention into line with the 
universal mandate of the UNHCR’s Statute. The refugee definition of the 1951 
Convention only covers the persons who escape from persecution and excludes the 
persons displaced by other reasons. As a result, regional institutions in Africa and 
Central America revised this refugee definition according to their regional needs. 
In the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa (hereafter the OAU Convention), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
accepted the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention but extended the reasons 
of flight to include “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order” (OAU, 1969: Article 1.2). The Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees in 1984 similarly enlarged the concept of a refugee, in 
addition to containing elements of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol and the 
OAU Convention, as to cover also generalized violence, internal conflicts and 
massive violations of human rights (Americas - Miscellaneous, 1984: para.3).  
Alongside the enlarged definition of a refugee, the people of concern to 
UNHCR were extended throughout its mandate to cover not only Convention 
                                                 
9
 The concept of ‘people of concern’ was gradually produced by the UNGA’s distinction in 1960. 
‘People of concern’ was referred to non-Convention refugees, who are assisted by the good offices 
of the High Commissioner. (Bilgiç, 2013: 9) 
10
 Article I.2: For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term “refugee” shall, except as regards 
the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article 1 of 
the Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and ...” “and 
the words”... “a result of such events”, in article 1 A (2) were omitted. 
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refugees but also non-Convention refugees and individuals in refugee-like 
situations. Inclusion of other displaced persons to the concern of UNHCR would 
mean an extension of its mandate to the refugee resettlement and rehabilitation 
and protection and assistance for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and stateless 
persons. In 1970s, the UNGA requested the High Commissioner to become 
involved with stateless persons. He was required  “provisionally to undertake the 
functions foreseen under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in 
accordance with its article 11
11” (UNGA, 1974: para.1) and the UNGA requested 
UNHCR “to continue to perform these functions” (Question of the establishment, 
1974). In addition to its extension of people of concern including IDPs and 
stateless persons, UNHCR mandate was also extended together with its 
geographical scope.  
 
 
3.1.2.2 Extension of its mandate and geographical scope 
 
As being the lead agency for refugees, UNHCR has two main functions 
derived from its Statute (Article 1): providing international protection under the 
auspices of the UN and seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. 
The permanent solutions are defined as facilitating voluntary repatriation or 
assimilation within new national communities through local integration in the 
country of first asylum or through resettlement in a third country. The Office was 
                                                 
11
 Article 11: The Contracting States shall promote the establishment within the framework of the 
United Nations, as soon as may be after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or 
accession, of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for the 
examination of his claim and for assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority. 
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designed for the European refugees created by the World War II and its original 
scope was limited to persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951. Hence, the first article of the Statute states that UNHCR 
should assume its functions “to refugees who fall within the scope of the present 
Statute” and repeats the time limitation of the 1951 Convention, “events occurring 
before 1 January 1951” for the person to whom High Commissioner’s competence 
shall extend (Article 6). Since the UNHCR shall not be borne on the budget of the 
United Nations (UN) excluding its administrative expenditures and its activities 
shall be financed by voluntary contributions (UNGA, 1950: Article 20), the 
implementation of its mandate has been based directly on the donor contributions. 
So, although the scope of its mandate was limited, UNHCR still needed funds 
from donor states to put its mandate into practice. In the first year, due to the U.S. 
opposition to UNHCR and lack of its governmental support, the Office was not in 
a position to realize its mandate. Therefore, UNHCR’s first High Commissioner 
Gerrit Jan Van Heuven Goedhart (1951-1956) from Netherlands turned to the 
private sector to find the required financial assistance for its mandate. In July 
1952, the Ford Foundation granted $2.9 million for local integration programs and 
this grant enabled the Office for the first time to administer assistance for refugees 
in West European states (Loescher, 2001b: 67). As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
determining role of the Ford Foundation in regime activities presents an example 
for Young’s argument of a growing global civil society of non-state actors, in 
which regimes can operate,. In 1955, the US Congress finally approved its first 
financial contribution to the UN Refugee Fund when it was convinced that 
UNHCR’s activities would support the American struggle against communism in 
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strategic countries to US such as Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece (Loescher, 
2001b:74). Such a U.S. policy change supports the neoliberal argument that states 
can cooperate with international regimes only when regime authorities serve to 
their interests. 
The Hungarian Revolution transformed UNHCR as the lead agency for 
large scale emergency operations. UNHCR under Auguste R. Lindt (1956-1960) 
from Switzerland had to cope with the mass exodus of refugees resulting from the 
invasion of Hungary by the Soviet army on 4 November 1956. Major 
resettlements of the Hungarians in the host countries of Austria and Yugoslavia 
showed how the Office successfully handled its first mass asylum crisis (Loescher, 
2001b: 81-82). Since resettlement discredited the communist regimes, the 
Hungarian revolution also resulted in American solid acceptance of UNHCR 
activities. This event also supports the neoliberal argument on state cooperation 
under restrictive conditions, as examined in Chapter 2. 
Due to the limitation by its Statute and the 1951 Convention, Africa and 
Asia were “uncharted territories” for UNHCR’s mandate (Loescher, 2001b: 91). 
However, beginning in the late 1950s, mass refugee crises resulted from violent 
decolonization and post-independence strife in Asia and Africa dominated the 
agenda of UNHCR and extended the scope of the Office’s mandate to the Third 
World through Western support and encouragement to reorient its program from 
Europe to the Third World. Involvement with activities in the Third World would 
have caused a broadening of UNHCR’s people of concern through including also 
non-Convention refugees as category of displaced persons, who fall within 
UNHCR’s de facto competence. According to Loescher (1994: 360-362; 2001b: 
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105), Western states supported such an extension as long as majority of refugees 
stayed in their regions of origin. Because as the Cold War moved from Europe to 
Africa and Asia and refugees were viewed as part of the East-West struggle, 
unresolved refugee problems causing instability would be exploited by the Soviet 
Union to extend communism in the Third World and it would be to the interest of 
the Western states to deal with such problems through UNHCR. Thus, with the 
backing of the Western powers, legal limitations were solved by the good offices 
formula to make UNHCR’s involvement possible in the Third World and 
implemented for the first time to the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. In 1957, the 
UNGA adopted its first good offices resolution specifically for the Chinese 
refugees in Hong Kong and authorized UNHCR to “use his good offices to 
encourage arrangements for contributions” (UNGA, 1957: para.2). Two years 
later, UNHCR would not even need to seek authorizations for each new refugee 
group since the UNGA authorized the High Commissioner “to use his good 
offices in the transmission of contributions designed to provide assistance” for the 
refugees who do not come within the competence of the UN (UNGA, 1959, 
para.2). The distinction between ‘mandate refugees’ and ‘good offices refugees’ 
was abandoned with the removal of geographical limitation in 1967 Amendment. 
Thus, as Bilgiç (2013: 10) points out, “UNHCR was officially accepted as the 
organization globally responsible for the protection of all refugees”. 
The Algerian refugee crisis fleeing to Morocco and Tunisia (1957-1962) 
signalized UNHCR’s extension both into the Third World and to the mandate of 
returnee resettlement and rehabilitation. The Office under Felix Schnyder (1960-
1965) from Switzerland oversaw the large repatriation operations for the Algerian 
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refugees from Tunisia and Morocco. In 1961, the UNGA requested the High 
Commissioner (UNGA, 1961: para.a, b) to continue his present action by 
organizing repatriations of Algerian refugees and to facilitate their resettlements in 
their homeland when necessary and as soon as circumstances permit. This 
resolution extended UNHCR’s mandate of voluntary repatriation as to facilitate 
returnee resettlement. In 1965, UNGA requested “UNHCR to pursue his efforts 
with a view to ensuring an adequate international protection of refugees and to 
providing satisfactory permanent solutions to the problems affecting the various 
groups of refugees within his competence” (UNGA, 1965: para.1). In 1976, the 
UNGA authorized the High Commissioner to promote assistance for the 
rehabilitation of returnees and requested the Office to promote permanent and 
speedy solutions to the problems faced through assistance for the rehabilitation of 
returnees alongside the problems faced through voluntary repatriation, 
resettlement and local integration (UNGA, 1976: para.3).  
When Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (1965-1977) from Iran became the 
fourth UN High Commissioner for Refugees in December 1965, UNHCR was 
already extended to Asia, Latin America and Africa. Giving priority to the 
UNHCR relations with the Third World, he strengthened the relations with 
African governments and increased inter-agency cooperation within the UN 
agencies to address problems of mass displacement in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia. (UNHCR, Previous High Commissioners) 
In his first years, Prince Sadruddin opposed to assist IDPs arguing that 
these groups of displaced persons were beyond the mandate of his Office and such 
an involvement would make the Office vulnerable to such other requests. Thus, 
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UNHCR was not involved in the massive human suffering in the Indonesian coup 
(1965), South Vietnam (1966) and Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). However, in 
early 1970s, the UNGA requested the High Commissioner to coordinate UN 
humanitarian assistance on behalf of the entire UN system. Thus, the Office 
became involved in assistance for returnees and IDPs in South Sudan (1972), 
Cyprus (1974), Guinea-Bisseau (1974), Angola (1974), Mozambique (1974) and 
Vietnam and Laos (1974) ((Loescher, 2001b: 144-150).  
The South Sudan Operation laid the groundwork for UNHCR’s further 
involvement with other refugee mass repatriation movements and humanitarian 
emergencies in Asia, Latin America and Africa through stretching good offices 
approaches towards returnees, IDPs and stateless persons. The UNGA used “other 
displaced persons” in relation with UNHCR for the first time in its resolution 
concerning the Sudanese refugees and recommended the Office to coordinate 
relief and resettlement operations of both refugees and other displaced persons 
(ECOSOC, 1972: para.2). Since at least 1972, UNHCR’s relief and rehabilitation 
programs for refugees and returnees have also included IDPs. In 1972, Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC, 1972: para.1) urged “governments, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, specialized agencies and other 
international organizations associated with the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations concerned, to provide the assistance required for the 
voluntary repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees returning 
from abroad, as well as of persons displaced within the country”. 
The evolution of international refugee regime together with the extension 
of UNHCR’s scope of activities during sixty years can also be observed in figures. 
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In 1951, UNHCR had a budget of $300,000 and a staff of 33 officers (Loescher, 
2001b: 50-51). In 2012, its budget reached more than $3.59 billion and it has a 
staff of more than 7735 officers working in 123 countries. The Office provides 
protection and assistance for 10.5 million refugees, 14.7 million IDPs, and 2.2 
million returned IDPs (UNHCR, Figures at a Glance). 
In sum, the extension of UNHCR’s people of concern including IDPs and 
stateless persons and the scope of its mandate both in terms of its activities and 
geographical limitation paved the way for the Office’s increasing activities in 
refugee producing countries to increase regime effectiveness. Particularly the 
conditions in the beginning of 1990s, namely increasing reluctant of states to 
provide asylum and emergence of the Protracted Refugee Situations (PRSs) led 
UNHCR to pursue voluntary repatriation as the most preferred durable solution.  
This shift among the preferred durable solution from resettlement and local 
integration to voluntary repatriation has also resulted in a shift in the 
understanding of effectiveness. Since regime mandate was rather limited with the 
activities in countries of asylum through focusing more on the resettlement and 
local integration, its understanding of effectiveness was reactive limited to the 
refugees in countries of asylum. However, the shift in the understanding of the 
regime mandate to sustain the repatriation process and prevent the reoccurrence of 
new mass flows resulted in a proactive understanding of effectiveness, operating 
in countries of origin and covering not only refugees and returnees but also IDPs 
and local people in need. This shift also led the Office to develop its strategy of 
prevention and solution to increase regime effectiveness refugee producing 
countries, mainly with low internal capacity. The next part will examine the 
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reasons for UNHCR’s shift in the preference of durable solutions in the beginning 
of 1990s and the underlying logic of its strategy of prevention and solution to 
increase regime effectiveness in refugee producing countries. 
 
 
3.2 The Regime in the beginning of the 1990s 
 
When UNHCR was established in 1951, voluntary repatriation was not 
regarded as a viable option. France and the U.S. objected its inclusion to the 
durable solutions as a part of UNHCR’s functions. The reason was mainly the 
Cold War considerations, because repatriation would mean sending refugees back 
to their communist states (Holborn, 1975: 325-27). The High Commissioners also 
shared the concerns on the voluntary repatriation. The High Commissioner 
Goedhart in 1955 and High Commissioner Lindt in 1957 made clear that they did 
not consider voluntary repatriation as a real solution and that UNHCR did not 
have a real mandate of pursuing repatriation. (Coles, 1989: 105, 109-110) The 
statistics on UNHCR’s assistance for durable solutions also shows the priority 
given to local integration and resettlement. Over the period 1955-62, UNHCR 
directly assisted 53,681 refugees to locally integrate, 16,613 refugees to resettle 
and only 251 refugees to repatriate (UNHCR, 1963: 4).  
In the early 1990s, the situation has changed dramatically and UNHCR 
began to focus on voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution. The Office 
stated that its actions for durable solutions to refugee problems have been oriented 
in a manner to enable refugee to return home in safety and dignity (UNHCR, 
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1996a, preface). The High Commissioner Sadako Ogata (1990-2000) from Japan 
has also considered repatriation as the primary objective of UNHCR and in 1991, 
she declared the 1990s as the decade of voluntary repatriation.  
Though UNHCR stated that local integration and resettlement should also 
continue to be among the durable solutions pursued for refugees (UNHCR, 1996d: 
para.11), the Office considered resettlement as a last resort “when neither 
voluntary repatriation nor local integration is possible and resettlement remains 
the only available measure to guarantee protection and/or offer a refugee a future 
commensurate with fundamental human rights” (UNHCR, 1991a: para.2). Hence, 
the Office would request resettlement only for small numbers and the aim would 
be protection rather than seeking durable solutions: “UNHCR may continue to call 
for less resettlement assistance annually. Such assistance, however, will be 
inextricably linked to protection cases” (UNHCR, 1991a: para.15). In other words, 
voluntary repatriation became the preferred durable solution for UNHCR and it 
began to assume a more active role in voluntary repatriation “from facilitating to 
actively creating” (Zieck, 1997: 83). The study identified the main reasons for this 
turn as the reluctance of potential countries of asylum to support resettlement and 
local integration as durable solutions, emergence of the major PRSs and 
UNHCR’s perception, mainly shaped by these reasons. This change in the 
preferences of durable solutions also shifted the understanding of regime 
effectiveness. Accordingly, UNHCR thought that international refugee regime can 
increase its effectiveness mostly when it operates proactively and in a prevention 
and solution-oriented manner in refugee producing countries. Loescher, et.al. 
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(2008: 100) describe this situation, in which international refugee regime operated 
in the beginning of 1990s as a “global crisis of asylum”.  
 
 
3.2.1. Reluctance of the Countries of Asylum 
 
Normally, there is no priority among durable solutions and it depends on 
the sources available to UNHCR in terms of the conditions in the countries of 
asylum and countries of origin. The individual decision of the refugee itself is 
determinant particularly in voluntary repatriation as a durable solution.  However, 
in practice, hierarchy among durable solutions is determined more often according 
to governments’ expectations and preferences rather than refugee preferences 
(Gallagher, 1994: 430). Similarly, during the Cold War, priority among durable 
solutions to massive refugee outflows was mainly determined by the ideological 
confrontation between the Communist and Capitalist blocs. This situation supports 
the neoliberal argument that states’ interests shape their behaviors towards 
international regimes, as examined in the literature review chapter. 
The ideological confrontation during the Cold War gave UNHCR the 
opportunity to resettle a considerable number of refugees from the Eastern 
European communist states since the escapees were seen as warriors against 
communism and as a strategic and political tool to discredit the communist 
regime. For the Western governments, refugee plights were something to prove 
the inadequacies of the communist system. So they encouraged the flow from East 
to West and opened their borders to resettle refugees fleeing from persecution in 
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their communist regimes (Loescher, 2001b: 54). For example the Hungarians in 
1956 could be resettled easily due to the acceptance from West European 
countries and overseas countries like Canada, USA and Australia. Thus, during the 
Cold War, the priority among durable solutions was given to resettlement since 
repatriation would denote the desirability of the conditions in the communist 
states. Local integration in the country of first asylum in Europe was also 
concentrated as a durable solution among Western powers. Under the High 
Commissioner Goedhart, the Office supported local integration instead of overseas 
resettlement or emergency reliefs in camps and the Ford Foundation program 
intended to concentrate on local integration through self-help projects in areas of 
housing, agriculture, youth projects or vocational training (Loescher, 2001b:66-
69). Contrarily, the Soviet Union opposed both repatriation and local integration 
as the primary goal since plights from communist regimes would discredit these 
regimes and weaken their ideological power (Loescher, 2001b: 51). 
Interestingly, the Soviet and Western positions for resettlement were valid 
only for the refugees fleeing from communist regimes since the political and 
strategic dimensions led different considerations in the Third World, namely 
composed of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The refugee crises in 
the Third World were not desirable by the West since they could be exploited by 
the Soviet Union as a source of instability (Loescher, 2001b: 123). Thus, Western 
powers supported repatriation as a durable solution for the refugee crises in the 
Third World and became reluctant to receive refugees from Africa unless there 
was a strategic or political importance such as Vietnamese escaping from 
communist Vietnam. In sum, as realists and liberals argue, Western states shaped 
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their policies towards international refugee regime based on their political and 
strategic calculations. 
The Western states have gradually shifted their policy of asylum to the 
policy of containment to limit the asylum and contain refugees in their region of 
origin, which is mainly the Third World. Thus, refugees began to constitute a 
problem for the countries in the Third World, mainly after the reluctance of 
Western states. When most of refugees began to remain in their regions of origin, 
countries in the Third World have responded to mass arrivals of refugees and their 
protracted presence by limiting both the quantity and quality of asylum. They 
became reluctant to provide local integration for significant numbers of refugees 
within their borders. For their declining commitments to refugee protection, they 
have cited security concerns and economic and social costs in the absence of 
support in sharing the burdens of refugees. Thus, Third World countries did not 
comply with international refugee regime mainly because of their low internal 
capacity to offer local integration for mass refugee flows. They have in return 
imposed tighter border controls, forced refugees to repatriate, confined them in 
closed camps and rejected to integrate them in local communities (Kelley and 
Durieux, 2004: 11).  
In sum, both the Western states and potential host countries of asylum in 
the Third World have been reluctant to offer durable solutions to refugees unless 
there were strategic or political interests. Three main reasons were identified for 
this “global crisis of asylum”, namely security concerns, social reactions such as 
racist attitudes towards refugees and economic reasons. 
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Security concerns have caused new restrictions on asylum in both Western 
and Third World states. The High Commissioner Thorvald Stoltenberg (January 
1990-November 1990) from Norway recognized in 1990 the difficulties faced by 
governments and the insecurity felt by the general public because of the increasing 
pressure of refugee flows. Given the increasing numbers of asylum-seekers, 
governments of developing countries could build barriers against asylum 
applications. That’s why he defined voluntary repatriation as “the best solution for 
refugees, the most productive use of resources and a concrete contribution to 
peace and security”. (UNHCR, 1990) Supporting Stoltenberg’s recognition, 
UNHCR observed “a growing awareness that refugee movements can constitute a 
serious threat to national, regional and even international security, particularly 
when they involve countries of asylum which have weak economies, fragile 
ecologies and a delicate balance of ethnic groups” (UNHCR, 1996c: para.2). 
Security concerns have led the Western states to support the protection in the 
region of origin, which would include both local integration and IDP protection. 
Thus, it might be argued that IDP protection has been intended to be used as a 
substitute for asylum in the West together with local integration in the Third 
World (Loescher, et.al., 2008: 124). As discussed in the first critique of the root 
causes approach in the literature review, there has been a risk that UNHCR 
activities in the countries of origin can have been used manipulatively by the 
Western states to support their own interests. It is further argued that security 
concerns legitimizes derogations of human rights, suspension of civil liberties, 
reinforced border control and forcible deportation and refoulement (Betts, 2009b: 
72). In other words, it is likely that states’ interests are prioritized over refugee 
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interests, as Morgenthau argues and the Western states preferred to contain 
refugees in their regions of origin. In 2005, UNHCR counted the fear of some 
states that ‘international protection may provide a cover for those involved in 
terrorist activities’ as one of the factors that prevent effective international 
protection (UNHCR, 2005b: 12).  Especially in the post 9/11 period, states are 
more concerned on asylum and refugee issues through security lenses. With the 
threat of transnational terrorism, they have developed tighter border control 
regimes and identified refugee camps with terrorist camps (Betts and Loescher, 
2011: 10). 
As Haggard and Simmons (1987) stress in arguing that states are not 
unitary actors, behaviors of the Western democracies are also shaped by the 
domestic political variables, in addition to interests and power considerations. 
Related with the issue of security, asylum-seekers and refugees have become more 
vulnerable to political manipulation and this has led to increasing xenophobic and 
racist attitudes and even violence against refugee populations (UNHCR, 2005b: 
12). In return, reluctance of the society has forced democratic governments to 
limit their support for resettlement and local integration as durable solutions.  
The economic costs of hosting refugees have also limited the availability of 
resettlement and local integration as durable solutions. Increasing states’ 
reluctance to host refugees (UNHCR, 2005b: 12) and reluctance of donor 
countries to provide refugees indefinite protection and assistance at the absence of 
a durable solution prospect (UNHCR, 1996c: para.2), have blocked ways for an 
effective refugee protection. As a result, refugees have stayed in camps without 
any prospect of durable solutions in a definite future. 
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It was not always possible to promote voluntary repatriation without the 
denial of non-refoulement. Accordingly, relentless violent situations in the 
countries of origin in Africa prevented the Office to promote voluntary 
repatriation and instead led it focus on resettlement in neighbor states. However, 
whereas UNHCR tried to protect the legal rights of refugees in Africa and sought 
durable solutions like local settlement, the reluctant governments in Africa forced 
for repatriation because the burden of refugees stretched the African governments’ 
sources to the limit considering their fragile economy, ethnic composition or 
scarce environmental resources. 
In sum, none of the three solutions could be sufficiently provided by 
UNHCR in the beginning of 1990s. First, there remained no political or 
ideological reasons for the Western states to resettle large numbers of Third World 
refugees. Second, local integration was mostly perceived as politically and 
economically infeasible, since most of the host countries were coping with volatile 
security situations and social instability. Last, most countries of origin were 
neither in a situation nor had an interest to promote repatriation due to the 
engagement of refugees in guerilla resistance movements and due to the reluctance 
of donor governments to support expensive repatriation operations (Loescher, 
2001b: 225). Thus the Cold War has both positive and negative effects on 
UNHCR mandates of refugee protection and solution. On the one hand, 
ideological motives and political interests of the West increased the resettlement 
opportunities for refugees from the Communist bloc. On the other hand, protracted 
conflicts during the Cold War decreased the mass repatriation opportunities 
indefinitely and refugees found themselves in camps without any durable solution 
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prospect in the near future. Some countries had also an interest in keeping 
refugees in camps close to their countries of asylum as they were linked to the 
political struggles in their country against communism (Gallagher, 1994: 432-
434). As a result, lack of states’ support for durable solutions, together with 
increasing number of refugees resulted in PRSs in camps. 
 
 
3.2.1 Protracted Refugee Situations 
 
During the 1980s, UNHCR still sought resettlement as the prior durable 
solutions among other alternatives. However, the dramatic rise in internal-regional 
conflicts involving external powers and decreasing opportunities for resettlement 
and local integration caused PRSs in camps. UNHCR defines PRSs as one ‘‘in 
which refugees find themselves in a long-standing and intractable state of limbo’’ 
and ‘‘their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs 
remain unfulfilled after years in exile” (UNHCR, 2004c). It identifies a major 
protracted refugee situation as one “where more than 25,000 refugees have been in 
exile for more than five years” (UNHCR, 2004c: para.5).  
PRSs have been caused by the failure of states to provide any kind of 
durable solutions but rather to provide refugees only temporary asylum in camps. 
In addition to the political unwillingness of states to seek political solutions to the 
long-standing regional conflicts, UNHCR and NGO officials also believed in the 
1980s that they could better supply food, shelter, clean water and health care when 
refugees would assemble in one place (Loescher, 2001b: 226). However though 
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UNHCR’s care and maintenance operations towards PRSs required a significant 
funding in the absence of any durable long term solutions, donor states sought 
ways to limit their overseas aid expenditures (Loescher, 2001b: 227). In addition, 
although camps save lives in the emergency phase, when the stay becomes 
protracted, camps waste the lives they saved. Because in a PRS, a refugee “is 
prevented from enjoying those rights – for example, to freedom of movement, 
employment, and in some cases, education – that would enable him or her to 
become a productive member of a society” (UNHCR, 2004c: para.10). Thus, the 
“global crisis of asylum” together with PRSs put pressure on UNHCR and in 
1990s, the Office focused on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution to find solutions to the global refugee problem. 
 
 
3.2.2 Voluntary Repatriation as the Most Preferred Durable Solution 
 
Based on its reason of existence, UNHCR needs to realize its mandate of 
protecting refugees and seeking durable solutions to the refugee problem. 
Accordingly, the reasoning of UNHCR to promote voluntary repatriation as the 
preferred durable solution is twofold. First, UNHCR considers voluntary 
repatriation as the only practical solution in a political environment where host 
states are reluctant to give more permanent commitments for local integration and 
there are limited opportunities for resettlement in third countries (Gallagher, 1994: 
430). As Loscher (2003: 4) rightly states that “UNHCR often walks a tightrope, 
maintaining a perilous balance between the protection of refugees and the 
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sovereign prerogatives and interests of states”. Thus, in addition to discussions in 
the literature on international regimes’ effectiveness on state behavior, it might be 
argued that international refugee regime has shaped its own policies according to 
states’ policies to increase state cooperation with the regime. Second, UNHCR has 
considered voluntary repatriation as the only feasible alternative to the problem of 
PRSs, created again by state policies, and protracted care and maintenance to 
refugees. The High Commissioner Jean-Pierre Hockè (1986-1989) from 
Switzerland identified voluntary repatriation as “the only realistic alternative to 
indefinite subsistence on charity” (quoted by Loescher, 2001b: 249). According to 
him, the Office should be involved with not only countries of asylum but also 
countries of origin. Thus, as countries of origin are part of the problem they need 
to be also considered as part of the solution. The High Commissioner Hockè had 
also the backing of the Executive Committee (ExCom) to actively pursue the 
promotion of voluntary repatriation, where there were appropriate conditions 
(UNHCR, 1985: para.e). Additionally, the Office believes that voluntary 
repatriation has been usually seen as the most desirable long-term solution not 
only by the international community but also by the refugees themselves 
(UNHCR, 1996a, preface). To UNHCR, refugees would also prefer repatriation 
since  
voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity is in principle the most 
satisfactory remedy to forced exile because it involves the resumption by 
the State of its responsibility for safeguarding the fundamental rights of its 
people, including the right of everyone to remain in safety in their own 
country and the right of refugees to return home (UNHCR, 1993a: para. 
35).   
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According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 94-97), UNHCR officials saw 
voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution to respond to the new 
circumstances in the post-Cold War context. At the beginning, they have worried 
about their traditional protection mission, particularly about the right of non-
refoulement. Within UNHCR, the fundamentalist camp pursued a more legalistic 
approach, arguing that repatriations should only be authorized when returns are 
indeed voluntary. On the other hand, the pragmatist camp argued for flexibility 
and to make the best of the given situation to protect refugees instead of inaction 
with abstract principles. However, over time, UNHCR developed a repatriation 
culture with formal and informal rules that led UNHCR officials to see 
repatriation as nearly synonymous with protection.  
 In sum, state policies and preferences both during and after the Cold War 
brought international refugee regime to a situation of protracted exiles in camps 
and led the Office to promote ‘early’ voluntary repatriation as the preferred 
durable solution. In return, UNHCR focused on activities in countries of origin 
including preventive measures to compromise its mandate of protection and 
solution with state policies. UNHCR has also treated repatriation as an important 
mechanism for rebuilding confidence and successful peace building in countries of 
origin (UNHCR, 1995c: 107). Accordingly, UNHCR has developed its 4Rs 
approach to increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in refugee 
producing states through promoting the sustainability of returns and preventing the 
recurrence of new mass flows. The next part will examine the 4Rs approach 
including its foundation stone of the strategy of prevention and solution. In the 
case studies, 4Rs activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners will be 
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examined, questioning the effectiveness of international refugee regime and 
conditions to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. 
 
 
3.3 The 4Rs Approach 
 
UNHCR introduced the 4Rs approach in 2002 with the aim of enhancing 
the sustainability of repatriation and preventing recurrence of new flows. It mainly 
borrowed its logic and purpose from the strategy of prevention and solution, 
developed in the early 1990s.  In the beginning of 1990s, number of refugees 
increased constantly and dramatically as a result of the new conflicts in the Middle 
East, Balkans and Africa. Number of refugees was 14.7 million in 1989 and 
increased to 17.2 million in 1990 and to 18.3 million in 1993. (Ambrosso, 2011: 2) 
During the same period, number of refugees repatriating to their country of origin 
also increased dramatically, from around 1.2 million between 1985-1990 to at 
least 9 million refugees between 1990-1995 (Crisp, 2001:8). Accordingly, 
UNHCR preferred to increase its activities in countries of origin. This part will 
first examine the activities in countries of origin under the framework of the 
strategy of prevention and solution and second, explore the concepts and purpose 
of 4Rs approach and the interagency collaboration. The aim will be to understand 
the underlying logic of UNHCR activities in refugee producing countries with the 
final aim of increasing regime effectiveness.  
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3.3.1 Its Foundation Stone: The Strategy of Prevention and Solution 
 
 Loescher stresses that (2001b: 352-53) international refugee regime has 
always adapted itself to the specific needs of the challenges to its authority from 
interwar years to the post-Cold War era. Thus, increasing UNHCR activities in 
countries of origin and its strategy of prevention and solution have also been a 
response to the significant challenges to the authority of international refugee 
regime. Hence, the regime reached a situation of deadlocks in which UNHCR 
could neither provide international protection nor seek permanent solutions for the 
problem of refugees. The increasing number of refugees in protracted camps, who 
could neither be resettled nor repatriated, led the Office to focus on removing the 
root causes of refugee flows to prevent further displacements. And promoting 
voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution required increasing in-country 
activities in terms of returnee reintegration and rehabilitation. As a result, not only 
UNHCR but also the UNGA and states recognized the need for a new strategy to 
seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees with “a legitimate interest in 
the prevention of refugee movements by means of operational activities within 
countries of origin” (UNHCR, 1996c: para.2).  
 Thus, when Ogata became the eighth UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees by the end of 1990, the Office introduced a new protection emphasis 
through a strategy of prevention and solution (UNHCR, 1991c: para.41). This led 
a further extension of UNHCR’s mandate through an increase in UNHCR’s 
activities including post-repatriation programs and emergency assistance for large 
numbers of IDPs in countries of origin, mostly countries with low internal 
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capacity. This new approach had a proactive and homeland oriented character, 
shifting also the understanding of regime effectiveness from reactive policies in 
countries of asylum to proactive activities in countries of origin.  
 
 
3.3.1.1 The dual purpose of prevention and solution 
 
UNHCR identified the older paradigm in search for solutions to refugee 
problems as “reactive, exile-oriented and refugee-specific” and characterized the 
new orientation as “proactive, homeland-oriented and holistic” (UNHCR, 1995c: 
43). This new orientation has two main aims:  
- Activities in the countries of origin and involvement with the plight of 
refugees would prevent further displacements (UNHCR, 1994b: para.248) and  
- Involvement with post-repatriation operations and preventive measures 
would ensure the durability of the voluntary repatriation (UNHCR, 1996b, para1). 
UNHCR’s reactive response to the refugee crises placed the sole 
responsibility for the mandate of protection and solution on the countries of 
asylum. Thus, this holistic approach also seeks to place responsibility for 
prevention and durable solutions on the authorities of the refugee-producing 
countries as supplementary to the obligations of asylum countries (UNHCR, 
1996b: para.1). Ogata has made prevention an integral part of this strategy since 
she was convinced that refugee emergencies would not come to an end until root 
causes of forced displacement are dealt with effectively. Hence, UNHCR has 
oriented itself to alleviate situations in countries of origin that threaten to create 
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internal displacement and new refugees and also that prevent refugees to return 
home (UNHCR, 1993a: para.4). In other words, the strategy of prevention and 
solution has been seen as a tool to increase the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime by fulfilling its mandate through increasing activities in refugee 
producing countries.  
The logic of this strategy was stressed in the report of Mr. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. He stated 
that “a large number of displaced persons would not have to seek refuge abroad if 
their security could be guaranteed and if they could be provided with both 
sufficient food supplies and adequate medical care” (UNCHR, 1992). Also 
UNHCR stated that “the experience of UNHCR staff in the field suggests that 
humanitarian presence has helped to avert or mitigate some of the worst crimes, in 
addition to facilitating the delivery of food and other supplies to the victims, 
helping to avoid even greater displacement and, in some situations, helping to 
pave the way for possible solutions” (UNHCR, 1993a: para.54). 
UNHCR activities in the countries of origin have led the Office to be 
involved with IDP protection alongside its responsibilities for IDPs on the basis of 
its humanitarian expertise at the request of the UNGA or the ECOSOC. UNHCR 
has assumed operational responsibilities for certain groups of IDPs in the context 
of its strategy of prevention and solution (UNHCR, 1994b: para.2). In this 
framework, UNHCR can involve IDP protection both with the aim of preventing 
new refugee flows and of promoting voluntary repatriation through returnee linked 
programs. Because according to the Office, taking measures necessary to prevent 
internal displacement would also remove the immediate cause of refugee flows 
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(UNHCR, 1994a: para.3). UNHCR defines the situations of internal displacement, 
except the ones resulting from natural disasters, as “the inability or the 
unwillingness of the national authorities to ensure effective protection, in 
particular the right of individuals and even whole communities to remain in safety 
in their homes” (UNHCR, 1994a: para.18). Since both internal and external 
displacements are the results of the same phenomenon of coerced displacement, 
UNHCR “has increasingly considered activities on behalf of the internally 
displaced to be indispensable components of an overall strategy of prevention and 
solutions” (UNHCR, 1994a: para.4). In the strategy of prevention and solution, 
UNHCR attempts to involve in IDP protection only in clear linkages with refugee 
repatriation. In addition to IDP involvement, ExCom encourages the High 
Commissioner “to continue its activities on behalf of stateless persons, as part of 
its statutory function of providing international protection and of seeking 
preventive action” and stresses “that the prevention and reduction of statelessness 
and the protection of stateless persons are important in the prevention of potential 
refugee situations” (UNHCR, 1995a: para.a). 
The next part will examine the logic of the protection, solution and 
prevention to identify the inter-linked relations among them. The aim here is to 
show that UNHCR can also provide protection to refugees through its strategy of 
prevention and solution and in return increase regime effectiveness by fulfilling its 
mandate.  
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3.3.1.2 The inter-linked relations between protection, solution and prevention  
 
International protection basically means ensuring the right of asylum, non-
refoulement and nondiscrimination through immediate protection and material and 
administrative assistance and for individual refugees. It might be argued that 
UNHCR’s 4Rs activities in countries of origin are supplementary to its mandate of 
protection since protection, solution and prevention are inextricably inter-linked. 
Thus, UNHCR assumes that its presence in countries of origin “would allow 
UNHCR to work to create conditions conducive to repatriation as well as 
undertake preventive work through training, promotion and advisory services and, 
as appropriate and feasible, to develop in-country protection possibilities” (UCHR, 
1992: para.27). 
The relation between protection and solution is two-sided. Providing 
international protection and seeking permanent solutions are inseparably inter-
linked since the ultimate aim of international protection is the pursuit of durable 
solutions (UNHCR, 1996d: para.3). The High Commissioner Ogata also 
emphasized UNHCR’s position by stating that “the best protection is to find a 
lasting solution so that refugees are no longer in need of international protection” 
(UNHCR, 1995b).  Though this approach puts seeking solutions prior to 
protecting as the ultimate aim of protection, on the other hand protection is the 
sine qua non of the mandate of seeking durable solutions as it governs the entire 
process towards solution (UNHCR, 1991b: para.1). As Goodwin-Gil (1996: 207) 
puts out, provision of international protection has the primary importance since 
solution can not be provided without protection. 
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Since the ultimate aim of protection is solution, the purpose of 
international protection is “to ensure the individual’s renewed membership of a 
community and the restoration of national protection” rather than remaining a 
refugee forever (UNHCR, 1996a, preface). Similarly, the strategy of prevention 
and solution aims to maintain the link of citizenship between individuals and 
governments (UNHCR, 1993a: para.36). Thus, protection, solution and prevention 
serve all the same goal through different aspects of a single process. According to 
Kourula (1997: 211), international protection has been gradually shifted to a more 
operational approach through activities from covering respect for the rights of 
asylum seekers and refugees in the receiving countries to including assistance in 
countries of origin in connection with voluntary repatriation. In other words, as 
will be examined in cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, UNHCR extends 
protection and assistance from countries of asylum to countries of origin through 
being directly present in such countries with the aim of increasing the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. 
Since prevention of further refugee flows is open to exploitation by the 
reluctant states to offer asylum, critics (for example, Barutciski, 2002; Frelick, 
1992, Mertus, 1998) have argued that the right to remain would prevent the right 
to seek and enjoy asylum and undermine the protection mandate of the Office. 
However, UNHCR has underlined that its activities within countries of origin is 
not “incompatible with and must not in any way undermine the institution of 
asylum or the individual’s access to safety” and defined the objective of 
prevention as “not to obstruct escape from danger or from an intolerable situation, 
but to make flight unnecessary by removing or alleviating the conditions that force 
 84 
people to flee” (UNHCR, 1993a: para.37). The goal of preventing the 
reoccurrence of new mass flows aims to develop a concerted, comprehensive 
strategy to prevent involuntary movements and address the consequences of 
displacement within the region” (UNHCR, 1996b: para.9). Since UNHCR’s 
activities in the field of prevention would support the Office’s international 
protection responsibilities, it is assumed that prevention would not be realized at 
the expense of the institution of asylum (UNHCR, 1993b: para.19u).  Thus 
prevention in its nature does not aim to erect barriers to make departure impossible 
and contain the ‘potential’ refugees within their countries of origin but the goal of 
prevention instead aims to eliminate the causes of departure so that people will not 
feel compelled to leave. In other words, stressing prevention is not a substitute of 
asylum, the Office aims to reduce or contain cross-border movements before a 
situation of exodus becomes unmanageable in terms of both humanitarian and 
political sense (UNHCR, 1991c: para.43; 1992, para.26). Thus, UNHCR would 
like international community to perceive the phrase of “address causes of refugee 
movements” in the meaning of “prevention of refugee movements” (Zapater, 
2010: 7).  
Once the Office seeks to ensure voluntary repatriation as the preferred 
solution, UNHCR has no more assessed positively whether conditions are 
sufficiently safe to encourage and has instead actively involved promoting a safe 
environment for returning refugees (UNHCR, 1993a: para.59). In other words, 
promotion of voluntary repatriation in its nature contains the need of post-
repatriation activities since it is possible that the conditions in the country of origin 
have not fundamentally changed. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will illustrate post 
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repatriation activities in each case study. UNHCR admits that securing the 
sustainability of repatriations as a durable solution “is a long-term undertaking that 
exceeds the mandate and resources of UNHCR” (UNHCR, 2004b: 7). Thus, 
focusing on voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution, the High 
Commissioner Ruud Lubbers (2001-2005) from Netherlands initiated a new 
partnership in March 2002 between UNHCR, UNDP and World Bank (WB) given 
their clear repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction mandates (Lippman and 
Malik, 2004: 9). Accordingly, in 2003, Lubbers introduced the concept of 
repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction, known as the ‘4Rs 
approach’12 (Muggah, 2006). 
 
 
3.3.2 The 4Rs Approach: Its Conceptual Framework and Purpose 
 
4Rs approach is a flexible and country specific framework for institutional 
collaboration, particularly conducted in refugee producing countries to provide 
durable solution for refugees and to prevent the reoccurrence of new mass flows. 
Within the framework of 4Rs activities, UNHCR, together with its implementing 
partners organize voluntary repatriation operations, provide reintegration and 
rehabilitation activities to ensure the sustainability of repatriations and implement 
capacity building activities through reconstruction of governance capacity. Thus, it 
                                                 
12
 To ensure the durability of other solutions – resettlement and local integration – the Office also 
developed the notion of Development Assistance for Refugees and Development through Local 
Integration. For a detailed information, please see UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern, 16 September 
2003, EC/53/SC/INF.3. 
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might be argued that it basically aims to mainstream reintegration activities into 
national development plans and programs (Muggah, 2006).  
The first R of the 4Rs concept is Repatriation. It is defined by UNHCR as 
“the free and voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin in safety and 
dignity” (UNHCR, 2004b: 8). The second R symbolizes Reintegration, defined as 
the ability of refugees and IDPs “to secure the necessary political, economic, legal 
and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity” upon their 
return (UNHCR, 2004b: 8). Reintegration activities are regarded as an integral 
part of UNHCR’s responsibility to ensure the sustainability of returns (UNHCR's 
Role, 2008: para.1). Reintegration activities can be considered as a process for 
progressive establishment of conditions, “which enable returnees and their 
communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, 
and on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives” (UNHCR's 
Role, 2008: para.7) 
The third R is reserved for Rehabilitation, which is defined as “the 
restoration of social and economic infrastructure destroyed during conflict in areas 
of return to enable communities to pursue sustainable livelihoods” (UNHCR, 
2004b: 8).  The activities in the context of rehabilitation include “investments in 
shelter, potable water, schools, primary health care, agricultural activities, income 
generation opportunities, micro-credit schemes, and skills training” (UNHCR, 
2008a: para.65). For such activities, UNHCR engages in partnerships with UNDP, 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Labor Organization 
(ILO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), World Food Programme 
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(WFP) and specialized NGOs. Rehabilitation activities can be considered to have 
a supportive role for the reintegration activities. 
The last R indicates Reconstruction, which is defined as “the 
(re)establishment of political order, institutions and productive capacity to create a 
base for sustainable development” (UNHCR, 2004b: 8).  It addresses medium and 
long term needs of a refugee producing country to prevent the recurrence of forced 
displacement.  
4Rs activities aim to promote durable solutions for refugees through 
ensuring linkages between all four processes. The underlying logic behind 4Rs 
approach is to address short, medium and longer-term needs of returnees with the 
aim of ensuring the sustainability of reintegration and prevent the phenomenon of 
back-flows to their country of asylum (UNHCR, 2003a, para.10). UNHCR sees 
4Rs approach both as a tool for reintegration and for capacity building efforts, 
attempting to ensure a smooth transition from emergency relief to long-term 
development (UNHCR, 1995c: 33). Thus, 4Rs approach aims to bring together 
humanitarian, transition and development approaches in a structured manner 
(UNHCR, 2003a: 19) to prevent the recurrence of mass outflows and to promote 
the sustainability of refugee returns through capacity building efforts. 
UNHCR defines capacity building as “the reinforcement of human, 
institutional or community performance, skills, knowledge and attitudes on a 
sustainable basis” (UNHCR, 1999a). In countries of origin, capacity building 
efforts are basically considered within the context of transition from war-to-peace. 
In this respect, UNHCR has two main aims: First, it aims to promote a sustainable 
reintegration through progressively transferring the responsibility in providing 
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protection and ensuring the people’s access to essential basic services to the states. 
Second, UNHCR aims to prevent forced displacement through building capacity 
in refugee producing countries, which would in return diminish the people’s need 
to seek refugee (UNHCR, 1999a). 
4Rs approach, particularly the last 3Rs require an important degree of 
development assistance in addition to humanitarian assistance. Ogata reminds that 
in the absence of development assistance, fragile peace situations often deteriorate 
and cause new insecurities and new human displacements. Hence she suggests 
implementing the notion of 4Rs as comprehensively as possible including both 
humanitarian and development assistance (UNHCR, 1999b). Thus, as shown in 
the case studies, the Office pursues a collaborative approach, in which the UNDP, 
UNHCR and the WB together with UNICEF and WFP to realize the 4Rs program 
(UNHCR, 2003a: para.17).  
 
 
3.3.3 Interagency Collaboration 
 
In the interagency collaboration, one or more international agencies take 
the lead for each phase of 4Rs approach. In the first phase (Repatriation), UNHCR 
takes the lead to organize returns in safety and dignity. In the second phase 
(Reintegration), UNHCR and the UNDP would take the lead together, while 
UNHCR focuses on the initial reintegration process, the UNDP consults with the 
local officials and people in countries of origin and organizes aid for communities. 
In the third phase (Rehabilitation), UNDP takes the lead in coordination with other 
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development agencies. Lastly, the WB and UNDP take the lead together in the 
phase of Reconstruction. (UNHCR, 2003a: 22) The interagency collaboration 
between UNHCR and its implementing partners will be examined in case studies 
to question the effectiveness of international refugee regime and to identify 
tentative principles to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. 
Since it is obvious that UNHCR could not manage 4Rs approach on its 
own ensuring the sustainability of reintegration and preventing new flows require 
an interagency collaboration. Together with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC), UNHCR and the UNDP attempt to increase collaboration and ensure 
greater accountability and predictability in responding to prevent and resolve 
humanitarian crises (Muggah, 2006). The “Delivering as One” initiative seeks to 
link displacement-related concerns into common needs assessment and 
programming frameworks by including returnees and returnee areas in country-
level strategic documents. It also allows including displacement-related concerns 
into system-wide efforts such as the UN Development Assistance Framework and 
Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (UNHCR, 2008a: para.9) 
It is also important to note that there are large-scale returns to non-secure 
environments, lacking a state with established legitimacy and authority. In these 
cases, peacekeeping forces or other external military actors play an essential role 
to provide security of returning refugees and IDPs.  And integrated missions for 
post-conflict recovery in war-torn societies provide an important opportunity for 
coordination with such actors (UNHCR, 2008a: para. 25). UNHCR examines the 
opportunities for interagency collaboration in each area and attempts to capitalize 
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upon them by establishing early and strategic cooperation with key partners 
(UNHCR, 2008a: para.29). 
 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter on international refugee regime and UNHCR activities in the 
framework of 4Rs approach sought to explore the evolution of international 
refugee regime from its temporary agencies to UNHCR as a global agency, 
including UNHCR’s activities in refugee producing countries in a preventive and 
solution-oriented manner. The first part of the chapter explores international 
refugee regime under temporary agencies and under UNHCR agency including the 
expansion of its mandate and people of concern. It was argued that such an 
evolution of international refugee regime created the necessary conditions for 
increasing activities in refugee producing countries in the 1990s. The second part 
examined the environment, in which the regime operated in the beginning 1990s. 
In the early 1990s, UNHCR began to focus on voluntary repatriation as the 
preferred solution. The High Commissioner Ogata also considered repatriation as 
the primary objective of UNHCR and in 1991, she declared the 1990s as the 
decade of voluntary repatriation. The main reasons for this turn were identified as 
reluctance of potential countries of asylum to support resettlement and local 
integration as durable solutions, major protracted refugee crises and UNHCR’s 
perception, mainly shaped by these reasons. This turn both led the development of 
strategy of prevention and solution and 4Rs approach to increase regime 
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effectiveness and shifted the understanding of regime effectiveness from countries 
of asylum to countries of origin. 
The last part evaluated 4Rs approach, first by examining the strategy of 
prevention and solution as the foundation stone of this approach. Increasing 
UNHCR activities in countries of origin and its strategy of prevention and solution 
have been a response to the significant challenges to the authority of international 
refugee regime since the regime reached a situation of deadlocks in which 
UNHCR could neither provide international protection nor seek permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees. The increasing number of refugees in 
protracted camps, who could not be resettled and repatriated, led UNHCR to focus 
on voluntary repatriation. Thus, the underlying logic of this strategy became both 
to promote conditions conducive to sustain repatriations and to remove root causes 
to prevent reoccurrence of mass flows through increasing activities in countries of 
origin. Improvements in solution and prevention would in return serve to an 
increase in the effectiveness of international refugee regime, since protection, 
solution and prevention are considerably inter-linked. Given that creating 
conditions conducive for sustainable return and prevention of new flows is far 
beyond the UNHCR’s mandate and capacity, the Office developed 4Rs approach 
to encourage interagency collaboration in refugee producing countries.  
This chapter concludes that the conditions in the beginning of the 1990s 
led UNHCR to prefer voluntary repatriation as the most viable durable solution 
and to increase its activities in refugee producing countries. The strategy of 
prevention and solution in the early 1990s and 4Rs approach in the early 2000s 
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have focused on countries of origin, being a tool for UNHCR to increase the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. 
The next chapter will examine Afghanistan, as the first case study with low 
internal capacity. It will first aim to question the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime in Afghanistan. 4Rs approach will be examined through 
quantitative criteria of sustainability of reintegration and prevention of new flows, 
as explained in the research design of the study. The chapter will, second, 
qualitatively analyze the social conditions, nature of the relations between the 
Afghan government and international community and perceptions of the local 
people to identify conditions to increase regime effectiveness in Afghanistan. The 
implications, derived from the case studies will in return provide tentative 
principles for international community, in terms of operating to increase regime 
effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CASE STUDY 1: AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
 
In Chapter 3, the study examined the evolution of international refugee 
regime and UNHCR’s 4Rs approach together with the strategy of prevention and 
solution. It concluded that the extension of UNHCR’s people of concern and 
geographical scope created the background for the regime’s increasing activities in 
refugee producing countries. In the beginning of the 1990s, UNHCR began to shift 
its understanding of effectiveness from reactive activities in countries of asylum to 
proactive policies in countries of origin through its strategy of prevention and 
solution and 4Rs activities. Thus, the study argued that 4Rs approach has become 
a tool for UNHCR to increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
countries with low internal capacity. 
The aim of this dissertation is to question whether international regimes are 
effective in states with low internal capacity and to provide tentative principles for 
regimes’ instutions to increase regime effectiveness in such countries. Since 
international refugee regime has activities in countries with low internal capacity, 
namely refugee producing countries, the study attempts to answer this question 
with a specific reference to international refugee regime in three refugee 
producing countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. Thus, the study will 
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examine three cases in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. This chapter seeks to examine 4Rs 
activities in Afghanistan, as being the largest refugee producing country. 
It will first give a brief introduction to political and social structures in 
Afghanistan to provide the background information for the country’s political and 
social fabric. The second part will examine the history of Afghanistan from the 
beginning of 20th century until present to understand the roots of Afghanistan’s 
low internal capacity and of the forced displacement in the country. The third part 
of the chapter will seek to examine the 4Rs activities of UNHCR and its 
implementing partners in Afghanistan. The next part will question the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan between 2002-2011 
through quantitative analysis. The last part conducts a qualitative analysis to 
identify the principles, by which UNHCR and its implementing partners can 
operate to increase the regime effectiveness. 
This chapter argues that international refugee regime was not effective in 
Afghanistan during the period 2002-2011. By the quantitative analysis, it is found 
out that 4Rs activities in Afghanistan have been inefficient to reintegrate returnees 
in a sustainable manner and to prevent the recurrence of new mass flows. The 
qualitative analysis seems to show that 4Rs activities had a limited effect in 
Afghanistan due to insecurity and strict religious and social conservatism in the 
Afghan society. The relations between government and international community, 
namely the UN agencies, international NGOs and their national partners and donor 
states, seem to dissatisfy both sides due to the corruption and insecurity in 
Afghanistan. Perceptions of the Afghan people’s in international community are 
 95 
also not positive given their critiques towards insufficient level of support, aid 
dependency and lack of authority on aid spending.  
 
 
4.1 A General Overview 
 
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has 652,230 sq km land territory and 
has borders with six neighbor states: Pakistan (2,430 km), Tajikistan (1,206 km), 
Iran (936 km), Turkmenistan (744 km), Uzbekistan (137 km) and China (76 km) 
(UNHCR, 2009d: 14). Afghanistan has a population of nearly 30,5 million. In the 
country, the ethnic majority belongs to Pashtun with 42%. While the second major 
ethnic group is Tajik with 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks each constitute 9% of the 
population. There are also ethnic groups of Aimaks with 4%, Turkmens with 3% 
and Balochs 2%. (CIA, 2013a) The numbers of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens in 
Afghanistan increased through refugee flows from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan in 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. The Pashtuns have been the dominant 
political group since the establishment of the country as a monarchy. They mainly 
live in the south and north of the Hindu Kush. Tajiks are mainly concentrated in 
the north of Hindu Kush, from east to west. Hazaras mainly live in the 
mountainous parts of the country. Uzbeks and Turkmens live in the north-central 
border regions. (Wahab and Youngerman, 2010: 14-16)   
There are two official languages in Afghanistan, namely Afghan Persian 
(Dari) and Pashto. Half of the population speaks Dari and 35% of the population 
speaks Pashto. Turkic languages are also spoken in Afghanistan (11%), primarily 
 96 
among the ethnic groups of Uzbek and Turkmen. 4% of the population speaks 30 
different minor languages. Turkic languages together with these minor languages 
constitute the third official languages in areas, where they are spoken by the 
majority. (CIA, 2013a) Dari has traditionally been used as the language of 
literature and government. All Tajiks speak Dari and most of Afghans can speak 
both Dari and Pashto (Wahab and Youngerman, 2010: 18). Religion of the most of 
the population is Sunni Muslim (80%) while 19% of the population believes in 
Shia Muslim. Other religions constitute the remaining 1%. (CIA, 2013a) Nearly 
all Hazaras are Shiite Muslims (Wahab and Youngerman, 2010: 16).  
Afghanistan has 34 provinces in terms of administrative divisions, of 
which the capital is Kabul. It has a mixed legal system of civil, customary and 
Islamic law. Hamid Karzai is the President of Afghanistan since December 2004 
and he is both the chief of state and the head of government. In August 2009, he 
was reelected as president and the next election is to be held in 2014. In the 
legislative branch, Afghanistan has a bicameral National Assembly, Meshrano 
Jirga (House of Elders) and Wolesi Jirga (House of People). The government may 
also convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The last election was held in September 2010 
and next election is expected in 2015. (CIA, 2013a) 
The country has a GDP (purchasing power parity) of US$ 29.74 billion in 
2011, ranked in 111st in the world. Its GDP real growth rate is 5.8% in 2011, 
ranked in 49
th
 in the world. Afghans have a GDP per capita US$ 1,000 in 2011, 
ranked in 217 in the world. (CIA, 2013a) Thus, Afghanistan is indicated as a 
country with low internal capacity according to the various indexes. According to 
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key economic, political, security and social welfare criteria, Index of State 
Weakness (Rice, Patrick, 2008: 10) ranked Afghanistan in the 2nd place among 
141 countries. Using key social-economic and political-military indicators, the 
Failed State Index of Fund for Peace (2012: 4) ranked Afghanistan in 6th of 177 
countries. According to the index, the country was at 11st in 2005 (Failed State 
Index, 2005) and within 7 years, its rank was decreased to 6th. Human 
Development Index (HDI) of the UNDP (2011: 126) ranked Afghanistan in 172 of 
187 countries. According to the index, Afghanistan increased its development 
ranks within the last 10 years, having very low development rank.  Its HDI was 
0.230 in 2000, 0.340 in 2005 and became 0.398 in 2011. 
In sum, based on the various indexes, it can be concluded that Afghanistan 
is a country with low internal capacity. It is also the world’s largest refugee 
producing country. By the beginning of 2012, Afghanistan hosts 447,547 IDPs 
and more than 2,5 million refugees abroad, mainly in Pakistan (1,7 million) and 
Iran (840.500). (UNHCR, 2011a: 21) The next part of the study will examine the 
history of Afghanistan with the aim of identifying main causes of the country’s 
low internal capacity. 
 
 
4.2. A Brief History of Afghanistan 
 
This section seeks to understand the roots of the Afghanistan’s low 
internal capacity through examining its political evolution during the past century. 
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With this aim, the section will study the period before the Soviet invasion, the 
Soviet era, the Taliban era and the post9/11 period. 
 
 
4.2.1. The Period before the Soviet Invasion 
 
Ahmad Shah Durrani managed to unify the tribes in Afghanistan and in 
1747, he established monarchy under the unifying name of Afghanistan (the ‘land 
of the Afghan’) (Edwards, 2010: 972). However power of monarchs in 
Afghanistan was constantly undermined by civil wars and foreign invasions 
(Modern History). 
King Amanullah Khan reigned the country for ten years from 1919 and 
attempted to establish a Western style constitutional monarchy. However Loya 
Jirga, which is a traditional forum for tribal elders to settle affairs, rejected most 
of his proposals. (Edwards, 2010: 972) He fought for independence from Britain 
and gained complete independence by the Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on 8 
August 1919 (Katzman, 2009:50). He was overthrown by the traditionalists in a 
rebellion. His successor King Nadir Shah took into consideration the constant 
division between modernizers and traditionalists and tried to consolidate his power 
by appeasing the mullahs. His constitution in 1931 stated that religious law would 
be the basis of law in Afghanistan. However his reign ended in three years with 
his assassination by a high-school student. (Edwards, 2010: 973) 
His son King Zahir Shah reigned between 1933-1973. He made a 
constitution in 1964 and established a constitutional monarchy with national 
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legislature (Katzman, 2009:50). The constitution introduced an independent 
judiciary based on a secular legal system, though most power remained with the 
king (Edwards, 2010: 973). In his reign, Afghanistan joined the UN in 1946. He 
also established close relations with the Soviet Union. De Bree (2008:3) argues 
that deteriorating relations with Pakistan led Zahir Shah to develop Afghanistan 
relations with Soviet Union. Afghanistan became economically isolated when 
Pakistan closed the border with Afghanistan as a result of Zahir Shah’s statement 
that the Pashtuns living in Pakistan has the right to be autonomous. Katzman 
(2009:50) rather argues that he established significant political and military 
relations with the Soviet Union to limit its support to communist factions in 
Afghanistan. There was a growing dissatisfaction among the unemployed in 
Kabul, mainly as a result of tension between migrants from rural areas and elites 
in Kabul. This dissatisfaction prepared the base for a growing interest in both 
Islamist and Marxist ideas. Accordingly in 1965, Marxist People’s Democratic 
party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded. (De Bree, 2008:3) The PDDA had two 
wings, comprising rural Pashtuns and left-leaning urbanities (Edwards, 2010: 
973). 
In 1973, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daoud. He 
declared Afghanistan a republic and became president of the country (Modern 
History). He was a military leader and established a strong dictatorship in 
Afghanistan and increased the state involvement in the economy. (Katzman, 
2009:50) The PDPA killed Daoud in a coup in April 1978 and established a 
Marxist regime in Afghanistan. PDPA leader Noor Muhammad Taraki became the 
new President (Modern History). The new regime made some reforms in the areas 
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of economic, land, education and female rights. Such reforms created a tension 
among rural Afghans. Detentions and executions of the PDPA increased the 
unrest. (De Bree, 2008:3) In later 1978, there was an armed revolt against 
communists by the Islamists and ethnic leaders and in September Taraki was 
overthrown and later killed. His successor Hafizullah Amin also could not manage 
to suppress the rebellion and the government weakened especially in rural areas of 
Afghanistan. (Modern History) Due to the unrest, the first wave of refugees from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran occurred in 1978. On December 27, 1979, this 
increasing unrest together with the internal division among PDPA members led 
the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan to prevent a seizure of power by the 
Islamist, namely mujahedin (Islamic fighters) and to protect the existence of 
Marxist regime in the country. (De Bree, 2008:3; Katzman, 2009: 50) Within two 
years (1979-80), 1.7 million Afghan were forced to flee Afghanistan, mainly to 
Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR, Statistical Online Population Database). 
In sum, Afghanistan enjoyed a relatively stable political administration for 
forty years during the reign of Zahir Shah. It was a period that the country had the 
capacity to have a political stance in its foreign policy, as in the example of 
relations with Pakistan. It could also make strategic calculations on its relations 
with the Soviet Union, such as the attempts to decrease its support to the 
communist fractions in Afghanistan. However, beginning from 1973, the country 
witnessed short-termed governments, mainly ended by coup d’états as a result of 
the unrest between the Communist and Islamists. During this period, Afghanistan 
turned to be a country with low internal capacity, mainly due to the increasing 
unrest and internal division within the country. The invasion of the Soviet Union 
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in Afghanistan in favor of one side, namely the Communists, increased this unrest 
and division, which led further mass flows from the country.  
 
 
4.2.2. The Soviet Period 
  
Upon its invasion, the Soviet Union replaced Hafizullah Amin with their 
ally Babrak Karmal. However given the Cold War conditions, the U.S. provided 
military equipments and assistance for the mujahedin and the Soviet Union could 
not manage to pacify Islamists against communists. The U.S. provided again about 
$3 billion military aid to the Afghan mujahedin between 1980-1986.  In 1986, 
Karmal was replaced by Najibullah Ahmedzai, the Director of the Afghan 
intelligence service and the leader of PDDA. (Katzman, 2009: 50-51) He became 
president in November 1987. As a result of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de 
Cuellar’s good offices, the Soviet forces began to withdraw in April 1988 under 
the UN auspices. The withdrawal was completed in February 1989. (Modern 
History) However the withdrawal of Soviet troops did not end the civil war. The 
civil war had already begun before the Soviet invasion and Soviets could not 
manage to eliminate mujahedin. Thus, after the withdrawal, the fight between 
mujahedin and Najibullah government continued.  The civil war resulted in the 
second wave of forced displacement between 1989-1992. In 1991, Afghan 
refugees reached to 6.3 million (UNHCR, Statistical Online Population Database). 
Mujahedin ranged from traditionalist groups to minority Shi’a groups and the 
more fundamentalist Islamist groups.  In addition to the civil war, Afghanistan 
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faced a new crisis: an economy based on drug production, a country with full of 
weapons and a devastated civil society. (Edwards, 2010: 974)  
 
 
4.2.3. The Taliban Period 
  
After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Najibullah managed to remain in 
power until 1992 and fought against mujahedin. However the collapse of the 
Soviet Union decreased Moscow’s capacity to support Najibullah government and 
in 1992, the ethnic Tajik branch of mujahedin forces seized the power in Kabul. 
Burhannudin Rabbani, head of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party, was 
declared President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in July 1992. Though he 
would only serve until December 1994, he did not step down from power. While 
Afghanistan was traditionally governed by the domination of Pashtuns, the 
Pashtun resistance forces, supported also by ethnic Hazaras and Uzbeks, did not 
accept a Kabul ruled by Tajiks. This increased tension among other mujahedin 
factions, especially so called Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (a Pashtun) 
accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. (Katzman, 2009: 52)   
In 1994, a movement emerged named as Taliban (students). The Taliban 
were mostly sons and orphans of mujahedin, raised in refugee camps in Pakistan 
(Modern History). It was composed by rural Pashtuns from Kandahar, who were 
educated in the Sunni religious schools of Pakistan, supporting a strict 
implementation of Shari’a (Islamic law). Taliban quickly gained power in Pashtun 
areas of the country with the support of Pakistan and there was also a popular 
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support for Taliban with the hope of ending the factional fighting. In 1998 the 
Taliban movement already controlled most of the country and Shari’a law was put 
in practice. (De Bree, 2008: 4; Katzman, 2009: 52) The Taliban regime was led by 
Mullah Muhammad Umar. He became the head of State and had close relations 
with Osama bin Laden, who was the head of the jihadist organization of al Qaeda. 
Taliban regime lost international and domestic support because of its strict 
adherence to Islamic customs and harsh punishments and executions to enforce 
strict Islamic practices. Umar banned television, Western music, dancing and 
female attendance to schools and working outside the home. (Katzman, 2009: 52) 
Meanwhile, Rabbani, head of the Islamic Society, joined an opposition alliance, 
the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance). 
Fighting continued between the Northern Alliance and Taliban between 1997-
2000 and caused new forced displacements. Number of Afghan refugees reached 
to about 3.8 million in 2001 (UNHCR, Statistical Online Population Database). 
 In sum, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and its decreasing support to 
the Najibullah government caused a power vacuum in Afghanistan. With the 
weakening of the common enemy, the remaining power centre, namely the 
Mujahedden, turned to have ethnic divisions and unrest within itself. The 
overwhelming success of the Pashtuns under the organization of Taliban with a 
fundamentalist view of Islam deepened the unrest and division in the country. In 
1997, a civil war began between the two major ethnic groups, Pashtuns and Tajiks, 
which caused a new mass flow from Afghanistan. 
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4.2.4. The post 9/11 Period  
 
The U.S. accused the Taliban regime of providing a safe haven to al Qaeda 
terrorists, whom the U.S. held responsible for 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus, the U.S. 
and its allies supported Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban regime from 
Afghanistan. US started to supply arms to the Tajik mujahedin resistance forces 
and started Coalition attacks on 7 October 2001. (De Bree, 2008: 4)  After the 
removal of the Taliban regime, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 
known as the Bonn Agreement was signed on 5 December. As a peace agreement, 
it aimed to establish a democratic government in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai has 
been installed as the new leader of the Interim Administration in Kabul. In sum, 
the U.S. and its allies intervened on behalf of one party of the civil war, as the 
Soviets did on behalf of the Communists about twenty years ago.  
However there was no agreement between the parties and as a result 
“progress with reconstruction, rehabilitation and peace-building has been 
relatively unsuccessful” (Bialczyk, 2008: 14). After the fall of the Taliban regime 
in October, the U.S. invited Northern Alliance and major Afghan factions except 
Taliban leaders to the conference in Bonn (Katzman, 2009: 56). That’s why, one 
can not regard Bonn Agreement as a peace agreement that put an end to the 
internal conflict. For example, the AI did not regard Afghanistan in 2003 as a 
country that has crossed over into a post-conflict situation (Amnesty International, 
2003: 20). Indeed, in 2003 and 2004, several local clashes between groups 
supporting different warlords were reported (Danish Immigration Service, 2004: 
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6). As another example, UNHCR referred the year 2007 as the highest number of 
security incidents since the fall of the Taliban (UNHCR, 2007: 7). In other words, 
the U.S. and its allies could not pacifize the internal division and unrest within 
Afghanistan. The ongoing insecurity both deepened the low internal capacity of 
the country and hampered the effectiveness of 4Rs activities, conducted in 
Afghanistan. 
The external intervention on behalf of one side resulted in a regardless 
support on every anti-Taliban groups, which caused various power centres within 
the government. Nojumi et.al. (2009: vxii) indicate that significant number of 
Afghan warlords and former militia commanders have integrated into powerful 
government positions at national and provincial levels. Weakness of the central 
government provided them the possibility of maintaining their criminal networks 
and ethnic-based factionalism within government. They enjoy both having the 
most powerful blocs in the government and access to resources from international 
assistance. Thus, Nojumi et.al. (2009: vxii) further argue that the warlords and 
former militia commanders constitute a considerable threat to the reformist 
officials within the government.  
Continuing armed conflict between Afghan/international forces and 
Taliban groups decreased the internal capacity further by preventing access to 
health care, education and humanitarian aid especially in south and south-east of 
the country, where Taliban forces have been particularly dominant (Amnesty 
International, 2010). In April 2002, the U.S. and its allies met in Geneva to 
address threats to Afghan security and established a security reform strategy. 
Accordingly, the U.S. would train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
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Germany would lead reconstitution efforts of Afghan National Police (ANP). 
(Katzman, 2009: 4) The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was 
deployed in 2001 to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security 
in Kabul. However, its main aim was to enable the Afghan authorities as well as 
the UN personnel to operate in a secure environment, rather than providing 
security for civilians. In August 2003, NATO took command of ISAF and its 
mission was expanded to outside of Kabul. NATO’s primary objective in ISAF is 
to transition responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces by focusing on 
training, advising and assisting the Afghan forces. Thus, ISAF is not mandated for 
providing security of the Afghan local people but its mission has an indirect effect 
on civilian security, through enabling the Afghan government to provide effective 
security across the country. (NATO, ISAF’s Mission) In July 2011, the Afghan 
transition process started and was planned to be complemented by the end of 
2014. By April 2012, ISAF completed the first and second phases of transition and 
gave responsibility to Afghan national security forces in 17 out of the 34 
provinces. (World Bank, 2012b) Despite the transitional process, there are 
concerns about the future security of Afghanistan, given the existence of the 
Taliban forces within the country. 
In sum, Afghanistan has a history of short reigns until 1933, a relatively 
stable and capable period under the reign of King Zahir Shah, coup d’états and 
foreign interventions. In 1994, Taliban movement, dominated by Pashtuns, gained 
control in almost all the country and has been accused by providing support to 
terrorist organization al Qaeda. However Taliban is still active in southern and 
southeastern provinces of Afghanistan.  
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The short-termed governments due to several coup d’états, civil wars due 
to the ideological divisions between the Communists and Islamists, foreign 
interventions by the Soviet Union and the U.S. and ethnic divisions between 
Pashtuns and Tajiks were identified as the factors that weakened the internal 
capacity of Afghanistan to provide security within its borders and to provide basic 
public services to its own citizens. The same causes of the country’s low internal 
capacity constituted also the roots of the forced displacements in Afghanistan. 
During its history, Afghanistan produced mass refugee flows, mainly to Pakistan 
and Iran and became the largest refugee-producing country since 1979. The first 
forced displacement from Afghanistan occurred in 1978 due to the armed revolt 
against communists by the Islamists and ethnic leaders. The second wave of the 
forced displacement was between 1989-92 as a result of the civil war between the 
Najibullah government and the Mujahidden. The civil war from 1992-1996 
because of the ethnic tension between Pashtuns and Tajiks caused the third wave 
of forced displacement. The last wave of displacement occurred until 2001 due to 
the rise of Taliban movement.  
Accordingly, UNHCR together with its implementing partners has 
conducted its strategy of prevention and solution and the 4Rs program in the 
country, namely Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. 
Before examining their effectiveness through quantitative analysis, the next part of 
the chapter will provide brief information on the 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. 
Being conducted since 2002, the 4Rs operations aim to increase the effectiveness 
of international refugee regime by building the internal capacity of Afghanistan 
through humanitarian, economic, military and development aids. 
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4.3. 4Rs Activities of UNHCR and its Implementing Partners 
 
Recalling the shift in the understanding of effectiveness from reactive to 
proactive policies, as examined in Chapter 3, UNHCR shifted its activities mainly 
to countries of origin by being directly present in Afghanistan. This part examines 
4Rs activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan. 
 
 
4.3.1. Repatriation
13
 Activities 
 
Voluntary repatriation is among the solutions, mandated to UNHCR and it 
became the preferred option for UNHCR in its Afghan refugee operations. To 
ensure the integrity of the repatriation process, UNHCR signed tripartite 
agreements with major host countries Pakistan and Iran. It also signed such 
agreements with non-neighboring countries, including United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, France and Sweden. UNHCR 
provides repatriation assistance for Afghan refugees in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. UNHCR has the supervisory role in the 
repatriation process, facilitating safe and dignified returns. It monitors encashment 
centres
14
 and ensures the voluntary nature of returns. UNHCR also provides 
                                                 
13
 Since the voluntary character of mass repatriations is questionable in general, the study refrains 
from defining repatriations from Afghanistan as ‘voluntary repatriations’. 
14
 Encashment centres are centres that Afghan returnees should visit to receive the transportation 
and reintegration cash assistance. At these centres, returnees also have access to a variety of 
services, such as landmine awareness training, basic medical assistance and legal aid. (UNHCR, 
Voluntary Repatriation Leaflet, 2009) 
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information to Afghan refugees on the current situation of Afghanistan through 
mass information projects, to ensure that refugees are fully informed before their 
decision to return. It also provides cash grants – though as a timely and short-term 
aid – for the transportation and initial reintegration assistance for the returnees 
under the voluntary repatriation program. (UNHCR, 2009b) 
In the case of Afghanistan, UNHCR began its voluntary repatriation 
operation in March 2002. In total, over 5.7 million Afghan refugees returned home 
by the end of 2012 and over 4.6 million of them received assistance from 
UNHCR. (UNHCR, 2012a: 1)  Since the strategy of prevention and solution 
requires post-repatriation activities in its nature, UNHCR and its implementing 
partners also operate reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in 
Afghanistan. Thus, the remaining of this part will examine the last 3Rs. 
 
 
4.3.2. Reintegration Activities 
 
UNHCR has increased its activities in the country of origin in terms of 
both ensuring sustainable returnee reintegration and IDP protection since 2002. 
UNHCR also entered a Partnership Agreement with the Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission in 2005 with the aim of addressing human rights 
problems in a more efficient manner. It entered another partnership with the 
Norwegian Refugee Council to address legal safety issues arising during the 
process of voluntary repatriation (Protection Leaflet: 2-3). In addition to UNHCR, 
a variety of IOs/NGOs have activities in Afghanistan, such as UNDP, IOM, UN 
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Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, World Bank Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance, Human Dignity Society and New Noor Rehabilitation Organization, to 
list some of them (UNHCR, 2011e). 
To provide the sustainability of repatriation, UNHCR has developed 
“complementary programs such as Shelter & Water management, as well as Cash 
for Work projects (CFW), Income Generating Activities (IGA), and Vocational 
Skills Training (VT)”, particularly in the areas where job opportunities are scarce 
and community members are most vulnerable. (Altai Consulting, 2006: 56) 
UNHCR’s initial reintegration support is to provide cash grants, shelter, water and 
some income-generation and vocational training activities. Cash grants constitute 
the bulk of UNHCR expenditures and Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation 
(MoRR) is its biggest national implementing partner. In terms of shelter, UNHCR 
provides the construction materials and beneficiaries have to provide labor for 
construction under a self-help scheme. (OIOS, 2009: para.3-5) 
To prevent IDPs becoming refugees abroad, UNHCR pursues and 
advocates for local integration in cooperation with the Afghan national and 
provincial authorities, especially on the issues related with shelter, land for 
agriculture and access to social services. According to UNHCR data, 493,556 
IDPs were assisted by UNHCR to return from 2002 until 2009, which means 
nearly 30% of the total IDP population during those years. UNHCR return and 
reintegration assistance for the IDPs includes medical screening prior to travel, 
transportation means, transit support and initial reintegration support. (UNHCR, 
2009a). 
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In 2011, UNHCR began a new project aiming to provide comprehensive 
development assistance to areas with high refugee returns. The difference of this 
pilot project lays on its focus on village by village through a package program. 
Only after finishing one village’s development, another village is focused for the 
development program. This project has the benefit of pooling resources and 
directing them to one area of high refugee return. UNHCR has identified 48 Areas 
of high return areas across Afghanistan to implement this project. (IRIN news, 27 
February 2012) 
 
 
4.3.3. Rehabilitation Activities 
 
While there are many rehabilitation projects in Afghanistan, the study will 
only illustrate some examples of them to give a general idea on the rehabilitation 
projects in the country. Decades of conflict destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges and crucial buildings including schools and hospitals. 
Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project by Asian 
Development Bank aims to rehabilitate 447 km primary national roads, power 
transmission lines in the northern provinces and gas production, transmission and 
distribution facilities in Sheberghan. Such projects are an attempt to push 
economic development and reduce poverty through generating employment 
opportunities and increasing access to basic services. (Asian Development Bank, 
2012: 4) 
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The US Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the 
Afghan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program in 2006. It mainly aims to 
provide economic recovery and political stability through rehabilitation of 
essential physical infrastructure in Afghanistan. (Louis Berger Group) Under this 
program, nearly 2000 km road has been constructed, a capacity building program 
was launched to teach road construction and maintenance techniques to the local 
staff. The program has created more than 16,000 jobs in the region and has 
positively impacted the lives of an estimated 9 million people. (Afghanistan 
Infrastructure Rehabilitation) 
 
 
4.3.4. Reconstruction Activities 
 
The reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan mainly aim to rebuild key 
governance institutions. In an interview with IRIN (3 February 2004), Javier 
Solana, the European Union (EU) High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy stated that the EU set  the full implementation of the Bonn 
Agreement, assistance to  Afghanistan to become a fully-fledged member of the 
international community as a democracy as political priorities.  
One of the goals of the reconstruction of Afghanistan is the reconstitution 
of the ANP, which began in February 2002. The ultimate goal is to establish a 
multiethnic, sustainable police service committed to the rule of law, protecting the 
right of citizens and maintaining civil order. (Katzman, 2009:6) UNDP has played 
an important role in the process of rebuilding civilian police, believing that ANP 
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has “the potential to contribute to regional and global security” and to serve as a 
symbol of national identity (State Building and Government, 2008:6) 
One of the crucial implementing partners of UNHCR in Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction is UNDP, particularly on disarmament, institution building, 
security sector reform and rural development. In 2005, UNDP began to focus also 
on state building, democracy and civil society empowerment and sustainable 
livelihoods. UNDP has three basic aims in Afghanistan, namely enhancing 
government’s ability to deliver public services, consolidating a participative 
democracy including a responsible civil society and creating a secure environment 
for sustainable livelihoods. (State Building and Government, 2008:3) 
UNDP’s Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program aims to 
restructure and rationalize government machinery to ensure a fiscally sustainable 
political administration. UNDP also aims to reform civil service functions of the 
government to reflect its core functions and responsibilities. UNDP’s Capacity for 
the Afghan Public Service Program aims for capacity development in Afghanistan. 
It has developed a novel approach of coaching and mentoring Afghan civil servant 
both at national and sub-national levels. (State Building and Government, 
2008:13.18) 
Security Council established a political mission in 2002, the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), to assist the Afghan government 
for sustainable peace and development. It has rather a pro-active role, promoting 
peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading international community, regional 
cooperation and the work of all UN agencies, funds and programs. (Mandate, 
UNAMA)  
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In Afghan reconstruction efforts, World Bank is an essential implementing 
partner of UNHCR. The Bank aims to expand rural programs in the areas with 
high returns to create economic outputs and poverty reduction. (World Bank, 
2013: xvii) As of April 2012, it has 25 active projects in Afghanistan and by the 
end of October 2012, the Bank provided more than $2.35 billion for development 
and emergency reconstruction projects (World Bank, 2012b). 
UNICEF is also one of the leading partners of the Afghan government and 
the leading one for the reconstruction of education sector since 2002. UNICEF 
provides teaching and learning materials to instructors and students, work to 
increase school enrollment, establishes community based schools and accelerated 
learning centres and literacy centres. (UNICEF, 2011) In addition to the school 
enrollment of millions of boys and girls, thousands of government judges have 
entered into legal training. Together with education, newly established private 
radio stations, TV channels, and print media have enabled the civil society in 
Afghanistan begin to expand. (Nojumi et.al., 2009: xv) Thus, USAID funded an 
initiative to increase the role and viability of civil society. In this effort, 
organizations showing potential to be sustainable and effective have been support 
by capacity-building training programs. However, Nojumi et.al. (2009: xxi) argue 
that such initiatives failed to cover rural Afghanistan and institutions could not 
become sustainable in the select urban centers.  
In sum, UNHCR and its implementing partners have conducted 4Rs 
activities in Afghanistan since 2002. The main aim of 4Rs activities has been to 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan through 
providing durable solutions to Afghan refugees and preventing the reocurrence of 
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new mass flows. The next part will question whether international refugee regime 
was effective in Afghanistan during 2002-2011 through examining 4Rs activities.  
 
 
4.4. Effectiveness of International Refugee Regime in Afghanistan: A 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
Questioning the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Afghanistan through a quantitative analysis as explained in the research design of 
the study, this part examines, first, the repatriation as a durable solution by the 
sustainability of reintegration process. It then questions whether international 
refugee regime could prevent the reoccurrence of new mass flows from 
Afghanistan by 4Rs activities, as assumed in the strategy of prevention and 
solution.  
 
 
4.4.1. Repatriation as a Durable Solution: Sustainability of Reintegration 
 
 As explained in the research design of the study, repatriation movements as 
a durable solution need to be sustainable in terms of the reintegration of returnees. 
This study will use three criteria to measure the sustainability of reintegration 
process: access to rights, access to employment opportunities and access to social 
services. 
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The indicators for the criterion of access to rights are whether all returnees 
have identity documents, whether they are allowed to vote and whether they are 
reports of security incidents towards returnees. Based on the data provided by a 
senior officer in Afghanistan (Online Interview, 23 October 2011), all returnees 
have individual identity documentation, are allowed to vote and no security 
incidents towards returnees, excluding any personal feuds and disputes. Peter 
Erben, chief electoral officer at the Afghan-UN Joint Electoral management Body, 
stated that in September 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections, all 
returnees under the UNHCR’s voluntary program had the opportunity to get voter 
registration cards for their province of residence. However, unofficial returnees 
could not get their registration cards in the absence of any proof of identity. (IRIN 
news, 30 September 2005)  
The indicators for the criteria of access to employment opportunities and 
social services are the percentage of returnees with regular employment, shelter, 
health, education and clean water supply. According to the latest available data, 
covering one third of the assisted returnee population, only around 20% of 
returnees have regular employment (Community-based Snapshot Survey, 2011: 2). 
UNHCR has provided shelters over 216,000 since 2002 (Online Interview, 23 
October 2011), which means 1,296,000 returnees have benefited from shelter and 
thus the rate of the returnees having adequate shelter is calculated as 23%. The 
snapshot survey (2011c: 3) reports that half of the returnee populations has only 
partial access to basic health services and only half of the returnee children have 
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full access to school.
15
 According to the survey (2011: 3), less than 20% of the 
returnee population has full access to clean drinking water. According to UNICEF 
data (UNICEF, 2011), total population with access to safe drinking is 48%, which 
is also relatively low, though higher than returnee’s access. Table 3 summarizes 
the latest reintegration level of the Afghan returnees. 
 
Table 3: Reintegration process of the Afghan refugee returnees, 2011. 
 
 
 Indicator Standard 
Measurement 
in standard 
Value 
Measurement 
in value 
Access to 
rights  
Individual 
identity 
documentation 
YES 
 
1 
YES 1 
Allowed to vote YES 1 YES 1 
Reports of 
security 
incidents 
NO 1 NO 1 
Access to 
employment 
opportunities 
Returnees with 
regular 
employment 
100% 1 20% 0.20 
Access to 
social 
services 
Shelter 100% 1 23% 0.23 
Health 100% 1 50% 0.50 
Education 100% 1 50% 0.50 
Water supply 100% 1 20% 0.20 
Total   8  4.63 
 
Reintegration 
process: 57% 
 
Mohammad Hanif Atmar, the Afghan Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development stressed the huge challenges in rural areas of Afghanistan. He 
counted food security, access to health and education, lack of basic infrastructure 
                                                 
15
 “The majority of returnee children living in central highlands attend school, but only around 5% 
of those living in the eastern region have similar access” (Community-based Snapshot Survey, 
2011: 3). 
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and insecurity as the basic survival challenges for the communities in rural 
Afghanistan. (IRIN news, 4 July 2005) Regular employment opportunities are 
scarce for returnees. 80% of them have mainly partial or full access to irregular 
employment and 75% of returnees have no access to regular employment (MoRR, 
2012: 2). 
In government controlled areas, access to healthcare system has increased. 
In 2001, only 9% of Afghans could access to public health while the percentage 
increased to 65% by the end of 2010. (Amnesty International, 2011: 6) Indeed, 
international assistance has improved health care system to a considerable degree 
by establishing a public health institute, developing primary and secondary care 
and reforming the Ministry of Health. However, there are still important gaps both 
in the presence of health facilities and in their access by the population. In 
southern Afghanistan, it is estimated that there are one health centre per two 
hundred thousand residents. (Nojumi et.al.2009: xix) According to IRIN news (1 
November 2012), nearly 30% of the population has no or very poor access to 
primary health care but in areas of conflict, it is estimated to increase to 70%. 
Thus, as average, 50% of the population is accepted to have access to healthcare 
facilities, which supports also the UNHCR survey among returnee population. 
Lack of access to health facilities causes also increase in opium consumption. 
Unfortunately, the Afghan people, especially women, use opium as a pain killer. 
(Nojumi et.al.2009: xx)  
Enrollment in primary school increased dramatically, though it still does 
not cover the whole population. In 2001, the number of children, enrolled in 
school was 900.000 and girls’ enrollment to school was around 5000. In 2011, 7 
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million children were enrolled to the school and 2.5 million of them were girls. 
Despite these numbers, however, rates of dropping out or absenteeism remain very 
high, namely 22% for girls and 11% for boys. (Amnesty International, 2011: 6) 
According to UNICEF data (2011), there are still 2.5 million girls out of school. 
As will be shown in the qualitative analysis, primary reasons for low female 
enrollment are identified as insecurity and socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism. 
 Table 3 attempts to show the latest situation of the reintegration process 
in Afghanistan by 2011. According to the findings, during 10 years, 4Rs activities 
are able to integrate only 57% of the returnees in general. In terms of economic 
and social rights, a considerable majority of returnees do still not have regular 
employment, adequate shelter, health services, education and clean drinking water. 
The percentage is even lower in the criteria such as access to regular employment 
(20%), access to adequate shelter (23%) and clean water (20%). A UNHCR 
survey, conducted during 2011, also supports this finding. UNHCR survey 
covered 30% of the UNHCR-assisted refugee returnee population in Afghanistan 
and found out that more than 43% of them failed to reintegrate and have poor 
living standards. (UN, 2012: 11) While UNHCR’s own standard for success is full 
reintegration (100%), it is regarded that international refugee regime has failed to 
promote sustainability of reintegration. It seems that reintegration of the Afghan 
returnees failed to be sustainable, mainly because of the low internal capacity of 
the country, namely poor access to basic services, lack of basic infrastructure and 
insecurity at the state level. The next part examines whether UNHCR’s 4Rs 
activities in Afghanistan have managed to prevent occurrence or recurrence of 
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mass refugee flows in terms of diminishing the numbers of asylum-seekers and 
IDPs. 
 
 
4.4.2. Prevention of the New Mass Flows 
 
The number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan decreased steadily (56%) 
between 2002-2006 and have increased (%69) since 2006, as shown in Figure 1. 
In 2011, the number of asylum-seekers reached 43.440, which means a big 
increase of 12.548 people (40%) in comparison with the date on 2002. In the 
absence of sustainable reintegration, the number of asylum seekers is likely to 
continue increasing. Because access to land or housing and employment are 
indicated as the key factors and root causes for secondary flow. A recent survey by 
the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit of University of York (2012: 
39) demonstrates that insecurity (39%), lack of income opportunities (36%), better 
services and conditions (19%) in their home of origin as their main drivers of 
displacement. Accordingly, it is estimated that 91.000 people fled their homes in 
the first five months of 2011, an obvious increase compared to 42.000 for the 
same period in 2010. Since the increased insecurity is an important cause for the 
increase in displacement, it is expected that the withdrawal of international forces 
from Afghanistan in 2014 would also cause further displacements. (The Study, 
2012: 41)  
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Figure 1: Asylum-seekers, originating from Afghanistan, 2002-2011
16
 
 
The sustainability of repatriation is also closely linked to prevention of 
further displacements. The failure in providing sustainability of repatriation in 
Afghanistan means majority of the population lacks access to basic services. This 
would also increase the potential for further displacements. A recent UNHCR 
survey (MoRR, 2012: 2) finds out that 44% of the rural secondary migration are 
directed to foreign countries and the remaining to urban. The survey indicates the 
search for employment as the primary motive for the secondary migration of rural 
communities. Inadequate shelter and landlessness and food shortages constitute 
the secondary reasons. In the southern provinces, poor security becomes the main 
motivation and 63% secondary migration in the South are directed to foreign 
countries, mostly to Pakistan (63%) and Iran (30%).  
 
                                                 
16
 The data for Figure 1 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
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Figure 2: Number of IDPs in Afghanistan, 2002-2011
17
 
 
In addition to the prevention of the asylum-seekers, the study questions 
also the change in number of IDPs. Because in addition to preventing secondary 
movements, another core aim of the prevention strategy is to prevent IDPs to 
become refugees through increasing their access to basic services. IDPs in 
Afghanistan indicate three major protection priorities, namely employment, food 
and water and housing. However, a recent survey conducted by Norwegian 
Refugee Council (2012: 7) shows that unemployment rates are below national 
averages and only less than a tenth of IPDs have received employment assistance. 
IDPs experience food shortage, spend over three quarters of their income on food 
and have still nutritional deficiencies as those displaced 10 years ago.  Water is 
also in short supply. As Figure 2 shows, number of IDPs in Afghanistan decreased 
30% between 2002-2011. However number of IDPs increased dramatically 
between 2006-2011. In 2006, number of IDPs was 129.310 and in 2011, it 
increased to 447.547 with a sharp increase of 246%. 
                                                 
17
 The data for Figure 2 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
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In sum, examining the two goals of UNHCR’s strategy of prevention and 
solution, the analysis first concludes that international refugee regime has failed to 
reintegrate Afghan returnees fully to provide the voluntary repatriation as a 
durable solution. Instead only half of the returnees have been reintegrated in 
general sense. The section, second, finds out that the goal of prevention of new 
mass flows or secondary flows could not be fulfilled. Especially since 2006, an 
increase of 44% has been observed for the number of asylum seekers from 
Afghanistan and a dramatic increase of 246% has been observed for the number of 
IDPs. The study concludes that the reasons of failure in prevention are 
unsustainable process of reintegration and the ongoing insecurity. These reasons 
are also among the main characteristics of countries with low internal capacity. 
Based on the findings of the qualitative analysis, it is concluded that international 
refugee regime has not been effective in Afghanistan, mainly because of its low 
internal capacity. In other words, the Afghan case shows that the effectiveness of 
4Rs activities are hindered by the factors that 4Rs activities intended to overcome, 
namely low internal capacity.  
The next section will first question the main social conditions in 
Afghanistan that lead the Afghan people cooperate with or resist 4Rs activities. 
Identifying these conditions will enable the study to provide tentative principles to 
shape them in accordance with the regime activities. Second, it will question the 
nature of the relations between the Afghan government and international 
community to identify factors that shape this bilateral relationship. The aim, here, 
is to provide incentives to international community to increase the cooperative 
nature of the relations with the government. Last, it will examine how 4Rs 
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activities are perceived by the Afghan people again to identify the factors that 
shape their perceptions. This will enable the study to make suggestions to 
international community to increase people’s support for their activities. This 
qualitative analysis aims to provide incentives to UNHCR and its implementing 
partners to increase regime effectiveness in Afghanistan as a country with low 
internal capacity. 
 
 
4.5. Conditions to Increase Regime Effectiveness in Afghanistan: A 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
4.5.1. Social Conditions 
 
A senior officer in Kabul (Online Interview, 30 January 2013) states that 
current volatile and dynamic socio-economic conditions prevent any program to 
be fully effective and consistent with the social conditions of Afghanistan. Since 
4Rs activities are largely donor-driven, donors’ preferences mostly shape the level 
of attention to such aspects of the environment. However it is still attempted as 
much as possible to be consistent with the social conditions of Afghanistan and 
work under the given political climate to adequately support and assist the socio-
economic needs of its people of concern. In Afghanistan, main social conditions 
that prevent the effectiveness of 4Rs programs are identified as the lack of security 
for years and socio-cultural and religious conservatism. Thus, it might be argued 
that contrary to the neorealist claim of the importance of states’ power capabilities 
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within the anarchical system This study supports the importance of the unit level 
characteristics such as social conditions in making implications for regime 
effectiveness. Thus, identifying such characteristics can provide incentives to 
regimes’ institutions to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low 
internal capacity. 
As Cole (2012) stresses, conventional development efforts that have 
worked in elsewhere can not be functional in volatile regions like Afghanistan. For 
example, demobilization efforts for small arms to increase security level for 
returnees and local people became ineffective in Afghanistan. Because the lack of 
security for long years created a culture of bearing arms to provide security in the 
absence of distrust in central government and national security forces. An in-depth 
report on the small arms (Guns out of Control, 2006: 24) quoted Abdul Hamid 
Mubarez, former deputy Minister of Information and Culture, stating that “many 
people feel obliged to keep guns for their personal safety because of a lack of 
security”. It is also stated in the report that Afghanistan is still an ungovernable 
land of local power struggles and traditional law is still maintained by village 
courts and the use of guns. Thus, as will also be illustrated in the Iraqi case, there 
is a culture of bearing arms in Afghanistan, which are perceived as necessary for 
providing security.  
Insecurity has also implications for parents’ decision on education of their 
children. Attacks of Taliban insurgencies on schools lead parents prefer their 
children to be illiterate but alive. (Nojumi et.al.2009: xviii) In the Afghan case, 
insecurity can prevent children access to schools in a general sense, regardless of 
male or female enrollment. However, as the Iraqi and Sudanese case will show, 
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insecurity can have also specific implications for girls’ attendance to school. 
Having a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity, neorealists do not 
question whether state can provide security within its borders. Accordingly, they 
focus on the states’ feeling of insecurity at the system level and argue that the 
anarchical nature of the international system constrains states to cooperate with 
international regimes. However, the Afghan case shows that in states with low 
internal capacity, there can be feeling of insecurity among society at the state 
level, which in return prevents cooperation of people with 4Rs activities. In other 
words, similar to the feeling of insecurity at the system level, the feeling of 
insecurity at the state level can prevent people’s cooperation with the regime 
activities, as in the example of Afghanistan. Thus, providing civilian security can 
increase the regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. 
The suspicion among the Afghan society, due to socio-cultural and 
religious conservatism, is also likely hindering the effectiveness of a health 
project. Recently, WFP and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition began a 
new project. It aims to reach 15 million Afghans with fortified foods. It will fortify 
wheat flour, vegetable oil and ghee “to reduce the prevalence of vitamin and 
mineral deficiencies among the general population and vulnerable groups such as 
children under five and women of reproductive age” (WFP News, 8 September 
2012) Regarding the project, however an Afghan analyst states that  
Are Afghans prepared to eat this food? How are you going to convince 
people that something added to their food is good for them? Afghanistan is 
full of conspiracy theories. And then there is corruption; how can this be 
implemented so those who buy the fortified wheat flour are not taking it 
out of the bag and filling it with other flour? In a large project like this, 
mullahs [religious leaders] and tribal elders need to be key advocates, 
otherwise it won't work. (IRIN news, 4 October 2012) 
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Thus, the Afghan people can trust religious leaders and tribal elders more 
than their government. Due to socio-cultural conservatism, there is suspicion on 
government and involvement of international NGOs within a project can not 
always be sufficient enough to build people’s trust. So the involvement of 
religious leaders and tribal elders can support trust-building activities in 
Afghanistan, 4Rs projects are more likely to be effective through people’s 
acceptance and support. In other words, norms including shared ideas, 
expectations and beliefs as defined by Finnemore and Skkink (1998) can be 
subject to change as constructivists argue in the literature review. And this study 
proposes the inclusion of religious leaders and tribal elders in addition to 
government, to the trust-building and awareness raising activities to increase 
people’s support to 4Rs activities.  
Many Afghan families do also not allow their girls to continue their 
education beyond primary school due to socio-cultural and religious conservatism, 
as the Iraqi case will also illustrate. In an IRIN interview (13 October 2003), 
Nadya, a female teacher in the southeastern province of Paktika, said that 
Afghanistan is a conservative society and there would be more girls at schools 
when there were more female teachers. There is also a low level of awareness on 
the benefit of education in the public. “Some families still say if their daughters 
study higher classes they will forget their cultural values. Many parents still prefer 
their daughters to learn traditional embroidery and handicrafts rather than literacy 
and other subjects.” In 2004, Karin Sham Poo, UNICEF deputy Executive 
Director stated that UNICEF has worked with religious leaders and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs. The reason for working with them is to reach the ordinary man 
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and woman and convince them for the equal participation of girls and boys in 
primary schools. UNICEF is also aware of the importance of school location 
closer to home and of the female teachers in schools especially for the 
participation of girls to the school.  Thus, it talks religious leaders to create 
learning spaces at the community level. (IRIN news, 5 April 2004)  
In sum, unit level characteristics such as social conditions including the 
ongoing insecurity for years and socio-cultural and religious conservatism 
decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. Thus, social conditions 
in Afghanistan can not support the activities on disarmament, health and 
education, as the exemplified areas in this section. First, the ongoing insecurity 
together with the distrust in national government and national security forces 
decrease the effectiveness of disarmament activities to increase security in 
Afghanistan. Second, again the feeling of insecurity and socio-cultural and 
religious conservatism hinder the effectiveness of reintegration activities for 
female enrollment. Last, suspicion among local people on projects due to socio-
cultural and religious conservatism is likely to decrease effectiveness of the 
project on improved nutrition. These implications, derived from the analysis of 
social conditions in Afghanistan will provide insights for the tentative principles, 
to be proposed in Chapter 7. 
The next part will question the nature of the relations between the Afghan 
government and international community, namely the UN agencies, international 
NGOs and their national partners and donor states. While they are mostly related 
with the conditions within state, the factors that shape the nature of this bilateral 
relationship are regarded among the unit level characteristics. Because. Identifying 
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these factors will enable the study to provide incentives to international 
community to increase regime effectiveness in Afghanistan. 
 
 
4.5.2. Nature of the Relations between the Government and International 
Community  
 
Since the nature of relations between the government and international 
community is presumed to be determinant in the effectiveness of 4Rs activities, 
this section will attempt to analyze relations between the Afghan government and 
international community based on the views of both international community and 
the Afghan officials. This study identifies the critiques towards the corruption 
within government, allegations of the involvement of government officials in the 
opium trade and working difficulties in Taliban-controlled areas as the factors that 
determine the nature of the relations of international community with the Afghan 
government. It also finds out that complains of the Afghan officials about the 
insufficient level of support, lack of authority to use international aid and 
dependency of the government on foreign aid as the factors that shape the nature 
of the government’s relation with the international community. 
There are both political and administrative corruptions in Afghanistan. On 
the one hand, political corruption has visible negative impacts on political 
decision-making and good governance in the country. On the other hand, 
administrative corruption has impacts on the lives of Afghans by limiting their 
right to access public services and eroding their trust in government. (UNODC, 
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2012: 3) Thus, as will also be illustrated in the Iraqi case, it might be argued that 
corruption is a common problem in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the UNSC mission 
to Afghanistan calls on the Afghan government to address corruption among its 
officials and the judiciary in a more effective way. (IRIN news, 7 December 2006) 
Being related with corruption, opium cultivation is also a major issue in 
Afghanistan and makes up an estimated 50% of the actual GDP (Nojumi 
et.al.2009: xx). The UNODC has the role of strengthening the capacity of criminal 
justice system to enable the government to deal with the opium trade. Doris 
Buddenberg, head of UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that there 
are allegations for the involvement of key government figures in the opium trade 
in Afghanistan. Thus, corruption in the government as a recognized problem can 
prevent the effective implementation of a drug-control strategy. (IRIN news, 30 
November 2004) Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the UNODC also 
expressed his concerns on the opium trade and argued that it is the opium trade 
that corrupts officials and demonstrates that the government is inefficient. Thus, 
he argues that a centre of gravity for the responsibilities and institutions should be 
built together with a coalition of honest people to fight against corruption. (IRIN 
news, 2 August 2004) As the Iraqi case will also show, states with low internal 
capacity can have corruption problem, which can in return diminish the 
effectiveness of international regimes. When the corruption problem once exists, it 
is also likely that choices of political leaders and elites are shaped by their 
individual interests. Making policy decisions by individual interests rather than 
national interests, can in return damage the cooperative nature of the relations 
between the government and international community. 
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In addition to corruption and opium trade, international community has 
difficulties to work in Taliban-controlled areas. Taliban leaders mostly oppose to 
aid missions when they think they are linked to international military operations or 
seen to counter Afghan traditional values. Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, a Taliban 
spokesman stated that Taliban is not against health facilities as long as they obey 
the Islamic law. He said that they welcome and support them when they come to 
treat poor people. (IRIN news, 14 January 2009) According to IRIN news (12 
December 2012), the UN agencies have contact with the Taliban groups with the 
aim of delivering humanitarian aid. A major problem in Afghanistan is that there 
are a lot of fragmentations, which are operating quite autonomously. Robin 
Waudo, the ICRC spokesman in Afghanistan, told IRIN (12 December 2012) that 
there is not one single body in Afghanistan to deal with. There are armed ethnic 
gangs, village protection forces and semi-official militia, which complicate the 
delivery of aid. Thus, as IRIN news (5 April 2013) stated, the war in Afghanistan 
is more than a fight between Taliban insurgent groups and the government and the 
international forces. There are in reality local armed groups, who frequently 
operate in a kind of grey area between and among these sides.  
Apart from critiques towards the Afghan government, international 
community makes also self-critiques
18
. According to the aid workers in 
Afghanistan, billions of dollars of aid have not been spent based on needs but 
instead driven by short term political and military aims. Laurent Saillard, head of 
the European Commission’s humanitarian aid arm in Afghanistan, admits that 
humanitarian community is partly to blame while it allowed the government to 
                                                 
18
 The ‘self’ in the concept of self-critique will be used within the broad definition of international 
community, namely UN agenices, international NGOs, donor countries and international security 
missions. 
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defer its responsibilities. Because the Afghan government have used the excuse of 
lack of capacity and kept the right actors outside the game. (IRIN news, 30 
January 2012) Analyst Barnet Rubin (IRIN news, 20 June 2006) also criticizes 
international actors in putting primary emphasis on military action and thus 
arming a large number of uncoordinated and mainly criminalized militias. This led 
the transfer of power from Taliban forces to a group of criminalized and armed 
groups. The leaders of those groups have been funded by the drug economy and 
there emerged huge centres of illegitimate power in these armed groups. Instead, 
international actors should have first form the government with political 
legitimacy before starting the military effort. An IRIN analysis (Towards more 
sustainable solution, 2012) also criticizes international aid. According to the 
analysis, the main reason of failure in getting the desired effect of international aid 
over the last decades is the priority given to political and military goals instead of 
humanitarian and developmental needs. These critiques together with the 
conditions in Afghanistan, examined above will provide incentives to the study in 
proposing tentative principles for the regime effectiveness. 
Since the nature of relationship between the government and international 
community is shaped by both of the parties, the remaining of the section will 
examine the concerns of the Afghan officials on the policies of international 
community. 
In general, the Afghan government has been pleased with the support of 
international community in reconstruction efforts and improving security situation 
in Afghanistan. Though, Afghan officials mostly find the support as being not 
enough and demand more, the Afghan officials seem to admit that international 
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aid is not a one-way relationship. Dr. Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan Finance Minister, 
told IRIN (28 August 2003) that the Afghan government should be accountable 
for the international aid, having measurable criteria of success in using this 
money. Thus, major improvements should be made in transparency, 
accountability, anti-corruption and management. However the Afghan officials 
have also critiques in terms of the level of support, the level authority given to the 
government and the dependency in the absence of economically self-sufficient 
Afghan government.  
The Afghan officials are not satisfied with the level of support, given by 
the international community. Afghan leaders told the UNSC mission to 
Afghanistan that the government and international community failed to provide 
basic services, governance and security to rural communities. And this failure led 
in return increase in the Taliban insurgency. In relation with the insurgency within 
the state, they also criticized international community not to support the 
government enough to develop its own security forces. (IRIN news, 7 December 
2006) Though they admit their failures in preventing insecurity and corruption, the 
Afghan officials blame the international community for providing insufficient 
resources. IRIN (18 October 2006) reports that Qadam Ali Nikpai, Public 
Information Officer at the Afghan Upper House of Parliament, says “our 
government is not even able to pay the salaries of its own employees or train 
enough police to maintain security, so how is it possible to tackle the problems of 
corruption and opium without firm support from the international community?” In 
an interview with IRIN (18 October 2006), Barnet Rubin also stated that 
international actors underinvested in security sector. According to him, 
 134 
international actors did not fund adequately in rebuilding of administration and 
they delayed the reconstruction and development programs. Such delays prevented 
Afghan government to have enough capacity to implement the programs.  
Mohammad Hanif Atmar, the Afghan Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development stated that the funding provided to the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development in 2005 was more than the money provided over 
the past 47 years. But it is still a drop in the ocean considering what is required in 
rural areas. (IRIN news, 4 July 2005) Habibullah Qadiri, the chief adviser to the 
Afghan government on refugees and returnees argued that there was also not 
enough humanitarian assistance by the donor countries for returnees. He stated 
that the Afghan government received US$ 200 million for the return process in the 
previous years and in 2004 the funding was decreased to US$ 100 million. He 
criticized the donors to be less interested in humanitarian assistance, which is 
crucial for the sustainability of return process and on the development of the 
country. (IRIN news, 28 December 2004)  
The Afghan officials also criticize international community in terms of the 
level of support, provided to outside of Kabul, particularly to the rural areas. In 
2003, Mohammad Ali Jalali, the Governor of southeastern border province of 
Paktika, stated that no reconstruction and development aid has taken place in 
isolated and unstable Paktika, where is deprived of any school, hospital and other 
essential services. (IRIN news, 16 October 2003) The WB prediction of that 
reduction in aid flow will have little impact on poverty levels proves this critique 
right. Because the WB argues that much of the aid was never targeting the poorest.  
(IRIN news, 26 March 2012)  
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In terms of the lack of capacity and authority, there are critiques towards 
both the government itself and international community. For example, in 2010, the 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) officials stated that the main problem in the 
health sector in Afghanistan is not little funding but ineffective spending and a 
lack of national institutional capacity. Saadia Fayeq Ayubi, Director of 
Reproductive Health at the MoPH criticized the foreign agencies arguing that the 
MoPH has only a symbolic role with extremely low capacity. She stated that that 
donors give money to NGOs and other implementing agencies and the MoPH 
could not even monitor the projects implemented by these agencies. (IRIN news, 9 
June 2010) The report of the International Development Committee (2012) also 
indicates that massive aid effort bypasses the Afghan government. This in turn 
limits the ability of the government to build public services and strengthen its 
governance systems. The Afghan Government estimated that 82% of external aid 
between 2002-10 bypassed the government. However the report also states that the 
Afghan government does have a limited capacity for absorption. That’s why much 
of the funding goes through the UN agencies and NGOs. The WB also admits that 
large aid flows have brought problems for Afghanistan in addition to its benefits. 
Afghanistan’s national economy is heavily aid dependent. Civilian aid constitutes 
$6 billion a year, nearly %40 of the GDP. Most of the aid is outside the 
government budget and directly delivered by donors. In 2010/11, the core budget 
was only $1.9 billion (%12) whereas $13.8 billion (%88) was the external budget, 
executed by donors and their implementing partners. (World Bank, 2012a: 1) 
In sum, the Afghan government does mainly not have the governance 
capacity to cooperate with international community, particularly due to corruption 
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within government as a common characteristic in countries with low internal 
capacity. It is identified that corruption lead international community to bypass the 
Afghan government in the allocation of international funds and operation of 4Rs 
projects. This bypass tendency in return is likely to hinder the capacity-building 
process of governments further, by causing a vicious circle.  
There are also critiques towards international community in terms of doing 
too much for Afghanistan rather than too little. President Karzai argues that the 
biggest part of the corruption in Afghanistan is imposed on the government by the 
foreign countries. He accuses foreigners of attempting to gain influence over the 
government through giving contracts to high-ranking Afghan officials. This, 
according to him, in return, paves the way for corruption. He argues that 
Afghanistan “is still depending on relations with foreign countries. In order to 
fight graft, we must reform our administrative system and make sure we pay 
enough salary to our employees and make sure their future is guaranteed”. (Radio 
Free Europe, 22 December 2012)  
Astri Suhrke argues that adding more troops, more money and more 
consultants became counterproductive in Afghanistan. For example, external aid 
provided to Afghanistan is far beyond the absorbing capacity of the Afghan 
economy and constructed a dependent state with vulnerable foundations. Thus, 
Afghan elites have been given more incentives for corruption and they adopted 
their behaviors according to international donors instead of Afghan citizens.  
(Omestad, 2011) The report released by the Feinstein International Center 
(Fishstein, Wilder, 2012: 3) argues that the international aid is destabilizing 
Afghanistan by fuelling massive corruption and generating competition over aid 
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resources and conflict along factional, tribal or ethnic lines. Peter Graaff, Country 
Representative of the WHO told IRIN (12 October 2009) that the MoPH has only 
a small government budget to cover running costs and the major development 
projects and specific health projects are funded by international and multinational 
donors. Thus, Afghan public health system is a donor-dependent one, which 
threatens the long-term sustainability of the existing health services.  
In sum, this section concludes that the nature of relations between 
government and international community are not cooperative and that there is a 
reciprocal dissatisfaction between Afghan government officials and international 
aid community in terms of provision of 4Rs activities. The factors that shape their 
relationship are identified for international community as corruption in 
Afghanistan government and allegations for the government officials’ 
involvement in opium trade and fragmentation in Afghanistan due to the existence 
of Taliban controlled areas. The factors that shape government relations with the 
international community are identified as critiques towards the level of support, 
lack of authority to control aid spending, dependency on foreign aid. 
This study seeks to examine the unit-level characteristics of Afghanistan to 
derive implications for regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. In addition to social conditions, the nature of the relations between the 
Afghan government and international community are examined so far. The next 
part seeks to examine the perceptions of the Afghan people in order to give 
incentives to UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase people’s support 
for 4Rs activities. 
 
 138 
4.5.3. Perceptions of the Local People in Afghanistan 
 
The Afghan people mostly welcome 4Rs activities of the international 
community and almost half of them have confidence in the activities of 
international and national NGOs. However more than half of them have still 
distrust in international community, mainly because of their belief on that 
international community serves its own interests rather than the Afghan people 
and that their distribution of international aid is unfair. 
In 2004, Sima Samar, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) stated that in the beginning, there were allegations to 
prevent the increase in public awareness on human rights issues, arguing that the 
commission was against the Afghan culture and was instead spreading the 
Western culture. However in three years, perception of the Afghan people in 
AIHRC began to change positively, considering AIHRC as a platform to share 
their concerns and complaints. (IRIN news, 22 December 2004) In an interview 
with IRIN (17 November 2004), a disarmed female ex-combatant Bubany 
Khairandesh stated very positive views on the Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) program. She believed that DDR is a good process serving 
for the prosperity of the Afghan nation.  
 Despite their welcome on the international community, it seems that 
Afghans have also distrust in international community. As will also be explained 
in the case of Iraq and Sudan, the feeling of distrust among local people can create 
adverse implications for the operation of 4Rs activities. Thus, it is important to 
identify the reasons of distrust are important in providing tentative principles to 
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increase effectiveness of international refugee regime in countries with low 
internal capacity. The main reasons of distrust in international community in 
Afghanistan are different than Iraq and Sudan. As will be shown in Chapter 5, 
main reasons of distrust among the Iraqi people in international community are the 
existence of fake local aid agencies, the belief on its contact with intelligence 
services and the Christian missionary activities. As will be illustrated in Chapter 6, 
the Sudanese people have distrust in international community because of a 
different reason, namely their unmet expectations from the presence of 
international missions. However, in Afghanistan, people’s belief on that 
international community serves its own interests rather than the Afghan people 
and that distribution of international aid is unfair mainly create distrust among 
them in the international community. 
According to the surveys conducted by the Asian Foundation Afghanistan 
Office annually, the percentage of the people who have a great deal or fair amount 
of confidence in international and national NGOs was stable at around 65% and 
60% (Asia Foundation, 2007: 22; 2008: 24; 2009: 24). However in 2010 (p.10) 
and 2011 (p.69) surveys, a significant fall in confidence in NGOs were identified. 
Confidence of the Afghan people towards international NGOs decreased to 54% 
and in national NGOs decreased to around 55%. In 2011 survey (p.112) nearly 
half of the respondents (47%) think that officials in national NGOs act in their 
own interests rather than public’s interests. Also 47% of the respondents think that 
international NGOs consider their own interests when making decisions and 
policies rather than the interests of the Afghan public. As Betts (2009) indicates, 
4Rs activities are motivated by North’s self-interests.  
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In terms of the second critique of the Afghan people on international 
community, concerns on the unfair distribution of international aid between the 
regions are raised. Mullah Najibullah, a village elder from the northern Afghan 
province of Faryab criticizes international community to pour much of the 
resources into the volatile southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand since 
they mainly fight against insurgents in these provinces. Meanwhile, the northern 
provinces could not benefit fairly from development aid. He told IRIN (26 March 
2012) that “we keep calm and support our government, so no development 
projects come here. People are unhappy about this”. The report of Feinstein 
International Center, Tufts University (Fishstein, Wilder, 2012: 42) finds out that 
the critique of international aid as being unfair and not enough is a widely 
accepted one. The consistent refrain is that international aid has been inequitably 
distributed among other regions, ethnic groups, tribes and villages. The Afghan 
people complain also on a “peace penalty”, which means donor resources are 
mainly directed to the less secure areas. In the report by the Feinstein International 
Center (Fishstein, Wilder, 2012: 3), it is found out that many Afghans viewed aid 
projects negatively because of the injustice in benefiting from the international 
assistance. A few corrupt officials and powerbrokers were the main beneficiaries 
of the international assistance at the expense of the majority of Afghans. Thus, it 
might be argued that as Goodwin-Gil (1999) warns in his critique of root causes 
approach in the literature review, 4Rs activities jeopardize the neutrality and 
impartiality of international organizations in Afghanistan. Interestingly enough, 
international community and the Afghan people have different views on the same 
phenomena. On the one hand, UNHCR and its implementing partners in 
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Afghanistan provide the security situation in southern Afghanistan as an excuse 
for their inactivities in some parts of Afghanistan, particularly in Taliban-
controlled areas. On the other hand, the Afghan people complain about injustice 
distribution of aid, as a result of the priority given to the more problematic areas of 
Afghanistan by international community.  
In sum, the Afghan people welcome 4Rs activities and about half of the 
Afghan people have confidence in international and national NGOs, which means 
nearly half of them do not. Though the Afghan people welcome 4Rs activities, tow 
factors are identified: international community serves its own interests rather than 
the Afghan people and their support is unfair and insufficient.  
 
 
4.6. Results of the Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses 
 
Questioning two main goals of UNHCR’s strategy of prevention and 
solution, the chapter first concludes that international refugee regime failed to 
reintegrate Afghan returnees to ensure the voluntary repatriation as a durable 
solution. Instead only half of the returnees have been reintegrated. The study finds 
also out that the goal of prevention of new mass flows or secondary flows could 
not be fulfilled. Thus, it is concluded that international refugee regime was not 
effective in Afghanistan, during the years 2002-2011. The main reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan is found as the main 
reasons that motivated UNHCR to conduct 4Rs activities in the country, namely 
low internal capacity. In other words, international refugee regime attempted to 
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increase its effectiveness in Afghanistan since the country diminishes its 
effectiveness by being a refugee producing country. In return, the main 
characteristics of the low internal capacity hindered the effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities in Afghanistan. Table 4 illustrates the findings of regime effectiveness in 
Afghanistan between 2002-2011.  
 
Table 4: Effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan, 
2002-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The qualitative analysis first questions the main social conditions in 
Afghanistan that lead the Afghan people cooperate with or resist regime activities. 
Second, the nature of the relations between the Afghan government and 
international community are examined and the factors that shape this relationship 
have been identified. Last, the nature of people’s perceptions in 4Rs activities are 
questioned and factors that shape people’s perceptions are identified. 
The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Afghanistan are identified as the lack of basic public services and insecurity at the 
state level. While these factors are attributed to the characteristics of the low 
internal capacity, it is argued that Afghanistan’s low internal capacity created 
adverse implications for the effectiveness of international refugee regime. The 
Case 
Sustainability 
of repatriation 
 (Y/N) 
Prevention 
of new 
flows 
(Y/N) 
Effectiveness 
 
Afghanistan NO NO 
NOT 
EFFECTIVE 
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chapter conducted also a qualitative analysis to identify tentative principles for 
UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase regime effectiveness in 
countries with low internal capacity. 
In the first part, it is concluded that social conditions such as ongoing 
insecurity for years, distrust in Afghan government, socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. 
Regarding the implementation of the social conditions on the possible ways of 
increasing the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan, three 
suggestions are identified. First, the Afghan people do not comply with the 
demobilization program because of the ongoing insecurity and access to education 
can also be prevented due to insecurity. In the example of demobilization 
program, if civilian security is provided through the mandate of international 
missions, effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan is likely to increase, as the 
case in the Iraqi disarmament efforts. Thus, insecurity that civilians have faced for 
long years seems to decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. Second, suspicion 
among local people on 4Rs projects due to socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism can cause difficulties to convince people to cooperate with a health 
project on improved nutrition. Thus, in addition to government, involvement of 
religious leaders and tribal elders as key advocates in large 4Rs projects can 
increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. Third, through trust-
building activities, socio-cultural and religious conservatism seems to prevent the 
effectiveness of education projects in the framework of 4Rs activities. If the level 
of awareness on the benefits of education among public increase and schools are 
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located closer to home with more numbers of female teachers, it is likely that 
girls’ attendance to schools will increase in Afghanistan.  
The second part finds out that the nature of relations between Afghan 
government and international community are not cooperative and that there is a 
reciprocal dissatisfaction. From the international community side, corruption in 
Afghanistan government and government involvement in opium trade and 
fragmentation in Afghanistan due to the existence of Taliban controlled areas are 
identified as the main factors that cause dissatisfaction from the Afghan 
government. The factors that shape government relations with international 
community are identified as critiques towards the level of support, dependency on 
foreign aid and lack of authority to control aid spending. Regarding the 
implementation of the relations between government and international community 
on the possible ways of increasing the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime in Afghanistan, two suggestions are identified.  
First, corruption among Afghan government officials and allegations for 
the involvement of key government figures in the opium trade can prevent 
effective implementation of 4Rs activities. If government institutions pursue their 
responsibilities in a transparent and accountable way, bilateral relations between 
international community and government is likely to be more cooperative, which 
would in turn can increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. Thus, 
funding government sufficiently to increase its capacity of rebuilding its 
administration can increase the Afghan government’s capacity to deal with 
corruption. The fragmentation of politics can also hinder the effective 
implementation of 4Rs activities, when there is more than one center of gravity, 
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such as local commanders, other armed groups and criminal gangs. They all can 
have different preconditions to support 4Rs activities and it can be different for 
international community to contact with them to pursue its 4Rs activities. In other 
words, the presence of a single body in Afghanistan to be dealt with can increase 
the likelihood of cooperation between government and international community. 
The insufficient level of support can also decrease the government ability to 
cooperate with international community in the implementation of 4Rs activities. If 
international actors fund the Afghan government adequately to rebuild 
administration and to develop its own security forces, it is likely that government 
capacity to implement 4Rs programs will increase. Second, as the Iraqi case will 
also illustrate, lack of government authority on aid spending and monitoring 
projects can diminish the cooperation between Afghan government and 
international community. Because, bypassing the government can limit its ability 
to build and strengthen the governance systems. Additionally, dependence on 
foreign aid can diminish government capacity to sustain 4Rs activities. Thus, 
activities to increase government authority on aid spending and 4Rs projects and 
government core budget are likely to increase cooperation between government 
and international community in Afghanistan. 
In the last part, nature of the perceptions of the Afghan people is identified 
as distrustful, namely because of the belief on that international community serves 
its own interests rather than the Afghan people and their support is unfair and 
insufficient. Distrust among the Afghan people in national and international NGOs 
can hinder people’s confidence and support on the 4Rs activities. Regarding the 
implementation of perceptions of the Afghan people on the possible ways of 
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increasing the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Afghanistan, two 
suggestions are identified. First, trust building activities to convince people on the 
neutrality of international community can increase effectiveness of international 
refugee regime through developing positive perceptions in 4Rs activities. Second, 
given the absence of any real improvement on the lives of Afghan people, difficult 
process of transition in countries with low internal capacity  can create a feeling of 
a fair and equal distribution of aid, which is likely to increase regime effectiveness 
in implementing 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. 
 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
Afghanistan, as a country with low internal capacity, has produced the 
world’s largest refugee flows and decreased the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime by its continuing insecurity and low political, economic and social 
performance. This chapter first examined Afghanistan’s political, social and 
cultural structure and its history, with the aim of understanding the historical 
background of its fragile political structure. During its history, Afghanistan 
produced mass refugee flows and became the largest refugee-producing country 
since 1979. As being a refugee producing country, the strategy of prevention and 
solution and the 4Rs program have been conducted in Afghanistan by UNHCR 
and its implementing partners since 2002. Thus, the third part of the chapter 
provided brief information on the 4Rs activities in Afghanistan, which aim to 
build the internal capacity of Afghanistan through humanitarian, economic, 
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military and development aids. In other words, the main aim of 4Rs activities has 
been to increase the internal capacity of Afghanistan to increase the effectiveness 
of international refugee regime in Afghanistan, through fulfilling its mandate of 
durable solutions and protection to refugees.  
The quantitative analysis in this chapter questioned whether international 
refugee regime has been effective in Afghanistan through its 4Rs activities 
between 2002-2011. It measured regime effectiveness through criteria of 
sustainability of reintegration and prevention of new flows. It is concluded that 
international refugee regime was not effective in Afghanistan between 2002-2011. 
The regime failed to reintegrate 100% of the Afghan returnees to provide the 
voluntary repatriation as a durable solution. Instead only half of the returnees have 
been reintegrated in general sense. In terms of the second goal, the study found out 
that occurrence of new mass flows or secondary flows could also not be 
prevented. Especially since 2006, an increase of 44% has been observed for the 
number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and a dramatic increase of 246% has 
been observed for the number of IDPs. 
The qualitative analysis questioned whether 4Rs activities implemented in 
Afghanistan are consistent with the social conditions of Afghanistan, how the 
international community and Afghan government perceive each other and how 
4Rs activities are perceived by the Afghan people. It found out that international 
aid community could not shape their activities in accordance with the country’s 
social conditions due to given difficulties such as security, religious believes or 
traditional behaviors. A reciprocal dissatisfaction between Afghan government 
officials and international aid community was also found. Similarly, it was found 
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out that the Afghan people have critiques towards international aid as being unfair 
and not enough. They have also complaints on the dependency on international aid 
to be able to sustain their lives.  
Several implications for the regime effectiveness are derived from the case 
of Afghanistan. In terms of social conditions, increasing civilian security and 
overcoming socio-cultural and religious conservatism are likely to increase the 
regime effectiveness in Afghanistan. In terms of the relations between the Afghan 
government and international community, funding government sufficiently to 
increase its capacity of rebuilding its administration can increase the Afghan 
government’s capacity to deal with corruption. Activities to increase government 
authority on aid spending and 4Rs projects are likely to provide cooperative nature 
of the bilateral relations. Regarding the perceptions of the Afghan people, trust-
building activities on the neutrality of international community and information 
campaigns on the difficult process of transition in Afghanistan can develop 
positive perceptions among Afghan people towards the 4Rs activities. 
The next chapter will continue with the second case of the study, namely 
Iraq. It will first aim to question the effectiveness of international refugee regime 
in Iraq through the quantitative criteria of sustainability of reintegration and 
prevention of new flows. The chapter will, second, qualitatively analyze the social 
conditions, nature of the relations between the Iraqi government and international 
community and perceptions of the local people to identify conditions to increase 
regime effectiveness in Iraq. The implications, derived from the case studies will 
in return provide tentative principles for international community, in terms of how 
to operate to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE CASE STUDY 2: IRAQ 
 
 
 
In Chapter 4, the first case study, Afghanistan, was examined through 
qualitative and quantitative analyses both to question the effectiveness of 
international refugee regime in the country and to derive implications for tentative 
principles in Chapter 7. By the analysis of the reintegration level of the Afghan 
returnees by the end of 2011 and prevention of further displacements, the chapter 
found out that international refugee regime was not effective in Afghanistan 
during the years 2002-2011. Examining the socio-cultural and socio-political 
categorizations, identified in the research design to increase regime effectiveness, 
the chapter also found out that social conditions and perceptions of the local 
people were not supportive of the 4Rs activities in Afghanistan and the nature of 
the relations between the Afghan government and international community was 
not cooperative. The implications derived from this qualitative analysis would be 
used together with the implications from Iraq and Sudan in providing tentative 
principles for international community to increase regime effectiveness in 
countries with low internal capacity. 
This chapter examines the second case study through quantitative and 
qualitative analyses to question whether international refugee regime was effective 
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in Iraq, as being a refugee producing country with low internal capacity and to 
derive implications for the conditions to increase regime effectiveness. The 
chapter will first give a brief introduction to the political and social structures in 
Iraq and then examine the history of Iraq to understand the roots of Iraq’s low 
internal capacity and of the forced displacement waves in the country. The third 
part will seek to examine the 4Rs activities of UNHCR and its implementing 
partners in Iraq. The next part will examine the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime in Iraq between 2003-2011 through quantitative analysis. The last 
part will seek to derive implications for the principles to increase regime 
effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity by qualitatively analyzing the 
social conditions, nature of the relations between the Iraqi government and 
international community and the perceptions of the local people on the activities 
of international community in Iraq. 
This chapter argues that international refugee regime was not effective in 
Iraq during the period 2003-2011, based on the findings of the quantitative 
analysis. 4Rs activities in Iraq became inefficient to reintegrate returnees in a 
sustainable manner and to prevent the recurrence of new mass flows. The 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners had also a limited effect due to 
volatile security situation and conservative and social structure in Iraq. The nature 
of the relations between the Iraqi government and international community, 
namely the UN agencies, international NGOs and their national partners and donor 
states, remain uncooperative due to the bilateral critiques and particularly due to 
the problems within Iraqi government. Last, the Iraqi people have perceived 
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international community with suspicion and have confidence problem towards 
local and international NGOs.  
 
 
5.1 A General Overview 
 
The Republic of Iraq has 438,317 sq km territory, including 950 sq km 
water land with six neighbor states: Iran (1,458 km), Saudi Arabia (814 km), Syria 
(605 km), Turkey (352 km), Kuwait (240 km) and Jordan (181 km). (CIA, Iraq, 
2013) However, Iraq’s southern border with Iran has not been finally settled. Also 
its border with Kuwait was agreed by Iraq in 1993 under the UN pressure and it is 
still contentious. (Marr, 2012: 9) Iraq has a population of about 31,1 million. In 
Iraq, Arabs constitute the major ethnic group with 75-80% of the population. 
While the largest minority belongs to Kurds with 15-20%, Turkmen, Assyrian and 
others constitute the remaining 5%. (CIA, 2013b) Turkmens are village dwellers 
and mostly live in the northeastern Iraq, while Assyrians are thee descendants of 
ancient Mesopotamian peoples (Chanaa, 2007). The Arab Sunni minority 
traditionally dominated Iraqi politics and economy, particularly during the 
Saddam regime. Thus, many Arab Shiites had the feeling that they were excluded 
from the country’s politics and received very little dividend from its wealth. 
(UNHCR, 2003b: 4) 
Arabic and Kurdish are official languages in Iraq. Turkmen and Assyrian 
are also official languages but only in areas where they constitute a majority of the 
population. (CIA, 2013b) Majority of the population believes in Islam, though 
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there is a strong sectarian division among Shiite Muslim (60-65%) and Sunni 
Muslim (32-37%) (CIA, 2013b). As being a minority in the Arab world as a 
whole, Shiite Muslims constitute the majority in Iraq. Christians, Jews, Yazidis 
and Sabians constitute the remaining 3%. During the Saddam regime, Christians 
made up nearly 4% of the Iraqi population. (Chanaa, 2007) According to CIA data 
(2013c) the overall Christian population may have dropped by 50% since the fall 
of Saddam regime, with many fleeing to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Sunnis tend 
to be more secular and thus prefer a less religious form of government. Since 
many Kurds are Sunni Muslims, most of the Sunni population live in northern Iraq 
and dominate the urban population in the cities of Iraq. (Hunt, 2005: 6) 
Iraq has 18 governorates of which the capital is Baghdad. It has a mixed 
legal system of civil and Islamic law. As being a parliamentary democracy, Jalal 
Talabani is the President of Iraq since April 2005. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki 
is the head of government since May 2006. In November 2010, both Talabani and 
al-Maliki were reelected as the chief of state and head of government and the next 
election is to be held in 2014. In the legislative branch, Iraq has a unicameral 
Council of Representatives. Last election for the council was in March 2010 and 
the next election is to be held in 2014.  
Iraq has better economic indicators in comparison with Afghanistan. Its 
GDP (purchasing power parity) is US$ 155.4 billion in 2012, ranked in 61
st
 in the 
world (Afghanistan is ranked in 111st). Its GDP real growth rate is 10.2 % in 
2012, ranked in 7
th
 in the world (Afghanistan is ranked in 49th). Iraqis have a 
GDP per capita of US$ 4,600 in 2012, ranked in 160th in the world (Afghanistan 
is ranked in 217th). (CIA, Iraq, 2013) Iraq also has the world’s 4th largest oil 
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reserves, namely 141.35 billion barrels proven crude oil reserve (OPEC, 2012). 
However Iraq is still indicated as weak, failed and underdeveloped. According to 
the key economic, political, security and social welfare criteria, Index of State 
Weakness (Rice, Patrick, 2008: 10) ranked Iraq in the 4th place among 141 
countries. Using key social-economic and political-military indicators, Failed 
State Index of Fund for Peace (2012: 4) ranked Iraq in 9th of 177 countries. 
According to the index, the country was at 4th in 2005 (Failed State Index, 2005) 
and within 7 years, its rank was increased to 9th. HDI of UNDP (2011: 126) 
ranked Iraq in 132 of 187 countries. According to the index, Iraq increased its 
development ranks within the last 7 years, despite its still very low development 
rank. Its HDI (2011: 133) was 0.552 in 2005 and with a small increase in 2011, 
became 0.573.   
In sum, it can be concluded that Iraq is still a refugee producing country 
with low internal capacity. By the beginning of 2012, Iraq hosts about 1,332 
million IDPs and about 1,428 million refugees abroad (UNHCR, 2011a: 43), 
mainly in Jordan and Iran. The next part of the study will examine the history of 
Iraq with the aim of identifying main causes of the country’s low internal 
capacity. 
 
 
5.2. A Brief History of Iraq 
 
This section seeks to understand the roots of the Iraq’s low internal 
capacity through examining its political evolution during the past century. With 
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this aim, the section will study the independence process of Iraq, the period under 
the Saddam rule and the Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
 
5.2.1. Iraq as an Independent State 
 
Iraq hosted a number of the earliest civilizations such as Sumerians, 
Akkadians, Babylonians and Assyrians. In the 8th century, Baghdad became a 
famous centre for learning and arts. (Chanaa, 2007) Iraq had been under foreign 
rule for four centuries. Ottoman rule began in Iraq in 1535 and lasted in 1918. Iraq 
allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary during World War I and when the 
Ottoman Empire was defeated, it came under British occupation. In 1920, Iraq 
became a British mandate until its transition to independence. (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 154) British granted Sunni Muslims control over Iraq and set Faisal I as the 
King of Iraq. This Sunni Muslims’ political dominance over Shiite majority 
created a sectarian tension that still exists.(Hunt, 2005:57) Iraq gained 
independence in 1932. However, only one year later of its independence, a small 
minority uprising, namely Christian Assyrian community, led a violent crackdown 
of the government. Domestic politics remained turbulent since many factions 
compete for power and late in 1936, the first military coup of the Iraqi history 
happened. (Chanaa, 2007) 
From 1932 to 1958, Iraq was ruled by monarchy from the Hashemite 
family in the Hijaz (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 154).  The last monarch of Iraq was 
King Faisal II and massacred together with his family by a bloody coup in 1958 
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(Fattah and Caso, 2009: xvi). In 1958, Iraq was declared as a Republic and Islam 
became its national religion. Early Republican governments in Iraq could not 
survive effectively because of the problems stemming from having a fragmented 
society. Thus, Iraq went through several years of instability and in 1962, Abdul-
Karim Qasim’s government was itself overthrown. Qasim’s political ideology was 
Iraqi nationalism, which then paved way for the pan-Arabism. (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 188) Accordingly, Ba’ath (renaissance in Arabic) Party was founded in 
Syria in the 1940s as having an ideology of socialism and secular nationalism. It 
was a pan-Arab party, regarding individual Arab states as part of the larger Arab 
nation.  The Iraqi Ba’ath Party was founded in 1951 and seized the power in 1963. 
However within months, the party was overthrown and returned to power in July 
1968 by a coup. (Chanaa, 2007)   
In the aftermath of the overthrown of monarchy, the Kurds, Iraq’s largest 
minority, began to split from the Arabs. They expected to become equal partners 
with the Arabs in the Iraqi new provisional constitution. However, after the 1958 
revolution, their hopes began to slip away. As a result, the Kurds engaged in a 
revolt against central government in 1961. (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 192)  
 In sum, Iraq remained under foreign rule for about four centuries and 
gained its independence in 1932. However, beginning from the first years, the 
Iraqi history witnessed political unrest, several coup d’états and ethnic division 
between the Kurds and Arabs. During this period, Iraq became a country with low 
internal capacity, by the increasing internal unrest and divisions, similar to the 
situation in the history of Afghanistan. 
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5.2.2. Iraq under the Saddam Rule 
 
Saddam Hussein was the power behind the President Ahmed Hassan Bakr 
and in 1979, Saddam Hussein personally came to power when Bakr resigned. In 
the 1980s, the ideology of Ba’ath Party stepped in to liberal economy and national 
industries were privatized.  In 1980, eight years of war with Iran began and caused 
mutual destruction. Under the auspices of the UN, a ceasefire ended the war in 
1988. Remaining isolated, Saddam continued his repressive policies and armament 
after the end of the war with Iran. (Chanaa, 2007) He also deployed the army 
against its internal enemies, especially against the Kurds. (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
219) In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared its annexation, accusing 
Kuwait of flooding world oil markets. After the international trade sanctions 
imposed by the UN, US-led coalition forces retook Kuwait through air attacks on 
Iraq and a ground invasion. Despite the heavy casualties, Saddam remained in 
power, but under some conditions. First, the UN officials inspected the country 
and Iraq destroyed at least some chemical weapons found by the UN inspectors. 
Second, in May 1996, Iraq accepted the UN trade sanctions, allowing Iraq to sell 
US$ 1 billion’s worth of oil in every three months. This money would be used for 
food, medicines and compensation to Kuwait. (Chanaa, 2007) 
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5.2.3. The ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and Its Afterwards 
 
In November 1997, the UN inspectors were expelled from Iraq when they 
found information on biological arms, chemical weapons and missiles. As Iraq 
ceased to cooperate with the UN, the U.S. and Britain began attacking Iraqi 
military targets and oil refineries in December 1998. Finally in March 2003, the 
‘war on terrorism’ was expanded to Iraq under the name of ‘Operation of Iraqi 
Freedom’ accusing Iraq to have weapons of mass destructions and alleged links to 
al Qaeda. (Chanaa, 2007) This operation had two main aims. First was a regime 
change by military intervention, namely removing Saddam Hussein from power. 
Second was to recover his supposed cache of weapons of mass destructions. 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246) The U.S. troops began a “deBaathification” process, 
which dissolved the Iraqi army and annulled the Ministry of Defense and 
Information. Throughout this process, the aim was to have a national government, 
being clean from the Ba’athist past.  (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268) In May 2003, 
Coalition Provisional Authority was authorized by the UN to ease Iraq’s transition 
to democracy and carry on reconstruction of the country, lasting until June 2004. 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250) The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was 
established in August 2003, as a political mission in its nature. It is mandated to 
advise and assist the Iraqi Government and Iraqi people in political dialogue, 
national reconciliation, electoral process and promoting the protection of human 
rights and judicial and legal reform. UNAMI is also mandated to work with 
government partners and civil society to coordinate the humanitarian and 
development efforts in Iraq. (UNAMI, Mandate) 
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Upon the coalition invasion in Iraq, insurgency and sectarian violence 
increased. Sunnis were regarded as the ousted Ba’athists and Sunni religious 
elements constituted the main opposition to the coalition forces. With the fall of 
the Ba’athist regime, Shiite Arabs and Kurds wanted to enjoy their ‘emancipation’ 
from the Saddam’s repressive rule.  In terms of Shiite opposition, Muqtada al-Sadr 
led a group of poor and disaffected Shiites to oppose the coalition forces. These 
Militants attacked against Iraqi and the U.S.-led forces. In the face of growing 
opposition, US decided to turn sovereignty over a national administration by June 
2004. As a result of the elections in 2005, Kurds were given power in the north, 
Shiites in the center and south. In October 2005, the new Iraqi constitution was 
approved and it created an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan in the northern Iraq as a 
federal entity (Article 113). Its government is Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG), having three governorates of Duhok, Erbil and Suleymaniyah and its 
president became Massoud Barzani.  
In December 2005, the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani became President of 
Iraq and in May 2006, the Shiite politician Nuri al-Maliki was selected as the head 
of government. As a result of Sunnis’ marginalization, a sectarian war in Baghdad 
began in 2006 (Marr, 2012: 258). The sectarian violence reached its climax with 
the February 2006 al-Askari attack by the Sunni extremists. Maliki government 
strengthened its position in 2008, at least in Arab dominated areas. Iraqi security 
forces together with the U.S. forces launched a nationwide crackdown against 
Sunni and Shiite militants in 2011 (IRIN news, 23 December 2011). This 
relatively increased stability allowed the Iraqi government to agree with the U.S. 
to withdraw its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. After the withdrawal of the 
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U.S. forces by 18 December 2011, concerns about the capability of Iraqi security 
forces to handle Iraqi security challenges, particularly from a resurgence of Sunni 
militant groups and al-Qaeda in Iraq increased (IRIN news, 23 December 2011). 
Indeed, Sunni groups coordinated several high profile bombings across the 
country throughout 2012. IRIN (31 December 2012) reported that the situation is 
likely to get worse with the Syria’s deteriorating situation.  Indeed, since the U.S. 
withdrawal, wave of attacks carried out mainly by Sunni extremists from Al-
Qaeda in Iraq against the Shiite communities has increased. Increasing tension 
between the Sunni and Shiite communities can be observed also in the political 
scene with the arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi by the 
Shiite-led government (BBC news, 20 December 2011). IRIN (19 January 2012) 
reported that “many fear the current violence could send the country back to the 
days of 2006-07 when Shiite-Sunni conflict left thousands of people dead and 
millions of others displaced. A few families have already packed their bags and 
others are contemplating leaving.”  
In sum, Iraq has a history of foreign rules, a short monarchy, a repressive 
Republic and sectarian violence. Political unrest due to several coup d’états, ethnic 
divisions between the Kurds and Arabs, war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait, 
foreign intervention by the U.S. lead coalition forces and sectarian war between 
Shiite and Sunni Arabs weakened the internal capacity of Iraq. The same reasons 
constitute also the roots of the forced displacements in Iraq. UNHCR have 
conducted its strategy of prevention and solution in Iraq since 2003 to increase the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. The next chapter will provide brief 
information on the Iraqi 4Rs activities,  
 160 
5.3. 4Rs Activities of UNHCR and its Implementing Partners 
 
Recalling the shift in the understanding of effectiveness from reactive to 
proactive policies, as examined in Chapter 3, UNHCR shifted its activities mainly 
to countries of origin by being directly present in Iraq. This part examines 4Rs 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners, namely Repatriation, 
Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, to increase the effectiveness of 
international refugee regime in Iraq. 
 
 
5.3.1. Repatriation
19
  Activities  
 
Upon the fall of Saddam’s regime, many Iraqi refugees wanted to 
repatriate and UNHCR facilitated their return and redirected the money, staff and 
equipment towards repatriation (IRIN news, 28 July 2003). Though UNHCR 
began to organize convoys from Iran to Iraq in November 2003, it did not 
encourage people to return due to the volatile security situation in Iraq. UNHCR 
monitored borders, conducted interviews with returnees and distributed 
information on conditions in Iraq to ensure that refugees have sufficient 
knowledge to make informed choices about their return (UNHCR, 2010a). The 
agency provided a package of relief items, including tents, blankets, plastic 
sheeting, kitchen sets and one-month’s food ration. It also provided them travel 
assistance and mine-awareness training. (IRIN news, 18 August 2004) 
                                                 
19
 Since the voluntary character of mass repatriations is questionable in general, the study refrains 
from defining repatriations from Iraq as ‘voluntary repatriations’. 
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In total, 530,695 refugees have returned between 2003-2011
20
 either with 
UNHCR assistance or spontaneously (UNHCR Statistical Online Population 
Database). Since the Syrian conflict started in March 2011, more than 58,000 
Iraqis returned to Iraq (UNHCR, 2012b: 4). Since the strategy of prevention and 
solution requires post-repatriation activities, UNHCR and its implementing 
partners also operate reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in 
Iraq. Thus, the remaining of this part will examine the last 3Rs. 
 
 
5.3.2. Reintegration Activities 
 
Since the 1980s, UNHCR has been present in Iraq to protect refugees and 
asylum seekers. However, after the fall of Saddam regime, the agency began to 
expand its responsibility to assist also IDPs. (UNHCR, 2010a) UNHCR 
implements reintegration activities to ensure the sustainability of return. In that 
respect, it focuses on shelter, protection and legal assistance, cash assistance and 
reintegration activities together with its implementing partners. (UNHCR, 2009c: 
2)  
UNHCR has community based activities in returnee-affected communities 
to ensure access to basic services. It initiated a small-scale income generating 
project and it provides literacy training and landmine-awareness training. 
(UNHCR, 2004a: 2) UNHCR has Protection and Assistance Centers and launched 
Return, Integration and Community Centers in mid-2009. They provide legal 
                                                 
20
 The data on total returnees to Afghanistan is based on UNHCR Statistical Online Population 
Database, irrespective of UNHCR assistance. However it does not include deportations since 
UNHCR does not support the forcible return of refugees. 
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services, protect monitoring, coordinate operations, assess needs and provide 
social and information assistance. (UNHCR, 2010a). UNHCR established 
Community Return Centres and expand its presence in Iraq through a national 
NGO network. In case of restricted access to Iraq, national NGOs and Community 
Return Centres maintains the link between vulnerable communities and aid 
community. (UNHCR, 2009c: 6) 
UNHCR leads Protection and co-leads Shelter with UN-HABITAT and 
collaborates with other UN agencies on the ground to sustain the repatriation of 
Iraqi refugees and to reintegrate IDPs. (UNHCR, 2010a) In 2008-2009, UN-
HABITAT provided comprehensive temporary shelter assistance for the Iraqi 
government through the construction of a model accommodation of 400 low-cost 
units. The aim was to respond to the needs of IDPs and returnees in Kerbala/Najaf, 
Babylon, Thi Qar and Erbil Governorates. (UN-HABITAT, Improving Access) 
 In terms of shelter, UNHCR distributes non-food items, construction 
material, rehabilites damaged houses and construct basic shelter units and 
implement community-based projects directly related to housing, mainly water 
and sanitation. (UNHCR, 2009c: 7) UNHCR began also a pilot project in August 
2012, to provide shelter to the returnees and IDPs. It is projected to build proper 
housing units for 700 Baghdad’s displaced. However according to UNHCR, it will 
take more than 10 years to convert all the settlements in line with this model. 
(IRIN news, 4 September 2012)  
The WHO was withdrawn from Iraq after the August 2003 deadly attack 
and it returned to Iraq in June 2008. During its absence in Iraq, WHO tried to 
maintain its presence in the country by sending missions from its office in Jordan 
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to respond to humanitarian challenges. It maintained to supply medicines and 
oxygen cylinders to hospitals and provide health services for IDPs and returnees. 
(IRIN news, 23 July 2008) In terms of water and sanitation, UN HABITAT and 
UNICEF support Iraq at modernizing its public sector and at developing of a 
national water and sanitation policy. Also, FAO, WHO and UNICEF assist KRG 
to enhance the quantity and quality of water (IAU, 2011) UNICEF also supports 
the Ministry of Education to provide children education services.  It implemented 
an Accelerated Learning Program, which enabled over 60,000 children who have 
missed out on primary school to catch up with their primary education. (UNICEF, 
Iraq, Education) The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
working closely with the Iraqi government, UN and WB, have also activities to 
restore essential services such as health, education, water and electricity (USAID, 
Iraq). 
 
 
5.3.3. Rehabilitation Activities 
 
In Iraq, UNHCR has many implementing partners for Iraqi rehabilitation, 
such as ICRC, UN-HABITAT, UNDP and WB. While there are many 
rehabilitation projects in Iraq, the study will only illustrate some examples of them 
to give a general idea on the rehabilitation projects in the country. For example, 
ICRC implemented projects to repair and upgrade Iraqi water infrastructure to 
increase the access to the clean water, mainly in rural and neglected areas prone to 
violence. Throughout its activities, some 1.5 million Iraqis have better access to 
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clean water. (ICRC, 2012) UN-HABITAT and Counterpart International's 
Community Rehabilitation project addressed the rehabilitation of houses in run-
down urban areas “to improve the living standards of low-income groups through 
rehabilitation of houses and basic infrastructure, enhancing the capacity of small 
contractors and generation of income and employment” (Counterpart 
International). The WB implements also a nationwide school construction and 
rehabilitation project to increase access to basic education (World Bank, 2011). 
However, Khudhair Jassim Ali, an Iraqi analyst lecturing at university, told 
IRIN (14 July 2010) that lack of funding, corruption and lack of cooperation 
between the government and the related companies have delayed badly the needed 
infrastructure projects in Iraq. Government officials from Ministry of Municipality 
and Public Works and Ministry of Reconstruction cited corruption and violence as 
the main reasons of delays in infrastructure projects. Millions of dollars lost in 
corruption, especially in the oil sector, which then causes lack of funding for the 
projects. Hundreds of schools and hospitals need to be repaired but terrorist 
attacks cause delays in such projects. (IRIN news, 18 February 2007; IRIN news, 
25 December 2006) 
 
 
5.3.4. Reconstruction Activities 
 
Iraqi reconstruction efforts aim to increase capacity of the Iraqi 
government institutions. USAID (Iraq) has activities to increase Iraqi capacity in 
terms of strengthening the effectiveness of government and civil society, 
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expanding private sector opportunities and supporting focused stabilization 
activities. In 2009, it began to build Iraq's capacity to reconstruct and govern itself 
effectively. UNDP (Iraq) cooperates with Iraqi government to build state capacity 
in terms of domestic governance and strengthening accountable and responsive 
governing institutions with international standards. UNICEF, together with the 
WB and UNESCO, develop and implement projects to increase internal capacity 
of the country, such as a National Education Strategy to improve quality education 
from pre-school to Grade 12 and a Child Friendly Schools strategy to ensure 
primary schools adopt minimum standards that enable children to learn in a 
healthy and happy environment. (UNICEF, Iraq, Education)  
UN-HABITAT also launched a three-year Country Program for 2009-2011 
with US$ 70 million budget to provide technical assistance and capacity building 
to ministries and local authorities for urban governance, housing, infrastructure 
and basic services. (IRIN news, 30 July 2009) WHO begins a three-year 
comprehensive capacity-building program to support the Government of Iraq, and 
in particular the Ministry of Health, to increase the quality of health services in 
Iraq. It will cost 10 million Euro, which will be funded by the EU. (WHO, 2013) 
 In sum, UNHCR together with its implementing partners, have conducted 
4Rs activities in Iraq since 2003. The main aim of these activities has been to 
provide repatriation as a durable solution and to prevent reoccurrence of new mass 
flows in order to increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq. 
The next part will question whether international refugee regime was effective in 
Iraq during 2003-2011 through examining 4Rs activities. 
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5.4. Effectiveness of International Refugee Regime in Iraq: A 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
Questioning the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq 
through a quantitative analysis as explained in the research design of the study, 
this part examines, first, the repatriation as a durable solution by the sustainability 
of reintegration process. It then questions whether international refugee regime 
could prevent the reoccurrence of new mass flows from Iraq by 4Rs activities, as 
assumed in the strategy of prevention and solution.  
 
 
5.4.1. Repatriation as a Durable Solution: Sustainability of Reintegration 
 
As explained in the research design of the study, repatriation movements 
as a durable solution need to be sustainable in terms of the reintegration of 
returnees. This study will use three criteria to measure the sustainability of 
reintegration process: access to rights, access to employment opportunities and 
access to social services. The indicators for the criterion of access to rights are 
whether all returnees have identity documents, whether they are allowed to vote 
and whether they are reports of security incidents towards returnees. The 
indicators for the criteria of access to employment opportunities and social 
services are the percentage of returnees with regular employment, shelter, health, 
education and clean water supply. 
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According to the data provided by IRIN news (1 April 2004; 24 November 
2004), it is found out that all Iraqi returnees have individual identity 
documentation and are allowed to vote. However, there have been security 
incidents reported to UNHCR (Refugee Returning Monitoring, 2011: 10). 
According to the latest available data, nearly half of the returnee population has 
access to regular employment and shelter. In terms of access to health services and 
education, 58% of the population has access to health facilities (IOM, 2011: 8) and 
63% of the returnee population reports to have access to education (IOM, 2009b: 
9). Table 5 summarizes the latest available reintegration level of Iraqi returnees. 
 
Table 5: Reintegration process of the Iraqi refugee returnees, 2011 
 
 Indicator Standard 
Measurement 
in standard 
Value 
Measurement 
in value 
Access to 
rights  
Individual 
identity 
documentation 
YES 
 
1 
YES 1 
Allowed to vote YES 1 YES 1 
Reports of 
security 
incidents 
NO 1 YES 0 
Access to 
employment 
opportunities 
Returnees with 
regular 
employment 
100% 1 25% 0.25 
Access to 
social services 
Shelter 100% 1 50% 0.50 
Health 100% 1 58% 0.58 
Education 100% 1 63% 0.63 
Water supply 100% 1 60% 0.60 
Total   8  4.56 
 
Reintegration 
process: 
54,5% 
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Regarding the returnee access to ID cards, Mohammed Safu al-Naimi, 
spokesman for the Ministry of Migration and Displacement stated that returnees 
usually have their original documents or a national ID card. The registration 
documents supplied by the UN or by neighboring countries are also accepted. Iraq 
can also issue a temporary national certificate for the ones who were 
denationalized during the Saddam Hussein’s rule (IRIN news, 1 April 2004). In 
terms of voting, in an IRIN interview (24 November 2004), Hussain Hindawi, the 
President of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, stated that returnees 
without registration to vote can register themselves with an identification card 
such as passport or their old papers showing they are residents of Iraq. Thus, all 
returnees are entitled to vote when they have the proper documents. Regarding the 
security incidents, in 2011, UNHCR (2011b: 10) stated that 10% of refugee 
returnee families monitored reported security incidents including kidnapping, 
murder, large explosion and harassment. IOM (2008) also reported several 
episodes of violence targeting returnees, even including murders of entire returnee 
families. UNHCR (2010b) also notes that the majority of the returnees have 
regretted their decisions, particularly because of the astonishing levels of 
insecurity, namely instances of explosions, harassment, military operations and 
kidnapping occurring in their areas of return. 
In terms of access to employment and welfare situation, the percentage of 
the general population below poverty line
21
 is more than 20% and nearly 75% of 
the population depends on public distribution system for food (IRIN news, 22 
December 2011). The Planning Ministry also confirms that about 25% of the 
population lives under poverty line (IRIN news, 21 February 2011). UNHCR ( 
                                                 
21
 Poverty line means earning US$66 a month or less (IRIN news, 8 November 2009). 
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2009: 3) stated that unemployment ranges from 40% to 50% and even higher 
within IDP and returnee communities and the majority of IDPs do not receive 
assistance from public distribution systems. According to IRIN news (7 December 
2010), an IOM survey on female returnees found out that 71% of the female 
returnees with the ability to work are unemployed. Thus, without a regular 
income, they are heavily depended on aid for their basic needs. According to 
UNHCR (2011b: 15) monitoring, 75%, of returnees stated that their household’s 
current income was not sufficient to meet their families basic needs. They also 
indicated the prevalence of not only unemployment, but also underemployment. 
2011 study of IOM (2011: 7) reports that 75% of the IDP families cite access to 
work as their most pressing need. Thus, the study accepts the unemployment rate 
among returnee population as 75% and employment rate as 25%, as Table 5 
indicates. The returnees with regular employment are only 5% higher than in the 
percentage of Afghan returnees with access to regular employment. 
Regarding access to adequate shelter in general, UN-HABITAT (2009: 8) 
reports that more than 60% of the population lives in inadequate shelters which 
require major rehabilitation. In terms of returnee access to shelter, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (2011: 43) reports that 20% of the IDPs live in self-made 
dwellings, while nearly 14% live in public or military buildings and some 9% live 
with host families. The IOM report (2011: 7) confirms this finding, citing that 
48% of the IDPs state shelter as their most pressing need. IOM-assessed returnee 
families, including both refugee and IDP returnees told IOM (2011: 8) that about 
50% of them live in a shelter with good condition. Thus, the study accepts the 
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access to adequate shelter indicator as 50%. This percentage is more than twice of 
the percentage of the Afghan returnees with adequate shelters. 
In terms of access to health facilities, the WHO states that number of 
primary health care units and centres per 10.000 population is even less than 1, 
namely 0.7 (WHO, 2011). The Norwegian Refugee Council (2011: 46) reports 
that 30% of the IDPs lack access to required health services and 25% could not 
benefit from health services because of health care fees. IOM (2011: 8), also 
reports that it is often difficult to access hospitals or health care facilities because 
of their distance from villages or towns. There is also a lack of personnel in health 
services since many of them have fled. In its assessment on returnee families, IOM 
(2011: 8) found out that 42% of them cite health as their one of top priority needs. 
Thus, the study accepts 58% of returnees as having access to basic health services. 
This percentage is relatively better than the Afghan returnee access to health 
services (50%). 
Regarding the education, the immediate post-war level of school 
attendance in 2003 was almost 100% (IRIN news, 18 October 2006). The situation 
in access to education in Iraq worsened, however. In 2009, it is reported that 
nearly nine in 10 children under the age of 15 do not attend primary school 
regularly and the main reasons are identified as insecurity or distance to school 
(UN IAU, 2009: 46). According to the Norwegian Refugee Council report (2011: 
48), only about 30% of the boys and 22% of the girls from IDP families attend 
school, mainly because of cultural and social differences and language barrier. Of 
the returnee families IOM assessed, 63% reported having school-age children and 
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that their children were attending (IOM, 2009b: 9). The percentage is 13% higher 
than the percentage of the returnee access to education in Afghanistan. 
One of the general problems in Iraq regarding water is the access rights 
with Turkey and Iran for the water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. 
Though the country’s primary sources of surface water is these two rivers, The 
UN states that the water levels in these rivers decreased to less than a third of 
normal capacity since 2003 (IAU, Water in Iraq, 2011). As a result, for example, 
the amount of drinking water piped daily in Baghdad was about 2 million cu. m. in 
2008 while the daily demand was at least 3.25 million cu. m (IRIN news, 23 
October 2008). Another general problem for the Iraqi water system is the absence 
of safe water for human consumption. Water pipelines are over 30 years old and 
mainly because of that, water gets contaminated through either sewage or 
underground water (IRIN news, 23 October 2008). Iraqi Health Ministry reported 
that at least 17% of the water in the nationwide and more than 30% in Baghdad is 
not safe (UPI, 23 October 2008). 
According to the UN, 20% of the population does not have access to safe 
drinking water. The percentage goes ven higher in rural areas, up to the 57%. 
(IAU, Water in Iraq, 2011) In general, UN-HABITAT (Country Program, 2009: 7) 
reports that only half of the Iraqi population has access to regular safe water 
supplies. In 2011, 20% of the IDPs relied on open water sources or broken water 
pipes and 6% relied on water delivered by trucks (Norwegian Refugee Council 
2011: 46). 44% of the returnee families also cited water as their priority needs 
(IOM, 2011: 8).  Accordingly, UNHCR (2009c: 3) states that 40% of the returnees 
lack access to clean water. Thus, the study accepts that 60% of the returnees have 
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access to clean drinking water. This percentage is triple of the Afghan returnees 
with access to clean water supply. 
Table 5 attempts to show the latest situation of the reintegration process in 
Iraq by 2011 and only a little more than half of the returnees (%54,5) are able to 
reintegrate during 9 years. The level of reintegration for Iraqi returnees is almost 
the same with the reintegration level of Afghan returnees (57%). Though Iraqi 
returnees have enjoyed more access to shelter, education and water supply, the 
underlying reason of Iraqi returnee reintegration to be almost equal with the level 
of Afghan returnee reintegration is the security incidents in Iraq, reported targeting 
returnees. In the quantitative analysis, lack of returnee security decreases the 
general level of reintegration process. According to UN Inter Agency Information 
and Analysis Unit (IRIN news, 20 July 2011), the level of reintegration is lower in 
mine contaminated areas. The people in such areas have lower per capita income 
and their access to basic services is poorer than the people living in the areas 
without mines. There are economic inequalities and differences also between rural 
and urban areas in Iraq. According to Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation, the highest poverty rate is in the southern regions with maximum 
49% and the lowest rates are in the northern provinces of Kurdish region with 
minimum 3% (IRIN news, 24 May 2009). In terms of regional differences, Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO: 2) also reports that 69% of the Iraqis living in 
extreme poverty and food insecurity reside in rural areas. It is expected by the Iraq 
Red Crescent that thousands of Iraqi refugees returning from Syria will also create 
pressure on the sustainability of reintegration, including employment and basic 
services (IRIN news, 27 July 2012). It seems that reintegration of the Iraqi 
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returnees failed to be sustainable, mainly because of the low internal capacity of 
the country, namely poor access to basic services, lack of basic infrastructure and 
insecurity at the state level.  The next part examines whether 4Rs activities in Iraq 
was able to prevent reocurrence of mass exodus from Iraq, during the years 2003-
2011. 
 
 
5.4.2. Prevention of the New Mass Flows 
 
The number of asylum seekers from Iraq decreased steadily (33,5%) 
between 2003-2005 and began to increase sharply in 2006, as shown in Figure 3. 
In 2007, number of asylum seekers from Iraq increased by 64% of the 2003 
numbers. It began to decrease in 2008, a trend continued until 2010 and in 2011, 
the number of asylum seekers decreased by about 8% in comparison with 2003 
numbers. Insecurity and lack of access to basic services constitute the main causes 
of further displacements in Iraq, as also the case in Afghanistan. Despite almost 
the same reintegration level of Afghan and Iraqi returnees, however, in 
Afghanistan, number of asylum seekers increased by 40% (please see Figure 1) 
though in Iraq it decreased by about 8%. This difference may come from better 
level of access to basic services in Iraq (47%) than in Afghanistan (33%). 
Accordingly, the main determinant for Iraqi displacement in post-2003 period 
became insecurity. For example, IOM survey (2011: 6) shows that 81% of 
returnees were displaced, mainly for the second time, due to the direct threats to 
life and the fear of generalized violence. 
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Minorities, who subscribe to a religion other than Shi’a or Sunni Islam 
make up between 17-22% of the Iraqi refugees (IRIN news, 5 December 2011). 
Though the general trend is decreasing numbers of asylum seekers, Iraqi 
minorities have displaced due to increasing level of threats and violence, 
destruction of their homes and worship places (Minority Rights Group, 2011: 3). 
For example, on 31 October 2010, a Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad was 
attacked and 68 people were killed. Helene Caux, UNHCR’s senior external 
relations officer in Erbil, told IRIN (23 December 2010) that since the church 
attack, Christians constituted 30% of the new refugee arrivals in Jordan. 
According to a UNHCR Poll (2010b) survey of 2.353 Iraqi returnees 
between 2007 and 2008, 61% of the returnees regretted returning to Iraq and 34% 
of them considered to seek asylum again. The survey found out that the main 
reasons for the regret to return to Iraq were physical insecurity, economic hardship 
and a lack of basic public services. 87% of the interviewed said their income was 
insufficient and 80% indicated their fear of direct persecution. According to IOM 
(2011: 6), returnees were mainly displaced due to direct threats to life (58%) and 
fear of generalized violence (23%). Thus, an increasing threat in displacement is 
expected with the withdrawal of US security forces from Iraq. 
 
 175 
 
Figure 3: Asylum-seekers, originating from Iraq, 2002-2011
22
 
 
In addition to the prevention of the asylum-seekers, the study questions 
also the change in number of IDPs. Since the IDP statistics before 2005 are not 
available, the comparison for the prevention will be made by the year 2005 and as 
Figure 4 shows, number of IDPs in Iraq dramatically increased by 120% between 
2005-2008. Though it began to decrease in the post-2008 period, UNHCR 
statistics show that number of IDPs is still 11% more than 2005 numbers.  
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Figure 4: Number of IDPs in Iraq, 2005-2011
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 The data for Figure 3 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
 176 
The failure in providing sustainability of repatriation has reflections on the 
prevention of Iraqi IDPs. Hence, according to Norwegian Refugee Council (2011: 
46), 25% of the IDPs and 44% of the IDP returnees still consider water a priority 
in 2009. Access to work is also listed as the top priority for 75% of the IDPs in 
2011 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011: 47). Minorities make up between 10% 
percent of the Iraqi IDPs (IRIN news, 5 December 2011) and the Society for 
Threatened Peoples (2010) stated that since 2003 more than three quarters of the 
400,000 Christian inhabitants have fled the Baghdad. Attack at the al-Askari 
shrine, one of the holiest sites in Shi’a Islam in February 2006 and counter attacks 
at Sunni mosques increased the sectarian violence in Iraq (BBC news, 22 February 
2006). IOM (2009a) states that following the bombing of the Al-Askari mosque, 
more than 1.6 million people were internally displaced. Since the church attack in 
October 2010, UNHCR (2010c) also reported a “slow but steady exodus” of the 
Christian communities fleeing Baghdad and Mosul to the Kurdistan Regional 
Government Region. According to IOM assessment (2011: 5), IDP families 
continue to flee their homes, mainly due to direct threats to their lives (30%) and 
due to fear or generalized violence (25%).  
In sum, examining the UNHCR’s goals of providing sustainability of 
reintegration and prevention of further flows, the chapter concludes first that 
international refugee regime could not reintegrate Iraqi returnees. Instead, about 
57% of the returnees have been reintegrated. UNHCR itself also concluded that 
“shelter and livelihood has been major difficulties, facing returnees and preventing 
their sustainable reintegration” (UNHCR, 2009c: 4). The study, second, finds out 
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 The data for Figure 4 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database 
and the statistics before 2005 are not available.  
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that the goal of prevention of new mass exodus could not be fulfilled. Especially 
in 2007, when sectarian violence reached its peak level, number of asylum seekers 
increased by 64% in comparison with 2003. In 2011, the number of asylum 
seekers decreased by only about 8% in comparison with the number of asylum 
seekers in 2003 and the number of IDPs increased by %120 between 2005-2008. 
The study concludes that the reasons of failure in prevention are unsustainable 
process of reintegration and the ongoing insecurity. These reasons are also among 
the main characteristics of countries with low internal capacity. Based on the 
findings of the qualitative analysis, it is concluded that international refugee 
regime was not effective in Iraq between 2003-2011, mainly because of its low 
internal capacity. In other words, as was the case in Afghanistan, the Iraqi case 
shows that the effectiveness of 4Rs activities are hindered by the factors that 4Rs 
activities intended to overcome, namely low internal capacity. 
The next section will first question the main social conditions in Iraq that 
lead the Iraqi people cooperate with or resist 4Rs activities. Identifying these 
conditions will enable the study to provide suggestions to shape them in 
accordance with the regime activities. Second, it will question the nature of the 
relations between the Iraqi government and international community to identify 
factors that shape this bilateral relationship. The aim, here, is to provide incentives 
to international community to increase the cooperative nature of the relations with 
the government. Last, it will examine how 4Rs activities are perceived by the Iraqi 
people again to identify the factors that shape their perceptions. This will enable 
the study to make suggestions to international community to increase people’s 
support for their activities. This qualitative analysis aims to provide incentives to 
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UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase regime effectiveness in Iraq as 
a country with low internal capacity. 
 
 
5.5. Conditions to Increase Regime Effectiveness in Iraq: A Qualitative 
Analysis 
 
5.5.1. Social Conditions 
 
According to Irene Khan, the head of AI, the biggest challenge in 2003 
was the absence of human rights culture in Iraq, as a country suffered under a 
repressive regime for decades (IRIN news, 19 June 2003). Indeed, the socio-
cultural and religious conservatism in Iraq prevents the effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities, as in the examples of female employment and female enrollment. 
Security is also another condition that hinders the operation of 4Rs activities, in 
the examples of female enrollment and disarmament. Thus, it might be argued that 
contrary to the neorealist claim of the importance of states’ power capabilities 
within the anarchical system, the study argues that unit level characteristics such 
as social conditions, play also a role in regime effectiveness by creating 
implications for the regime effectiveness. As in the case of Afghanistan, 
identifying social conditions and their affects on the 4Rs activities will support the 
aim of providing tentative principles to increase regime effectiveness in countries 
with low internal capacity. 
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In terms of the reintegration activities, international community attempts to 
increase female employment, which is particularly crucial for the self-sufficiency 
of female-headed families. However, insurgents and militias are against the 
employment because of socio-cultural and religious conservatism and threaten 
NGOs to stop their activities to increase female employment. According to Nuha 
Salim, a spokeswoman of a local NGO, Women’s Freedom, there are two main 
motivations for the insurgents and militias to force women out of the work 
environment. First is the religious belief against sharing the same space with men 
who are not close relatives.  However, religious belief is not the only reason, since 
Shiite militias also prevent women to teach other women. Thus, second reason is 
social belief on women traditional role of staying at home for cooking and 
cleaning. (IRIN news, 30 May 2007)  
According to Salama Smeisim, an Iraqi activist and former lawmaker, a 
new approach towards female employment should be taken by the government and 
local and international NGOs. She stressed that social norms, discrimination in the 
society, lack of awareness on their rights and corruption in the government make 
the Afghan women to find work very difficult though women need to work, 
especially when they head the families in the absence of their men. She argued 
that a special program for raising awareness among women on their rights should 
be operated and government and NGOs should support women to start projects, 
which would provide a steady income for them. (IRIN news, 7 December 2010) 
However as Sarah Muthulak, a spokeswoman for Women’s Rights Association, 
told IRIN (30 May 2007), many NGOs have been developing projects for the free 
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education of women but most of them have been threatened and forced to stop due 
to security reasons.  
In Iraq, international community attempts to increase access to education 
for girls. For example, a local NGO Keeping Children Alive tries to equally 
encourage both boys and girls to get education and tries to raise awareness among 
families that when girls work at home instead of attending to school, their future 
will be destroyed as well as the future of the country. (IRIN news, 29 October 
2007) However, conservatism again prevents activities to increase female 
enrollment as the case in Afghanistan. Particularly in rural areas, where 
conservative values are more dominant, fathers do not allow girls attend to school 
because of the conservative norms. Khalid Hassan, a Mahdi Army Officer, told 
IRIN (30 May 2007) that  
Girls and women don’t need to read. They should be good mothers and 
housewives. The schools are just imbuing them with new and modern 
ideas that are inconsistent with Muslim women’s duties. We have 
threatened all teachers near our villages, telling them to stop teaching, 
especially teaching women and girls. 
 
The study argues that more incentives given to the awareness raising 
activities on the benefit of women’s access to employment and education for girls 
can still increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities on employment and education 
in Iraq. As the Afghan case also illustrated, involvement of religious leaders and 
tribal elders in addition to government can support awareness raising activities. 
(IRIN news, 29 October 2007)  
Regarding the education in Iraq, reintegration activities to increase girls’ 
attendance rate to school is prevented not only by conservative norms but also by 
security reasons, as also the case in Afghanistan and Sudan. Different from Iraq, 
 181 
insecurity has a general effect on the low school enrollment in Afghanistan and it 
has specific implications for women enrollment in Sudan, due to women’s 
insecurity such as the danger of sexual assault and harassment. In Iraq, the general 
insecurity and violence have two specific implications for the female enrollment. 
First, families do not send girls to school because they have the fear of losing their 
children. Um Nour Zeid, a mother of four in Baghdad, told IRIN (29 October 
2007) that “it is sad to see my two girls losing their future like this but it is better 
than losing their lives”. Second, many families have lost one of their adults and 
according to Sinan Zuhair, a media officer for the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs, in such families girls are asked to stay at home to help housework. He told 
IRIN (29 October 2007) that “they are the ones paying the price of the violence 
since they have to forget about their future to be able to help the lives of their 
brothers”.  
In Iraq, ongoing security hampers also disarmament attempts as the case in 
the attempt for demobilization of small arms in Afghanistan. The ongoing 
violence in Iraq has led people to provide their security on their own and thus 
armament among the Iraqi people is very common. While there is an official 
prohibition on selling weapons, there emerged a black market for obtaining guns. 
Thus, little progress could have been achieved in terms of increasing public 
understanding of disarmament. (IRIN news, 26 October 2006) As in the case of 
Afghanistan, there are also security problems at the state level in Iraq, as being a 
state with low internal capacity. The feeling of insecurity among the Iraqi people 
can also hinder the regime effectiveness in addition to the feeling of insecurity 
among states at the system level, as neorealists argue. Thus, the study argues that 
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providing civilian security is likely to increase the regime effectiveness, 
particularly in countries, where insecurity within state is a common characteristic. 
In sum, unit level characteristics such as the social conditions including 
socio-cultural and religious conservatism and insecurity decrease the effectiveness 
of 4Rs activities in Iraq. In the exemplified areas of employment, education and 
demobilization, it is concluded that social conditions in Iraq do not support the 
activities of international community. First, socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism prevent international community activities on female employment to 
be effective. Second, again socio-cultural and religious conservatism, together 
with insecurity decrease the effectiveness of activities on female enrollment. Last, 
efforts on demobilization of small arms are hindered due to the ongoing insecurity 
conditions in Iraq. These implications, derived from the analysis of social 
conditions in Iraq will provide insights for the tentative principles, to be proposed 
in Chapter 7. 
The next part will question the nature of the relations between the Iraqi 
government and international community, namely the UN agencies, international 
NGOs and their national partners and donor states. While they are mostly related 
with the conditions within state, the factors that shape the nature of this bilateral 
relationship are regarded among the unit level characteristics. Because. Identifying 
these factors will enable the study to provide incentives to international 
community to increase regime effectiveness in Iraq. 
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5.5.2. Nature of the Relations between the Government and International 
Community 
 
This section attempts to analyze the relations between Iraqi government 
and international community to determine the nature of this bilateral relationship 
and to identify factors that shape this relationship. The study identifies the 
concerns of national and international NGOs about security and corruption as 
factors that shape the perception of international community in the Iraqi 
government. The study also finds out that the critiques towards the Iraqi officials 
on the lack of authority and unfair distribution of international aid as the factors 
that shape the nature of their relations with international community. 
As will also be illustrated in the Sudanese case, general insecurity and 
violence particularly directed towards humanitarian workers seem to prevent the 
effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Iraq through hindering operations of international 
community and its access to the population in dire need. The militant groups in 
Iraq constitute a constant threat for the international and local staff of the 
humanitarian aid agencies. Especially the international staff of the Western 
agencies is regarded by some extremists as an extension of the US-led forces. 
(IRIN news, 18 August 2009) Due to the violence against aid workers, UN 
agencies and international NGOs relocated their staff to neighboring countries, 
particularly to Jordan. On 19 August 2003, terrorists blew up the UN headquarters 
in Baghdad and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top UN envoy in Iraq, was killed (UN 
News Centre, 19 August 2003). This terrorist attack forced the UN mission to 
withdraw its mission to Jordan and to carry out its activities from there. In 2005, 
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the UN mission returned to the Green Zone in Baghdad, though Iraq was still not 
safe enough for aid workers. One of the aid workers, who personally present in 
Iraq told IRIN (18 August 2009) that he uses different names and has more than 
one ID card. He stated that he works in the dark, living in fear for offering help. 
Especially in 2006 and 2007, when the sectarian violence reached to its 
top level in Iraq, local aid workers reported IRIN (3 October 2007) the lack of 
access to the needy people due to the serious security situation. The first problem 
is that militants do not recognize and respect the neutrality of aid agencies. 
Therefore they try to prevent them from delivering humanitarian assistance for 
groups opposed to them. According to the Nafie Obeidi, Vice President of the Iraq 
Aid Association, there are checkpoints controlled by different factions every 
kilometer of the Diyala province, eastern central Iraq and this feeling of insecurity 
leads volunteers prefer to turn back rather than to confront insurgents or militants. 
Second, it is stated that local security forces do not support and protect local 
NGOs and volunteers of aid workers can even face detention when they deliver 
supplies to areas where insurgents can be hiding. Cedric Turlan, NGO 
Coordination Committee in Iraq reminds the legal responsibility of the Iraqi 
government to prevent violations and regulate and facilitate NGOs efforts to 
access vulnerable populations (IRIN news, 18 December 2006). 
Corruption is the second factor that the study identifies for the side of 
international community. As the case of Afghanistan, it is a common problem in 
Iraq and corruption within the Iraqi government seems to hinder the effectiveness 
of international aid projects. For example, in 2009 Abdul-Falah al Sudani, former 
Iraqi Trade Minister, was arrested and charged with corruption in food imports 
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unfit for human consumption (Bakri, 2009). According to Sheikh Sabah al-Saidi, 
the Chairman of the Parliament’s Integrity Committee, billions of dollars have not 
been spent effectively. As a result of the corruption in the Public Distribution 
System, citizens have received either no or bad food items (IRIN news, 19 May 
2009). Basil Abdul-Wahab al-Azawi, head of the Commission of Society 
Enterprises (CSE), a coalition of over 1,000 Iraqi NGOs, stressed the essential 
potential impacts of overriding corruption on the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in 
Iraq. According to him, spending money with accountability and for the benefit of 
the Iraqi people would reduce violence, poverty and deteriorated social situation in 
Iraq. It would work to absorb anti-government elements by bringing the society 
with the government. (IRIN news, 13 April 2008) The vicious circle, found in 
Afghanistan can be observed also in the Iraqi case. The tendency of international 
community to bypass the Iraqi government in the allocation of international funds 
and operation of 4Rs projects, due to corruption can hinder the capacity-building 
process of governments further. 
Ahmed Hassan Rasheed from the NGO Human Relief Foundation said that 
absence of cooperation with some ministries is one of the important obstacles 
NGOs faced to do their jobs. According to him, government officials lack the 
understanding of the importance of the NGO presence and essential role of their 
partnership with the government. (IRIN news, 7 March 2010) In terms of lack of 
cooperation, the local NGOs in Iraq have critiques towards not only government 
but also the UN agencies and international NGOs. For example, Basil al-Azawi, 
head of the CSE, criticizes the insufficient support both from Iraqi government 
and international community. He states that their support meets only 2% of real 
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needs. He argues that both the government and international community have 
disregarded the needs of deteriorated humanitarian situation with poor public 
services. (UNAMI, 2008: 2) According to him, the Iraqi NGOs have not got any 
direct financial support from the Iraqi government and the support from 
international bodies has been only symbolic, limited and conditional rather than 
being effective. This conditionality, such as not using international funding to pay 
salaries or to rent offices, leads some of the local NGOs cheat and diminishes the 
quality of projects by using the money to cover other expenditures.  (IRIN news, 
24 July 2008) These critiques together with the conditions in Iraq, examined above 
will provide incentives to the study in proposing tentative principles for the regime 
effectiveness. 
Since the nature of relationship between the government and international 
community is shaped by both of the parties, the remaining of the section will 
examine the concerns of the Iraqi officials on the policies of international 
community. 
 Different from the Sudanese case, the Iraqi government mostly welcomes 
the international support. Ibrahim al-Jaffari, interim Vice-President of Iraq told 
IRIN (2 March 2005) that Iraq needs aid agencies and the government has the 
responsibility to provide their security. Reminding the difficulties of the absence 
of the UN in Iraq, Sorya Isho Warda, the Minister of Displacement and Migration 
told IRIN (9 December 2004) that, the Ministry should substitute the UN missions 
through opening offices all over the country during those years. Narmin Othman, 
the Iraqi Environment Minister, also welcomed international support, particularly 
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on the qualified specialists and financial support to clear landmines and 
unexploded ordnance in Iraq (IRIN news, 8 June 2009).  
 In an interview, Akram Mantik, Governor of Erbil, also told that what 
Iraq needs more is not money but instead people with experience and skills on 
humanitarian reconstruction and cooperation with (IRIN news, 16 December 
2003). Indeed, contrary to the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq has the financial 
capacity for self-management thanks to the rich oil reserves
24
. Thus, the Iraqi 
government itself could make financial contributions to the international NGOs, 
operating in Iraq. For example, the Iraqi government contributed US$40 million to 
WFP in 2008 for the provision of food assistance for Iraqi IDPs. WFP (News, 27 
May 2008) stated that through Iraqi contribution, 85% of the WFP’s operation in 
Iraq could be funded. 
 Though they mostly welcome 4Rs activities in Iraq, the Iraqi officials 
have also critiques towards international community, namely for the lack of 
authority on aid spending and unfair distribution of international aid. Regarding 
the critiques towards lack of authority, Akram Mantik, the Governor of Erbil, 
criticized the UN’s allocation of the funds for Iraq, similar to the Afghan officials’ 
critiques towards bypassing the Afghan government on major aid efforts. He told 
that the Kurdish Regional Government would like to have more authority on the 
reconstruction projects and more control on where the money spent. (IRIN news, 
16 December 2003) The Refugees International (Younes, Rosen, 2008: 6) also 
reported that the local Iraqi officers believe that aid have been unfairly distributed, 
particularly based on a sectarian discrimination. Local officials in Sunni areas 
think that aid is more available in Shiite governorates, though the situation has 
                                                 
24
 Iraq has a US$155.4 billion GDP and Afghanistan has a US$ 29.74 billion. 
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more to do with access difficulties due to the security reasons, Refugees 
International argued. As in the case of the Afghan people’s perceptions in the 
unfair distribution of aid, the Iraqi officials also think that international 
community is not neutral. Thus, critique of Goodwin-Gil (1999) on the 4Rs 
activities in refugee producing countries proves to be right also in Iraq. Increasing 
activities in countries of origin seem to jeopardize the impartiality and neutrality 
of UNHCR and its implementing partners, as he argues. 
 The lion share of the critiques from the Iraqi officials belongs to 
themselves. In Iraq, government officials’ critiques towards the insufficient 
funding are mostly directed to their own government rather than to the donor 
countries, UN agencies and international NGOs as the case in Afghanistan. Azhar 
Al-Mousawi, the Deputy Minister for Displacement and Migration, stated that his 
ministry was allocated only US$ 250 million in 2011 to meet the needs of IDPs 
and returnees. He informs that, the allocated budget was nearly half of the required 
though the general budget was US$ 82.6 billion. (IRIN news, 28 February 2011) 
In 2008, Parliament’s committee on displacement and migration appealed for a 
separate budget. According to the appeal, the committee required to receive either 
3-5% of the Iraq’s oil revenues or US$ 2 billion to meet the needs of IDPs and 
returnees. However, given the priorities to other issues such as municipal services 
and security, both suggestions were rejected. (IRIN news, 5 January 2010) 
In terms of corruption, Sheikh Sabah al-Saidi, head of the Iraqi 
Parliament’s anti-corruption committee, warned that if more money were 
reallocated for development and reconstruction projects, it would pave the way for 
corruption and the Iraqi citizens would again not get benefit from the financial 
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resources of Iraq. Instead, he, thus, urged the Parliament to reallocate funding to 
social welfare programs rather than development and reconstruction projects. 
(IRIN news, 13 April 2008) Hazim Ibrahim, deputy head of Baghdad's water 
directorate, criticizes the government for neglecting the implementation of the 
strategic water projects since 1985. He defines corruption as the biggest 
catastrophe in all governmental ministries (IRIN news, 16 March 2008). In terms 
of critiques towards corruption within the Iraqi government, Salah Obaidi, a 
spokesman for the Ministry of Reconstruction, accepted that corruption together 
with violence has hampered reconstruction efforts in Iraq. He admitted that “many 
funds allocated for the rebuilding of the country have unfortunately gone into the 
wrong hands”. (IRIN news, 21 March 2007) 
It might be argued that Iraq has different motivations than Afghanistan to 
root out corruption within government. The Afghan government officials have 
been motivated to cope with corruption by the availability of international funds. 
They have thought that the donor countries would not support Afghanistan’s 4Rs 
program as long as the corruption continues in the country. Different from 
Afghanistan, Iraq needs to cope with corruption to increase security within Iraq. 
According to Barak Ibrahim, a political analyst and professor at Mustansiryiah 
University in Baghdad, improvement in economic conditions will bring peace and 
security to Iraq. He argues that Iraqi people’s welfare would increase through 
economic stabilization. Having a relatively better economic welfare, they would 
not tend to support insurgencies any more to look after their families. (IRIN news, 
2 August 2006) 
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 In sum, the analysis of the relations between Iraqi government and 
international community finds out that the nature of this bilateral relationship is 
not cooperative. There are dissatisfactions and critiques from both parties in terms 
of the provisions of 4Rs activities. From the international community side, 
critiques towards the insecurity and corruption are identified as the main factors 
that cause dissatisfaction towards the Iraqi government. The factors that shape 
government relations with international community are also identified as concerns 
on the lack of authority on 4Rs projects and unfair distribution of international aid.  
 International community criticizes the Iraqi government on the insecurity 
and violence against humanitarian workers. They experience working difficulties 
since the militant groups in Iraq constitute a constant threat for the international 
and local staff of the humanitarian aid agencies and the Iraqi government does not 
provide their security. According to international community, militants do not 
accept their neutral character and the Iraqi government does not provide security 
for them, though it has such a legal responsibility. Last, international community 
argues that corruption within the Iraqi government decreases the aid effectiveness 
since aids are not spent with accountability and in an effective manner. 
 Since Iraq has considerably a better economy than Afghanistan, the Iraqi 
officials do not criticize international community for the insufficient level of 
support, contrary to the case in Afghanistan. Instead, they direct their critiques 
towards the insufficient level of support for their own government, given its 
financial capability. Thus, in Iraq, government does not criticize government 
dependency on foreign aid. They instead demand more authority on reconstruction 
projects and more control on where the money is spent. This is a critique, very 
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similar to the Afghan officials’ on the lack of authority to control aid spending. As 
in the Afghan case, Iraqi local officials also criticize international community to 
distribute international aid unfairly, though by different reasons. In Afghanistan, it 
is argued that international community fails to provide basic services, governance 
and security to rural communities. Thus, the critique goes on the priority given to 
central cities. In Iraq, the reasoning has a sectarian base. The Sunni officials 
believe that there is a sectarian discrimination in aid distribution, arguing that 
governorates receive more aid. 
This study seeks to examine the unit-level characteristics of Iraq to derive 
implications for regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. In 
addition to social conditions, the nature of the relations between the Iraqi 
government and international community are examined so far. The next part seeks 
to examine the perceptions of the Iraqi people in order to give incentives to 
UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase people’s support for 4Rs 
activities. 
 
 
5.5.3. Perceptions of the Local People in Iraq 
 
It might be argued that Iraqis have more confidence in international NGOs 
than to their own government. They mostly welcome 4Rs activities of the national 
and international NGOs, as the case in Afghanistan. This relative confidence in 
international community comes mainly from the government-related reasons, 
namely the insufficient provision of basic services in comparison to Saddam 
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period and their beliefs on the sectarian discrimination. However, the Iraqi people 
have still critiques towards international community. The factors identified for 
their negative perception and non-confidence are aid dependency, insufficient 
level of support, distrust due to the existence of local fake aid agencies, Iraqis’ 
beliefs on international NGOs’ contacts with intelligence services and Christian 
missionary activities.  
As mentioned above, the Iraqi people have more trust in international 
community mainly due to the government-related reasons. The Iraqi people have 
several critiques towards their government, particularly when they compare their 
life conditions with the Saddam period.  
According to IRIN news (6 January 2010), Iraqis have welcomed the 
involvement of WFP in Iraqi food aid system. Iraqis believes that food aid system 
will be more secure and better governed through the control of the WFP, rather 
than the Iraqi government.  
 The perception of Iraqis in this example reflects their general distrust in 
the Iraqi government. In terms of security, people also do not regard the 
government as eligible to provide security in Iraq. According to Basra residents, 
the government is losing control to criminal groups and they demand resignation 
of provincial police and army chiefs. (IRIN news, 12 March 2008) According to 
an army officer, the government and the US forces force Iraqis to join the 
terrorists through humiliating the country and its people with no economic 
opportunities (IRIN news, 10 July 2007). The Arabs in Kirkuk think that they 
have been forced to leave Kirkuk to be able to make the city a part of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan region. According to the people in Kirkuk, the government has not been 
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taking any action to support and protect them against the Kurds. (IRIN news, 16 
December 2007) 
 There is a widespread belief among the Iraqi people that Saddam period 
was far better than Maliki administration. According to recipients and specialists, 
the food system worked almost perfect under Saddam. Food rations were nearly 
double of the current quantity and quality was also better. (IRIN news, 9 
September 2007) Mustafa Abdul-Muta’al, an IDP in Iraq, thinks that the promised 
democracy is flawed and life was better during the Saddam regime: “…our 
children were studying, our wives wore good clothes and more importantly, we 
had a house to sleep in and good food to eat. I thought that was democracy but 
they have given it a different meaning now.” (IRIN news, 28 May 2007) In terms 
of basic services, Sahira Salah, a local people in Baghdad said that they used to 
have safe water and good sewage systems during the Saddam period (IRIN news, 
18 February 2007). Fawaz Ahmed Ajil, another resident of Baghdad, also told 
IRIN (1 February 2007) that they prefer Saddam’s days when there was no much 
corruption as now and when people were not subjected to death every single 
moment as now. Asif Muhammad, an Iraqi engineer misses the solidarity among 
the society during the Saddam regime. According to him, the Iraqi people have 
lost faith in each other. During the Saddam regime, people would help each other 
but now they have to first think their own lives. (IRIN news, 8 May 2007) In 
addition to Iraqis, Fu’ad Ahmed, a Palestinian refugee in Iraq, expressed his 
aspirations in the Saddam era. His family could not get support from the 
government, being treated as ex-regime supporters. He told IRIN (14 March 2007)  
that being treated very well treated and respected during Saddam Hussein’s time, 
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they “were like any other Iraqi, receiving monthly food rations, free health and 
education and working in any place without trouble”.   
In addition to people’s dissatisfaction on their state of welfare in comparison with 
the Saddam period, the Iraqi people criticize their governments also on sectarian 
discrimination. According to Refugees International (Younes, Rosen, 2008: 6), 
While Ministry of Migration is controlled by Sadrist sympathizers, which is a 
Shiite organization, Sunni Iraqis perceive Ministry of Migration as having a strong 
bias in favor of Shiites.. In interviews, conducted by Refugees International in 
Sunni areas of Falluja, Kirkuk and Mosul, many IDP families told that Shiites 
displaced in the south received much more attention from the central government. 
In addition to Ministry of Migration, Ministry of Trade is also perceived by the 
Iraqi people as being in favor of Shiites. This ministry is particularly important 
since it is in charge of Public Distribution System. Also within Baghdad, Refugees 
International reports that there are critiques within Baghdad, arguing that the 
government services are distributed according to a sectarian bias and for example 
Shiite areas get more hours of electricity than Sunni areas. However sectarianism 
argument in Iraq is not one-sided. Aid groups argue that Shiites also face sectarian 
bias and receive an inferior quality of help in the Sunni areas. In the Iraqi example, 
it is possible to argue that political leaders and elites can make their choices on 
state policies by their religious/sectarian affiliations.  
 In addition to the critiques towards the Iraqi government, the Iraqi people 
have also critiques. The chapter identifies aid dependency, insufficient level of 
support, confidence and neutrality problems as factors that shape Iraqis’ 
perceptions in international community. Abu Hassan, a displaced people, told 
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IRIN (27 March 2007) that they depend on the assistance from NGOs and 
unfortunately this aid is not always available. Similarly, a Shiite Arab, who was 
displaced because of his religious sect, said that all families living in camp in 
Kerbala are totally dependent on local NGOs in terms of food, clothes and 
medicines. Thus when the aid does not come, they have no money to survive. 
(IRIN news, 11 January 2007) 
 In terms of people’s perceptions in the insufficient level of support, 
Rastgo Muhammad Barsaz, a spokesman for the Kurdistan Campaign to Help 
Victims of War, thinks that there is not enough support from NGOs near the Iraqi 
border in terms of basic supplies such as food, tents, potable water and clothes. 
(IRIN news, 5 November 2007) Adeela Harith, a widow and mother of three, told 
IRIN (31 May 2007) that she tries to find food in rubbish bins and her children 
beg in the street to buy water and milk. According to her, no one cares with the 
deteriorating situation in Iraq any more. Regarding the reasons for such critiques, 
Kim Bolduc, head of the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq in 
southern Iraq, stated that Iraqis are “impatient for real change”. First, the Iraqi 
people expect a real change together with the increasing level of freedom in the 
post-Saddam dictatorship. Second, people expect this change quickly in a wealthy 
country like Iraq. (10 June 2003) Thus, informing Iraqis on the difficult process of 
transition in countries like Iraq can remove such critiques. 
 In addition to the critiques towards their own government, the Iraqi 
people have also critiques towards international community. Refugees 
International (Younes, Rosen, 2008: 7) reports that most Iraqis perceive 
international NGOs as nonactors in Iraq, being physically not in the field. Most of 
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them are unaware of the UN activities thinking that it is only active only in green 
zone to support the central government. Most of them also are not aware of the 
international assistance available to them. According to Refugee International, 
many Iraqis also criticize remote decision making process from Amman. Being 
absence in Iraq was regarded by the Iraqis equal to be disconnected from the 
reality of Iraq (Younes, Rosen, 2008: 8). It is also argued that UN assistance 
activities in Iraq do not have any impact to the real life. Hamza Salih, an Iraqi taxi 
driver, said that “… meetings inside and outside Iraq resulting in tens or hundreds 
of agreements with millions and billions of dollars to help Iraqis, but we haven’t 
seen any improvement in our life.” (IRIN news, 14 August 2008) Kim Bolduc, 
accepted that there is clearly some anger in the streets against the occupying 
forces. However the informed population is aware of the difference between the 
UN and coalitions forces. The UN tries to show people that the UN officials are 
civilians, do not carry guns and work for the population. (IRIN news, 10 June 
2003) In an IRIN interview (24 March 2005), Ashraf Qazi, the UN Special 
Representative for Iraq, also told that absence of UN in Iraq after the tragedy in 
2003 was understood by the people and the UN has the best image in Iraq, 
compared with any other institution.  
In terms of the feeling of distrust among the Iraqi people, the chapter 
identifies the existence of fake local aid agencies, Iraqis’ beliefs on the 
international NGOs’ contacts with intelligence services and with Christian 
missionary activities. As explained in the Afghan case and will also be explained 
in the case of Sudan in Chapter 6, distrust among the local people can negatively 
affect the operation of 4Rs activities. Thus, reasons of distrust are important in 
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identifying tentative principles to possibly increase effectiveness of international 
refugee regime in countries with low internal capacity. The main reasons of 
distrust in international community in Iraq are different than Afghanistan and 
Sudan. As shown in Chapter 4, the main reasons of distrust among the Afghan 
people in international community were people’s belief on that international 
community serves its own interests rather than the Afghan people and that 
distribution of aid is unfair mainly create distrust among them in international 
community. As will be illustrated in Chapter 6, the Sudanese people have distrust 
in international community because of completely different reason, namely their 
unmet expectations from the presence of international missions. However, in Iraq, 
existence of fake local aid agencies harm confidence in aid agencies and belief on 
the contact of international community with intelligence services and Christian 
missionary activities create a neutrality problem among them towards the 
international community. It seems that as Goodwin-Gil (1999) warns in his 
critique of root causes approach in the literature review, 4Rs activities can indeed 
jeopardize the neutrality and impartiality of international community on the eyes 
of the Iraqi people, as the case in Afghanistan. 
 Regarding the problem of fake local aid agencies, according to Dawood 
Pasha, director-general at the Ministry of State for NGOs, there are thousands of 
aid agencies in Iraq that exist only on paper, even without an office. Their main 
aim is to misuse the money coming from outside Iraq. Some of these aid agencies 
can betray people by taking their money and by giving them worthless papers for 
the so-called government land. Mainly because of these fake aid agencies, many 
people lost confidence in these organizations. (IRIN, 23 December 2004) 
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 The distrust among Iraqis in international NGOs includes suspicions on 
their neutrality. On 27 May 2003, Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, was appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan as his Special Representative for Iraq.  Sergio Vieira de Mello told IRIN in 
an interview on 14 July 2003 that UN is seen to be independent by the Iraqi 
people: “We are seen to be independent, we are seen to be here to support them 
and achieve full self-government, that is full sovereignty, as soon as is possible.” 
Unfortunately, only one month later, he was killed by terrorist bombings at the UN 
headquarters in Baghdad (UN News Centre, 19 August 2003). Dawood Pasha, 
director-general at the Ministry of State for NGOs, said that the general view of 
the Iraqi people on aid agencies is that aid agencies are not neutral, having 
contacts with intelligence services such as Mosad or CIA. To put it differently, the 
Iraqi people don’t believe that NGOs are just in Iraq to help Iraqis. (IRIN news, 13 
December 2004)  
 The feeling of distrust among the Iraqi people also includes suspicions on 
missionary activities. The Iraqi people regarded NGOs as Christian missionaries in 
Iraq, using aid to convert young Muslims to Christianity (IRIN news, 23 May 
2007). Thus, it seems that international NGOs experience difficulties to gain 
confidence of the Iraqi people and to convince them that on their intention. 
Eduardo Marotto, spokesman for a missionary Christian organization (Christ’s 
Peace Organization) argued that they don’t force people or promise them money 
to convert. They can just find people, during their assistance work, who want to 
know more about Christ and his belief. (IRIN news, 23 May 2007) It can be true 
or not, but Proffessor Mustafa Abdallah, a humanitarian analyst at Mustansiriyah 
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University in Baghdad, suggested international NGOs to be clear about their 
intention and highlight their neutrality and impartiality (IRIN news, 23 May 
2007).  
 In sum, the Iraqi people have relatively more confidence in international 
NGOs than in their government both in terms of providing aid and security to 
them. Thus, they mostly welcome 4rs activities in Iraq. However, this relative 
confidence inward international community is mainly because of government-
related reasons. The Iraqi people compare the Maliki administration with the 
Saddam period in terms of their access to basic services and they complain about 
their current quality of life. They also criticize the central government and/or 
governorates for sectarian discrimination. Sunni Iraqis argue the existence of a 
strong bias in favor of Shiites and Shiites particularly living under Sunni 
governorates argue a bias in favor of Sunnis.  
The study identified factors, which lead critiques towards international 
community, namely aid dependency, insufficient level of support and distrust due 
to the existence of local fake aid agencies, beliefs on international NGOs contacts 
with intelligence services and Christian missionary activities. Such as the case in 
Afghanistan, that the Iraqi people are disturbed of being aid dependent, since this 
aid would not be always available and when it is the case, they would not have 
resources to survive. Again as Afghan people, Iraqis criticize insufficient level of 
support among local people for the NGOs. Iraqi people have also distrust in 
international NGOs, mainly because they don’t believe in their neutrality and 
sincerity. There is a widespread belief among local people that international NGOs 
have contacts with intelligence services, such as CIA or MOSSAD and thus they 
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have other purposes rather than helping Iraqi people, including Christian 
missionary activities.  
 
 
5.6. Results of the Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses 
 
Examining the UNHCR’s goals of providing sustainability of reintegration 
and prevention of further flows, the quantitative analysis concludes that 
international refugee regime has been inefficient to reintegrate Iraqi returnees. 
Instead, about 57% of the returnees have been reintegrated. The study also finds 
out that the goal of prevention of new mass exodus could not be provided. Thus, it 
is concluded that international refugee regime was not effective in Iraq between 
2003-2011. In other words, international refugee regime attempted to increase its 
effectiveness in Iraq since the country diminishes its effectiveness by being a 
refugee producing country. In return, the main characteristics of the low internal 
capacity hindered the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Iraq. Table 6 illustrates the 
findings of regime effectiveness in Iraq, as was the case in Afghanistan. 
 
Table 6: Effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq, 2003-
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 
Sustainability 
of repatriation 
 (Y/N) 
Prevention 
of new 
flows 
(Y/N) 
Effectiveness 
 
Iraq NO NO 
NOT 
EFFECTIVE 
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The qualitative analysis first examines the main social conditions in Iraq to 
find out whether they lead Iraqi people to cooperate with 4Rs activities. Second, 
the nature of the relations between the Iraqi government and international 
community are examined and factors that shape this relationship have been 
identified. Last, the Iraqi people’s perceptions in the 4Rs activities are questioned 
and factors that shape people’s perceptions are identified. 
The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Iraq are identified as the lack of basic public services and insecurity at the state 
level. While these factors are attributed to the characteristics of the low internal 
capacity, it is argued that Iraq’s low internal capacity created adverse implications 
for the effectiveness of international refugee regime. The chapter conducted also a 
qualitative analysis to identify tentative principles for UNHCR and its 
implementing partners to increase regime effectiveness in countries with low 
internal capacity. 
In the first part, it is concluded that social conditions such as insecurity and 
socio-cultural and religious conservatism decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities in Iraq by causing people’s resistance to 4Rs activities. Regarding the 
implementation of the social conditions on the possible ways of increasing the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq, two suggestions are 
identified. First, religious and socio-cultural conservatism seems to hinder the 
effectiveness of activities to increase female employment and female enrollment 
in Iraq. Thus, awareness-raising activities on women’s access to employment and 
education for girls are likely to increase effectiveness of 4Rs activities on 
employment and education in Iraq. Second, as in the cases of Afghanistan and 
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Sudan, insecurity and violence can also prevent 4Rs activities on female 
enrollment and disarmament in Iraq. Thus, international refugee regime is more 
likely to become effective if security for civilians is provided through the mandate 
of international missions. 
The second part finds out that the relations between Iraqi government and 
international community are not cooperative and there are dissatisfactions and 
critiques from both sides in terms of provisions of 4Rs activities. From the 
international community side, critiques towards insecurity and corruption are 
identified as the main factors that cause dissatisfaction fro the Iraqi government. 
The factors that shape government relations with international community are 
identified as critiques towards the lack of authority on 4Rs projects and unfair 
distribution of aid. Regarding the implementation of the relations between 
government and international community on the possible ways of increasing the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime in Iraq, two suggestions are 
identified. First, as Sudanese case will also illustrate, general insecurity and 
violence against humanitarian aid workers in Iraq hinders effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities through preventing access to the people in dire need. The local officers’ 
beliefs on unfair distribution of aid due to sectarian discrimination can prevent 
cooperative nature between government and international community. When Iraqi 
government would cooperate with international community in terms of providing 
security to the workers of international community and if militants would 
recognize and respect the neutrality of aid agencies, 4Rs activities of international 
regime is more likely to become effective. Thus, information campaigns on the 
neutrality of international community and trust-building activities can convince 
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government officials on the neutrality and real intention of international 
community, namely to help Iraqi people. Second, corruption within Iraqi 
government can prevent effectiveness of 4Rs activities through wasting aid 
spending. As the Afghan case, spending money with accountability and for the 
benefit of the Iraqi people is likely to increase effectiveness of 4Rs activities. 
Funding government sufficiently to increase its capacity of rebuilding its 
administration can increase the Afghan government’s capacity to deal with 
corruption. Third, as the Afghan case, KRG’s critiques towards the lack of 
authority on aid spending and 4Rs projects seem to prevent cooperation with 
international community. Thus, increasing authority in regional governments can 
give them incentives to cooperate with international community on 4Rs activities.  
In the last part, nature of the perceptions of the Iraqi people is identified as 
dissatisfied and non-confidence, namely because of aid dependency, insufficient 
level of support and distrust due to existence of local fake aid agencies, beliefs on 
international NGOs contacts with intelligence services and Christian missionary 
activities. Regarding the implementation of perceptions of the Iraqi people on the 
possible ways of increasing the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Iraq, four suggestions are identified. First, the Iraqi people feel that they are 
dependent on assistance from NGOs, which can not be always available. Since 
people are aid dependent instead of having their own income to survive, people’s 
perceptions in international community can be negative when this aid is not 
available. Thus, when 4Rs activities implement projects to increase people’s 
economic self-sufficiency, their support to international community can increase, 
which would in turn increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
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Iraq. Second, the Iraqi people’s perceptions in insufficient level of support from 
NGOs can diminish their support to 4Rs activities, which can in turn diminish the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. The reasons for critiques seem to be 
impatient expectations for real change in Iraq and lack of proper knowledge on the 
activities of UN agencies. Thus, information campaigns on the process of 
transition in Iraq and UN activities can increase people’s support to international 
community and increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. Third, distrust among 
Iraqis in national and international NGOs can prevent effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities in Iraq. If the existence of fake local aid agencies can be prevented, it is 
likely that people would have more confidence in national NGOs. Last, 
information campaigns to convince Iraqis on the neutrality of aid agencies are also 
likely to increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. 
 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Iraq, being a country with low internal capacity, has produced refugee 
flows and decreased the effectiveness of international refugee regime by its 
continuing insecurity and low political, economic and social performance. The 
4Rs activities in Iraq became ineffective to reintegrate returnees in a sustainable 
manner and have also failed to prevent the recurrence of new mass flows. The 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners had limited effect due to 
volatile security situation and cultural and religious beliefs, uncooperative 
behavior of Iraqi government and confidence problem of the Iraqi people.   
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This chapter first examined Iraq’s political, social and cultural structure 
and then its history, with the aim of understanding the historical background. As 
being a refugee producing country, the strategy of prevention and solution and the 
4Rs program have been conducted in Iraq by UNHCR and its implementing 
partners since 2003. Thus, the third part of the chapter provided brief information 
on the 4Rs activities in Iraq.  
The quantitative analysis of the chapter questioned whether international 
refugee regime was effective in Iraq through its 4Rs activities between 2003-2011. 
It first quantitatively measured regime effectiveness through criteria of 
sustainability of reintegration and prevention of new flows. The analysis 
concluded that international refugee regime was not effective to reintegrate 100% 
of the Iraqi returnees. Instead, about 57% of the returnees were reintegrated. The 
study also found out that the goal of prevention of new mass exodus could not be 
provided. Especially in 2007, when sectarian violence reached its peak level, 
number of asylum seekers increased by 64% in comparison with 2003 and number 
of IDPs increased by %120 between 2005-2008. 
The chapter sought to comprehensively understand the relations between 
4Rs activities and social conditions of the country, the Iraqi government and the 
local people. It found out that social conditions in Iraq, such as the feeling of 
insecurity and socio-cultural and religious conservatism, diminished the 
effectiveness of 4Rs activities. The nature of the relations between the Iraqi 
government and international community was not found cooperative, mainly due 
to the feeling of insecurity among the UN agencies and international organizations 
and corruption within the Iraqi government. Last, it was found out that perceptions 
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of the Iraqi people were not supportive of the regime activities, given their 
confidence problem.  
The case study on Iraq identifies several implications for the regime 
effectiveness, derived from the qualitative analysis. In terms of social conditions, 
awareness raising activities on the importance of women’s education and 
employment and increasing civilian security are likely to increase the regime 
effectiveness in Iraq. In terms of the relations between the Iraqi government and 
international community, information campaigns on the neutrality of aid agencies 
and funding the government sufficiently to increase its capacity of rebuilding its 
administration seem to increase the regime effectiveness in Iraq. Regarding the 
perceptions of the Iraqi people, implementing projects to increase people’s 
economic self-sufficiency, information campaigns on the difficult process of 
transition in Iraq, on the neutrality of aid agencies and prevention of the activities 
of fake local aid agencies are likely to develop supportive perceptions among the 
Iraqis in international community. 
The next chapter will continue with the third case of the dissertation, 
namely Sudan. It will first aim to question the effectiveness of international 
refugee regime in Sudan through the quantitative criteria of sustainability of 
reintegration and prevention of new flows. It will then qualitatively analyze the 
social conditions, nature of the relations between the Sudanese government and 
international community and perceptions of the local people to identify conditions 
to increase regime effectiveness in Sudan. The implications, derived from this case 
study, together with the implications from Afghanistan and Iraq will in return 
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provide tentative principles for international community, in terms of operating to 
increase regime effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CASE STUDY 3: SUDAN 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 examined Iraq as the second case of the study. It questioned the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime and sought to derive implications for 
tentative principles in Chapter 7. The chapter found out that international refugee 
regime was not effective in Iraq during the years 2003-2011. It also examined the 
social conditions, the nature of the relations between the Iraqi government and 
international community and perceptions of the local people. It was found out that 
social conditions in Iraq, such as the feeling of insecurity and socio-cultural and 
religious conservatism, diminished the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. The nature 
of the relations between the Iraqi government and international community was 
also found as uncooperative, mainly due to the feeling of insecurity among the UN 
agencies and international organizations and corruption within the Iraqi 
government. Last, Perceptions of the Iraqi people were not supportive of the 
regime activities, given their confidence problem.  
This chapter analyses the last case study of the dissertation, Sudan. The 
first part of the chapter will give a brief introduction of political and social 
structures in Sudan and then the second part will examine the history of Sudan to 
understand both the roots of Sudan’s low internal capacity and reasons of the 
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forced displacement in the country. The third part will seek to examine the 4Rs 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners in Sudan. The next part will 
examine the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Sudan between 2005-
2011 through quantitative analysis. The last part aims to identify the principles by 
which UNHCR and its implementing partners can operate to increase the regime 
effectiveness. 
This chapter argues that international refugee regime was not effective in 
Sudan
25
 during the period 2005-2011, based on the findings from quantitative 
analysis. The 4Rs activities in Sudan were not effective to reintegrate returnees in 
a sustainable manner and to prevent the recurrence of new mass flows. The 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners had a limited impact on the 
regime effectiveness, mainly due to lack of security and government cooperation. 
The relations between the Sudanese government and international community, 
namely the UN agencies, international NGOs and their national partners and donor 
states, diminished the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Sudan. The Sudanese local 
people have also lost confidence in international aid community, since they think 
that their presence does not change their quality of life considerably.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The study refers Republic of Sudan since Republic of South Sudan was also a part of it until July 
2011. 
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6.1 A General Overview 
 
The Republic of Sudan has 1,861,484 sq km territory with seven neighbor 
states: South Sudan (2,184 km
26
), Chad (1,360 km), Egypt (1,275 km), Ethiopia 
(769 krrm), Eritrea (605 km), Libya (383 km) and Central African Republic (175 
km). Sudan has a population of about 34,2 million.
27 
(CIA, 2013c) In Sudan, there 
are three major regional groups, those of African descent, those of Arab descent 
and those who share both ethnicities through intermarriages (Essien and Falola, 
2009: 5). Sudanese Arabs constitute the major ethnic group (about 70%) and 
others constitute the remaining 30%. (CIA, 2013c). Sudanese Arabs control the 
political, social and economic structures of the country. The two largest non-Arab 
groups include the Dinka and the Beja people (Essien and Falola, 2009: 5-6). 
Sudan has two official languages, namely Arabic and English. Nubian, Ta 
Bedawie and Fur are also regional languages. (CIA, 2013c) There are actually 
over 500 major languages in Sudan, which are associated with people from 
different cultural groups. However, Arabic can be regarded as the national 
language though English is also spoken in most urban areas. Dinka languages are 
the widely spoken non-Arabic language in the south. (Essien and Falola, 2009: 6). 
The Majority of the population is Sunni Muslim and there is also a small Christian 
minority in the country (CIA, Sudan, 2013). The north and south Sudan can be 
distinguished in terms of ethnicity and religion, since people from the north are 
                                                 
26
 Sudan-South Sudan boundary can be subject to change, dependent on the final sovereignty status 
of Abyei region (CIA, 2013d). 
27
 Sudan had also until recently the land and population of South Sudan, which meant an additional 
644,329 sq km land and 10,6 million population (CIA, 2013d). 
 211 
mostly Arabs and Muslims while most people in the south subscribe to traditional 
religions or Christianity (Essien and Falola, 2009: 7). 
Sudan has 17 states
28
, of which the capital is Khartoum. It has a mixed 
legal system of Islamic law and English common law. It is a federal republic, 
ruled by the National Congress Party (NCP). The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) mandated Government of National Unity for the government. 
Since 16 October 1983, President Umar Hassan al-Bashir is both the chief of state 
and head of government. Last elections were held in April 2010 and next elections 
are to be held in 2015. In the legislative branch, bicameral National Legislature 
consists of a Council of States and a National Assembly. Last election for the 
legislative branch was held in April 2010 and next election is to be held in 2016. 
(CIA, 201c3) 
Sudan has better economic indicators in comparison with Afghanistan but 
worse than Iraq. Its GDP (purchasing power parity) is US$ 80.43 billion in 2012, 
ranked in 80th in the world (Afghanistan is ranked in 111st and Iraq 61st). Its 
GDP real growth rate is -11.2 % in 2012, ranked in 216th in the world 
(Afghanistan is ranked in 49
th
 and Iraq 7th). Sudanese have a GDP per capita of 
US$ 2,400 in 2012, ranked in 182nd in the world (Afghanistan is ranked in 217
th
 
and Iraq 160th). (CIA, 2013c) According to the key economic, political, security 
and social welfare criteria, Index of State Weakness (Rice, Patrick, 2008: 10) 
ranked Sudan in the 6th place among 141 countries. Using key social-economic 
                                                 
28
 Red Sea, Gezira, Khartoum, Gedaref, White Nile, Blue Nile, Northern, Western Darfur, 
Southern Darfur,  Southern Kordofan, Kassala, River Nile, Eastern Darfur, Northern Darfur, 
Northern Kordofan, Sinnar and Central Darfur. While Sudan is geographically to fragmented and 
this fragmentation is also felt in practice, the detailed list of the Sudanese states are provided, 
different from the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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and political-military indicators, the Failed State Index of Fund for Peace (2012: 
4) ranked Sudan in 3rd of 177 countries. According to the index, the country was 
at 3
rd
 in 2005 (Failed State Index, 2005) and within 7 years, its rank did not 
change. HDI of the UNDP (2011: 126) ranked Sudan in 169 of 187 countries. 
According to the index, Sudan increased its development ranks within the last 7 
years, despite its still very low development rank. Its HDI (2011: 133) was 0.383 
in 2005 and with a small increase in 2011, became 0.408.   
In sum, this part concludes that Sudan is a refugee producing country with 
low internal capacity. By the beginning of 2012, Sudan hosts about 2,422,520 
IDPs and about 491,013 refugees abroad (UNHCR, 2011a: 44), mainly in Chad. 
The next part of the chapter examines the political history of Sudan with the aim 
of identifying main causes of the country’s low internal capacity. 
 
 
6.2. A Brief History of Sudan 
 
This section seeks to understand the roots of the Sudanese low internal 
capacity through examining its political evolution during the past two centuries. 
With this aim, the section will study the period until the Sudanese independency, 
the first and second civil wars, the Darfur conflict and the 2005 CPA and its 
afterwards. 
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6.2.1. Sudan as an Independent State 
 
Sudan hosted the Funj Sultanete, established between northern, central and 
southern Sudan in the 16
th
 century. The Sultanete was a form of monarchy with a 
centralized government, which was controlled by the Arabs and Muslims. Its 
formation created an enmity between the local Africans and Arabs, seen as foreign 
invaders. The Funj Sultanete increased Arabization and Islamization of Sudan in 
18
th
 century. The divisions in the Sultanete on the inclusion or exclusion of non-
Arabs in the administration and sentiments among various ethnic groups paved the 
way for the Ottoman conquest in the early 19
th
 century. (Essien and Falola, 2009: 
26) 
The Ottoman Empire, together with Muhammad Ali and Egyptian army 
ruled Sudan between the years 1821-1885. The Arabs felt threatened by the Turco-
Egyptian rule and organized more better than the local African people, given their 
common ethnic and religious faith. (Essien and Falola, 2009: 27) A religious 
resistance, known as the Mahdist Revolt under Mohammad Ahmed El Mahdi, 
revolted against the Ottoman leadership to liberate Muslims. In 1985, the 
Mahdists killed the General Charles Gordon, a British governor and military 
general, who was sent by the British government to assist the Egyptian army. They 
captured Khartoum in the same year. Although British conquered the Mahdists in 
1898, the Revolt became the first major nationalist movement and evoked a 
political consciousness to end foreign domination. (Essien and Falola, 2009: 27-
28) 
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Beginning in 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian rule constituted the last colonial 
period in the Sudanese history. National sentiments against the Anglo-Egypt rule 
began to increase in the beginnings of 1920s by Ali Abdel Latif, who proclaimed 
that Sudan should be governed by the Sudanese. He formed the White Flag 
League to challenge the colonial rule. In 1938, some reformation groups emerged 
among the educated class, claiming independence and freedom of the people of 
Sudan. In late 1938, violence increased against colonial officials and Sudanese 
society was divided over the question of either towards independence or an 
alliance with Egypt. (Essien and Falola, 2009: 29-31) In January 1956, Sudan 
became independent. 
In sum, the Sudanese history was a history of foreign rules until mid 20
th
 
century. There was also an ethnic and religious division within the society, with 
the dominant character of the Arabs and Muslims over the local African people, 
whose are mainly Christian or believe in traditional religions. 
 
 
6.2.2. The First Civil War 
 
The first civil war in Sudan started on 18 August 1955, about four months 
before the independence of Sudan and it ended in 1972, when the South gained 
regional autonomy. (Hovil, 2010: 8) In the first major election after independence, 
The Sudanese Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari was defeated by the alliance 
between the People’s Democratic Party and the Umma Party in 1956. Abdallah 
Khalil became the Prime Minister. However, his leadership lasted only two years, 
 215 
due to his inability to create a bridge between the north and south Sudan. He was 
overthrown by the first military coup in November 1958 and the army leader 
Ibrahim Abboud became the Prime Minister until 1964. His military government 
solidified the power of northerners. As a result, rebellions in the south together 
with the large-scale protests for economic problems weakened the government. He 
was overthrown after the October Revolution in 1964. The second military coup in 
1969 ended the new leadership of Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifah. Colonel Jaafara al 
Nimeiri, the chairman of the Revolution Command Council, was elected as the 
President of Sudan in 1971. Nimeiri signed the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, 
attempting to bridge the gap between the south and north. (Essien and Falola, 
2009: 33-34) The most important political implication of this civil war was a self-
governed South by the Agreement of Addis Abab.  However in 1983, the 
agreement fall apart, mainly because of the discovery of oil in the South and 
Southeners’ fears on a potential Arab Islamic state due to the increasing ties of 
Khartoum with Arab governments. (Hovil, 2010: 8) 
In sum, the Sudanese history witnessed an 18 years-long civil war, based 
on the ethnic and religious division between the North and South. During the civil 
war, it also experienced tow military coup d’états, which instabilized the 
government.  
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6.2.3. The Second Civil War 
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 guaranteed the southern autonomy 
and distribution of oil profits to improve the infrastructure in the south. However  
John Garang-led Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was unsatisfied with 
the conditions for southern freedom of equality with the rest of the country, and 
continued its revolts and attacks against the central government. (Essien and 
Falola, 2009: 34) Dr. John Garang de Mabior founded the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) in July 1983, with the intention of creating a new 
Sudan united under a socialist system. The SPLM was structured along the 
SPLA’s military line. (Gallab, 2008: 2) The SPLA was formed in the south and 
took control of much of South Sudan in the late 1980s. In 1991, SPLA was 
divided into factions, which went into a bloody war with each other. (Elnur, 2009: 
73) Two major fractions were based on two competing ideas: the ideology of 
separatism versus unity. These two sides were later took an ethnic profile, as a 
Nuer-Dinka conflict. (Hovil, 2010: 8) This bloody civil war continued until the 
signing of CPA in 2005. 
In the meantime, the President Nimeiri introduced the sharia law in 1985 
with the aim of stabilizing Islamization and Arabization in the country. This 
imposition of the Islam values on the rest of the population awakened the old feud 
and animosity among the local African people. It also showed that political leaders 
and can make their policy decisions by their ethnic and religious affiliations. 
Nimeiri was overthrown by a coup in May 1985. The civilian rule of Sadi al-
Mahdi of the Umma Party lasted only four years, when another military coup in 
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June 1989 gave power to General Omar Hassan al-Bashir. He banned political 
activities in the country and attempted to impose Islamic codes. (Essien and 
Falola, 2009: 34-35) Thus, with this coup, the period of the first Islamist republic 
began. In 1999, the second Islamist republic was initiated, when al-Bashir 
removed al-Turabi, who was the primary architect of the first Islamist republic. 
(Gallab, 2008: 1)  
 In sum, after the first civil war, Sudan had to deal with another civil war, 
until 2005, again based on the ethnic and religious divisions both between the 
north and south and within the south. The country had also two military coup 
d’états within four years. Given the civil wars and political unrest, Sudan became 
a country with low internal capacity. 
 
 
6.2.4. The CPA in 2005 and its Afterwards 
 
In 2001, a serious peace process began and on 9 January 2005, the CPA 
was signed between Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir and chairman of SPLM/A 
John Garang. It foresaw a six-year transitional period, after which south Sudan 
would vote for its future, namely to unite with the north or separate from it. (BBC 
news, 1 August 2005) The UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established in 
2005 to support the implementation of the CAP, to protect and promote human 
rights and to assist parties in governance, recovery and development. In terms of 
providing civilian security, UNMIS is mandated to observe and monitor 
movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in the areas of UNMIS 
 218 
deployment. It is also mandated to coordinate international efforts in the 
protection of civilians and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence in the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities. 
(UNMIS, Mandate) With the completion of the interim period in July 2011, a 
successor mission to UNMIS, namely the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
as established. In addition to UNMIS and UNMISS, the UN Security Council also 
established the African Union/Un Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in July 
2007 and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established in 2004 as 
a peacekeeping force, operating primarily in Darfur. As will be shown in the 
qualitative analysis, limitations on their movements, imposed by the Sudanese 
government and their lack of military capability prevent UNMIS, UNAMID and 
AMIS to provide effective security for civilians. In return, their presence in Sudan 
is likely to create disappointment and distrust among the Sudanese people in the 
absence of any real improvement in civilian security. 
The South Sudan referendum took place in January 2011 and 98.83% 
voted for secession (Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, 2011: 2). The 
country became independent on 9 July 2011 and Juba became its capital (BBC 
news, 9 July 2011). Garang returned to Khartoum and became the First Vice 
President on 9 July. However, he was killed on 20 July 2005 in a helicopter crash 
(BBC news, 1 August 2005). The Republic of South Sudan as a new nation state 
has the difficult task of state building. In addition to the difficulties of a stagnant 
economy, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society and millions of displaced 
people, the disappearance of the common enemy (Khartoum) constitutes a serious 
security challenge for the new state. The Refugees International (2012: 1) stresses 
 219 
that in the absent of a common enemy, competing tribal and ethnic interests are 
fueling internal conflict. To ensure a successful transition to a functioning nation, 
it also suggests a Sudanese identity regardless of the person’s color, faith, tribe, 
ethnicity, etc. 
According to Barltrop (2011: 4), the CPA was not comprehensive enough 
since it excluded the conflict in Darfur as well as lower-level conflicts in Eastern 
Sudan and parts of Southern Sudan. The CAP, signed in 2005 was to end the 
North-South conflict in Sudan and thus it was an attempt to solve only one conflict 
in Sudan. As John Ashworth, an independent analyst on Sudan said, “you can not 
have peace in one part of the country while war continues in other parts”. (IRIN 
news, 15 April 2005) Regarding South Sudan, there are still important issues, yet 
to be solved. First, the border region of Abyei would normally hold a separate 
referendum to become part of north or south. However, due to the deadlock on 
voting demand of the ‘temporary’ residents of Misseriya community, the 
referendum could not be hold. Hence, Misseriya community travels through 
region annually to graze their cattle and Dinka Ngok people, who largely support 
to be part of Bahr el Ghazal of South Sudan, reject the demand of Misseriya 
community. (IRIN news, 8 February 2011)  Second, an estimated 75% of all the 
former Sudan's oil reserves are in South Sudan, though the refineries and the 
pipeline are in Sudan. In January 2012, South Sudan halted oil production and 
halve public spending on all but salaries due to the breakdown of talks on the 
sharing of oil revenues. Finally in March 2013, it is decided that Sudan would 
resume pumping South Sudanese oil in May and create a demilitarised border 
zone. (BBC news, 14 March 2013) 
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In sum, the CPA in 2005 put an end to the second civil war in Sudan by 
paving the way for the independency of South Sudan and in June 2011, South 
Sudan became independent, as country being devastated from the long years of 
war and deprived from the governance and essential infrastructures. Other rooted 
conflict of Sudan, which also weakens its internal capacity is the Darfur conflict.  
 
 
6.2.5. The Darfur Crisis 
 
Barltrop (2011: 4) argues that the Darfur conflict is not an entirely separate 
and unconnected war from the much larger and more persistent war between the 
government and SPLM/A. According to him, Darfur (the land of the Fur) crisis 
can be described as the conflict between local nomads and Arabs, a live tension 
from Sudanese history. The region contains mostly ethnic Black Africans and 
some Arab population. Since 1983, two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have 
fought against the Sudanese government, mainly because of its policies of 
discrimination, marginalization and underdevelopment of their region. The 
violence in Darfur turned to a heavy war in 2003, when rebel forces attacked on 
the military section of the El Fashir airport in March and April 2003. The 
government gave an ethnic-based response, which caused a humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur. (Islam, 2006: 355) 
The Sudanese government sponsored a group of Arab militias, called 
Janjaweed to assist Sudanese groups in their response against civilians perceived 
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to be helping the rebels. Janjaweed have been alleged by systemic crimes of 
ethnic cleansing and slavery towards the southern native black Africans. (Islam, 
2006: 356) The report of International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur also held 
the Sudan government and Janjaweed responsible for the serious violations of 
human rights (2005: 3): 
the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting 
to crimes under international law. In particular, the Commission found that 
Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, 
including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction 
of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced 
displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a 
widespread and systematic basis, (…). 
 
On 5 July 2005, the Sudan government signed a Declaration of Principles 
with SLM/A and JEM (African Union, 2005). The parties committed themselves 
to undertake negotiations to end the conflict in Darfur in good faith (Preamble, 
Art.7). About one year later, on 5 May 2006, Darfur Peace Agreement was signed 
between the Sudanese government and the main Darbul rebel group, Minni 
Minnawi’s faction of the SLA. (IRIN news, 26 May 2006). However, Darfur has 
continued to remain an extremely violent and unstable place and the peace 
agreement has so far not brought security to Darfur (Reliefweb, 9 Jun 2006). The 
main reason was the refusal of two other rebel factions to sign the agreement, 
arguing that it did not meet their basic demands (IRIN news, 26 May 2006). 
Especially the rebel group, led by Mohamed al-Nur has a substantial popular 
support among the Fur ethnic group and there occurred violent clashes between 
Minnawi’s faction and al-Nur. (IRIN news, 19 June 2006) 
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In sum, Sudan has a history of foreign rule, three long civil wars based on 
ethnic and religious divisions and military coups. The civil wars between north 
and south, within the north and within the south, based on ethnic and/or religious 
divisions and the political unrest due to military coups weakened prevented the 
Sudanese governments to build their internal capacity. Different from the cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Sudanese government of Bashir has been alleged to be 
involved in the civil wars and violence against its own citizens. 
The factors mentioned above also caused mass forced displacements from 
Sudan. The first wave of displacement occurred in south Sudan during the first 
civil war and over one million people were displaced, of which 220,000 were 
refugees. Many of them returned after the 1972 peace agreement. The second 
major displacement was caused by the second civil war and estimated four million 
people were displaced between 1983 and 2005. (Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 8) In 
2005, there were an estimated 613,000 southern Sudanese refugees outside the 
country and some 4.5 million displaced within Sudan. In addition, some 200,000 
refugees and 1.8 million displaced people have fled the western Sudanese region 
of Darfur between 2003 and 2005. (IRIN news, 1 September 2005) 
Accordingly, in 2005, UNHCR and its implementing partners began 4Rs 
activities in Sudan with the aim of increasing capacity of Sudan, particularly the 
south, where a major repatriation movement occurred after the signing of CPA. 
Before examining the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Sudan, the next part will 
provide brief information on 4Rs activities in Sudan, which aims to ensure that 
returnees would be reintegrated in a sustainable manner and south Sudan would 
not produce secondary or new displacements. 
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6.3. 4Rs Activities of UNHCR and its Implementing Partners 
 
Recalling the shift in the understanding of effectiveness from reactive to 
proactive policies, as examined in Chapter 3, UNHCR shifted its activities mainly 
to countries of origin by being directly present in Sudan. This part examines 4Rs 
activities of UNHCR and its implementing partners, namely Repatriation, 
Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, to increase the effectiveness of 
international refugee regime in Sudan. According to the Joint Assessment Mission 
report (2005: 23), the first two “Rs” would be concentrated during the period 
between July 2005 and end of 2007 to repatriate and reintegrate returnees. From 
2008 to mid-2011, until the time schedule of South Sudanese independence, the 
last two “Rs” of reconstruction and rehabilitation will be undertaken for major 
infrastructure programs and capacity building.  
 
 
6.3.1. Repatriation
29
  Activities 
 
Emmanuel Nyabera, the spokesman for UNHCR in Kenya told IRIN (2 
March 2005) that in the Sudanese repatriation operation, UNHCR had time to 
ensure that the repatriations were organized and dignified, instead of rushing the 
process. The main reason for this was that there is no government pushing 
UNHCR to repatriate refugees as soon as possible, as Guterres stated (IRIN news, 
20 December 2005). Accordingly, UNHCR envisaged a phased approach for the 
                                                 
29
 Since the voluntary character of mass repatriations is questionable in general, the study refrains 
from defining repatriations from Sudan as ‘voluntary repatriations’. 
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return of Sudanese refugees in 2004. According to this approach, UNHCR 
conducted preparatory activities for early warning and monitoring of the returnees 
prior to peace agreement. In the second phase, adequate human and material 
resources were deployed in South Sudanese field offices and border crossing 
points, way-stations, and major repatriation routes were opened upon conclusion 
of peace agreement. The Tripartite Agreements concluded between hosting 
countries, Sudanese government/SPLA/M and UNHCR. (UNHCR, 2004d: 109)  
In late 2005, official voluntary repatriation by UNHCR to South Sudan 
began (IRIN news, 20 December 2005) and 371,846 refugees returned to home by 
the end of 2011. Along the major return routes, agencies provided food, water, 
primary health services, protection and emergency transportation (IRIN news, 18 
March 2005). Upon their arrival, returnees were provided non-food items 
including blankets, mattresses, plastic sheeting, mosquito nets, jerricans, kitchen 
sets, water buckets and soap (IRIN news, 3 May 2006) Since the strategy of 
prevention and solution requires post-repatriation activities, UNHCR and its 
implementing partners also operate reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
activities in Sudan. Thus, the remaining of this part will examine the last 3Rs. 
 
 
6.3.2. Reintegration Activities 
 
To ensure the sustainability of return, UNHCR has taken responsibilities in 
improving conditions upon return, such as drilling boreholes and building schools 
and health clinics in the south (IRIN news, 1 September 2005). On 1 April 2006, 
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UNICEF also launched ‘Go to School’ initiative in south Sudan, aiming to 
increase primary school enrollment rate. In 2009, significant progress has been 
achieved with the total enrollment rate at about 1.6 million up from an estimated 
343,000 in 2005. UNICEF has provided assistance for the development and 
implementation of an English-language based curriculum and supported the 
training of teachers through ongoing intensive English language courses. 
(UNICEF, News note, 31 March 2009)  
 IOM, together with the EU Instrument for Stability, initiated the Peace and 
Stability Quick Impact Fund Grants Program to help to create an environment for 
peaceful coexistence among communities in the border states. Thus, it would 
contribute the sustainability of reintegration through strengthening mutual 
confidence and trust among community members. (IOM Mission, 2013: 1) 
Conflict Development Fund of the WB has improved access to essential services 
for 2 million people in rural Sudan through its support on education, health, water 
and solar energy facilities (Work Bank, news). 
In addition to providing food and nutrition assistance in Darfur, in the 
eastern part of Sudan and in south Sudan, the WFP initiated its Food for Work 
program in south Sudan to provide food aid to individuals on the condition of 
being active in certain productive activities, such as cultivation or community 
service. Thus, this program also encourages the beneficiaries to be self-sufficient, 
which would in return contribute sustainable development of the country. 
(Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 11) 
However, the security at the state level has considerably hampered the 
reintegration efforts in Sudan. For example, attacks on trucks contracted by the 
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WFP to transport food to Darfur and south Sudan resulted in cuts in the amount of 
food transported (IRIN news, 10 April 2008). When the increased violence caused 
new displacements, UNHCR needs to redirect its priorities away from return and 
reintegration activities towards emergency response (UNHCR, 2013: 76).  
 
 
6.3.3. Rehabilitation Activities 
 
In south Sudan, the most challenging part of the rehabilitation activities is 
the complete absent of infrastructure and buildings of basic services. Accordingly, 
Guterres stated that “during centuries, very little has been done in southern Sudan. 
We have not a problem of reconstruction; we effectively have a problem of 
construction. Most things are missing” (IRIN news, 1 September 2005). Starting 
from almost null, UNHCR and its implementing partners began rehabilitation 
activities in south Sudan. While there are many rehabilitation projects in Sudan, 
the study will only illustrate some examples of them to give a general idea on the 
rehabilitation projects in the country. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South 
Sudan was established in 2005 to support the implementation of various projects 
and to rebuild conflict-affected areas. In terms of rehabilitation, the Fund 
renovated key government buildings and the Juba hospital and water supply 
system, including the improvement and maintenance of 1000 km roads.(MDTF, 
Projects) As being an operational arm of the UN, the UN Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) assists a range of partners to implement aid and development 
projects. It has also been operational in south Sudan since 2005 and implemented 
 227 
infrastructure projects, including construction of roads and bridges, rehabilitating 
airstrip and building government offices, schools, police and justice facilities. 
(UNOPS, web page) 
 
 
6.3.4. Reconstruction Activities 
 
As being a USAID-funded development program, Building Responsibility 
for the Delivery of Government Services (BRIDGE) aims to transform 
humanitarian relief to a sustainable development in Sudan. It is an attempt to 
empower local government and communities to manage resources and solve their 
own problems. (Sudanbridge, web page) Erik de Mul, the head of the UNDP in 
southern Sudan, stated that the leadership, ministers and vice-ministers in south 
Sudan are well-trained, well-educated and experienced people. However, they lack 
basic government administrative structures. The country is divided into 10 states 
and all need to be built up. (IRIN news, 18 April 2006) Accordingly, the UNDP 
has also implemented projects in Sudan to build capacity. In August 2006, UNDP 
created the projects of capacity building of the Sudan judiciary, together with the 
WB and the Ministry of Finance to support the implementation of the CAP 
(UNDP, projects). Another UNDP project, named Sudan post-conflict community 
based recovery and rehabilitation program, links rehabilitation to development. 
Since 2005, 44 NGOs work together across 10 locations for capacity building, 
improvements in livelihoods and provision of basic services. In terms of capacity 
building, administrative and financial trainings have been organized. 
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Administration offices have been built and equipped. Village development 
committees have also been organized and local government authorities have 
directly been included in the management of project activities. (UNDP, projects). 
In sum, UNHCR and its implementing partners have conducted 4Rs 
activities in Sudan since 2005. The main aim of these activities has been to 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime by ensuring the 
sustainability of repatriations and preventing the reoccurrence of further 
displacement. The next part will question whether international refugee regime 
was effective in Sudan during 2005-2011 through examining 4Rs activities. 
 
 
6.4. Effectiveness of International Refugee Regime in Sudan: A 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
Questioning the effectiveness of international refugee regime in Sudan 
through a quantitative analysis as explained in the research design of the study, 
this part examines, first, the repatriation as a durable solution by the sustainability 
of reintegration process. It then questions whether international refugee regime 
could prevent the reoccurrence of new mass flows from Sudan by 4Rs activities, 
as assumed in the strategy of prevention and solution.  
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6.4.1. Repatriation as a Durable Solution: Sustainability of Reintegration 
 
As explained in the research design of the study, repatriation movements 
as a durable solution need to be sustainable in terms of the reintegration of 
returnees. This study will use three criteria to measure the sustainability of 
reintegration process: access to rights, access to employment opportunities and 
access to social services. The indicators for the criterion of access to rights are 
whether all returnees have identity documents, whether they are allowed to vote 
and whether they are reports of security incidents towards returnees. The 
indicators for the criteria of access to employment opportunities and social 
services are the percentage of returnees with regular employment, shelter, health, 
education and clean water supply. 
According to UNHCR (2011d: 53), an overwhelming majority of returnees 
in the south (90%) have the same access to basic rights as other citizens. Thus, this 
part would use the data on the general population including local people, where 
specific data for returnees are not applicable.  
Basic services in South Sudan were already very poor before the mass 
repatriations to the region put pressure on South Sudanese economic and social 
resources in the post-2005 period. Brophy (2003: 3) states that in 2003, only 30% 
of school-aged children were enrolled in schools in South Sudan. In terms of 
water, only 30% of the population could have access to clean water (IRIN news, 
25 March 2005). Bishop Caesar Mazzolari of the diocese of Rumbek told in an 
interview in 2005 (IRIN news, 13 April 2005) that “the south has not been 
rehabilitated, and in most ways - no rehabilitation of roads - the infrastructure in 
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southern Sudan does not exist. (…) Education does not exist. (…) As people come 
we have discovered that we have no medicine to share with them”. In sum, the 
situation of basic services in South Sudan had already been very poor and 
devastated by the long civil war. In 2005, UNHCR and its implementing partners 
have begun 4Rs activities to increase the capacity of South Sudan with the aim of 
ensuring the sustainable reintegration of mass returns. Table 7 summarizes the 
latest available reintegration level of Sudanese returnees. 
 
Table 7: Reintegration process of the South Sudanese returnees, 2011 
 
 Indicator Standard 
Measurement 
in standard 
Value 
Measurement 
in value 
Access to 
rights  
Individual identity 
documentation 
YES 
 
1 
NO 0 
Allowed to vote YES 1 YES 1 
Reports of security 
incidents 
NO 1 YES 0 
Access to 
employment 
opportunities 
Returnees with 
regular 
employment 
100% 1 16% 0.16 
Access to 
social 
services 
Shelter 100% 1 27% 0.27 
Health 100% 1 33% 0.33 
Education 100% 1 44% 0.44 
Water supply 100% 1 55% 0.55 
Total   8  2,75 
 
Reintegration 
process: 
34,3% 
 
In terms of access to ID cards, UNHCR (2010d: 64) has provided 
assistance for the government to issue identity documents to returnees in Southern 
Sudan. However, according to UNHCR (2012-13: 80), large sections of the 
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population do not have the necessary documents to prove their nationality. The 
problem is particularly observed for the Southerners without sufficient 
documentation or for individuals with mixed origin. Different from Afghanistan 
and Iraq, in South Sudan, uncertainties still continue to exist in the post-CPA 
period, particularly because of further displacements in the frontline region and 
because of continuing repatriations to South Sudan.  Regarding voting, a majority 
of south Sudanese refugees returned to south Sudan to be able to vote in the 
referendum in January 2011. The returnees could vote as long as they reside in 
South Sudan (Gurtong, 11 August 2010), which means to be registered once they 
returned home. At least 3.4 million Sudanese registered to vote in the referendum. 
(All Africa, Photo Essays, 2011) Regarding the security incidents, a survey 
conducted by Bonn International Center for Conversion (Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 
11) found out that 45% of respondents have encountered prejudice by community 
members upon their return, such as accusations to bring HIV into community, to 
flee during the war and to ‘steal’ all the jobs with their education and skills. Thus, 
such prejudices can prevent the increase in the level of cooperation and integration 
between returnees and local people. 40% of returnees reported their belief on 
security problems in the future because of their status as returnees. Supporting the 
findings of the survey above, OCHA reported in 2011 (para.8) that returnees feel 
insecure and being harassed in their return communities. Especially the presence 
of SPLA soldiers and other militia groups causes fear among returnees to leave 
populated areas.  
In terms of population below poverty line, Southern Sudan Centre for 
Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) indicates that 51% of the population 
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lives below the poverty line (SSCCSE, 2011: 1) Centre for Strategic Analyses and 
Research (2012: 17) surveyed 445 returnees and 274 host community members in 
Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal in 2012. In terms of economic 
reintegration, the survey found out that 24.8% of female returnees and 23% of 
male returnees are unemployed. 12.7% of female returnees
30
 and 13.5% of male 
returnees
31
 have only part time, irregular jobs or no paid employment. Thus, 
according to the latest available data, 37.5% of female returnees and 36.5% of 
male returnees do not have access to regular employment. According to the 
survey, 8.4% of female returnees and 24.2% of male returnees have full time jobs. 
As average, only 16.3% of returnees do access to regular employment. The 
percentage of returnees with regular employment is the lowest among case studies. 
However, there is still relatively little differences among them considering the 
percentage of Afghan returnees with regular employment is only 20% and of Iraqi 
returnees only 25%. 
In terms of shelter, according to UNHCR’s (2013: 77) latest data only 30% 
of the IDPs live in adequate dwellings. IRIN (28 April 2008) reports that many of 
the returnees have settled in or near minecontaminated areas, since they could not 
find anywhere else to build their shelters. SSCCSE (2011: 7) reports that 83% of 
the South Sudanese population lives in tukul, which is accepted as an inadequate 
dwelling. Tukul is a cone-shaped mud hut, usually with a thatched roof and 
covered with plastic sheeting (Care International). Thus, it is accepted that only 
27% of the population lives in adequate dwellings. This percentage is relatively 
                                                 
30
 5% of female returnees have part time jobs, 4.7% have irregular jobs and 3% have no paid 
employment.  
31
 5.3% of male returnees have part time jobs, 6.5% have irregular jobs and 1.7% have no paid 
employment.  
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close to the percentage of the Afghan returnees with adequate shelters and nearly 
half of the Iraqi returnees.  
According to the survey conducted by Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 12) 60% of respondents have poor quality of 
health facilities and a lack of qualified doctors. According to the IOM (2009c: 25-
26) village assessments in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State between December 2008 
and June 2009, 93% of the villages assessed have no healthcare facilities and 77% 
of the population viewed access to existing health facilities as a serious concern. 
62% of them have access to health units by more than 60 minutes walking. Thus, 
the study accepts that only 33% of the population has access to health services. 
This percentage is the lowest among the case studies, since the percentage of 
returnees with access to health facilities is 50% in Afghanistan and 58% in Iraq. 
Regarding access to education, according to OCHA (2012: 2), net 
enrollment rate for primary schools in South Sudan is 44.4%. Thus, the study 
accepts the percentage of returnees with access to primary education as 44%, 
which is the lowest rate in comparison with Afghanistan (50%) and Iraq (63%). 
According to the survey conducted by Bonn International Center for Conversion 
(Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 12), 40% of respondents reported poor quality of 
education facilities, including lack of infrastructure and qualified teachers. IOM 
(2009c: 21) reported that 31% of the children attending school have to walk more 
than 60 minutes and 36% of them have to walk between 15 and 60 minutes. 
According to the report, access to the nearest school is very problematic and 
indicated as the main reason for nonenrollment in school and for early dropouts. 
Interestingly enough, security or religious beliefs are not indicated as the main 
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reasons for nonenrollment in South Sudan, being different from the cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. However distance is still related with security, given the 
presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance along the roads and footpaths to 
the schools (Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 11).  
In terms of access to clean drinking water, IOM (2009c: 16) stated that 
only 30% of the villages assessed had access to improved drinking water. The 
remaining 70% had unimproved drinking water sources such as unprotected wells, 
river water, lakes and springs and hafeers. Peter Pal Riak, the state’s minister for 
physical infrastructure stressed that the water from river is a source of disease, 
mainly for cholera (IRIN news, 30 April 2008). In terms clean water in the 
Southern Sudanese capital Juba, it is reported that the sources of water are often 
contaminated and Juba has not a functioning water and sewerage system (IRIN 
news, 23 May 2008). According to the survey conducted by Bonn International 
Center for Conversion (Ashkenazi, et.al., 2008: 12) 43% of respondents reported 
poor quality of drinking water. Accordingly, SSCCSE (2011: 1) data provides that 
just over half of the population (55%) have improved access of drinking water. 
This percentage is closer to the percentage of Iraqi returnees with access to clean 
water supply (60%) and considerably higher than Afghan returnees, which is only 
20%. 
In sum, returnee’s access to basic services such as employment, shelter, 
health, education and drinking water is very poor. Table 7 attempts to show the 
latest situation of the reintegration process in Sudan by 2011 and nearly 35% of 
the returnees are able to reintegrate during 6 years. One underlying reason for the 
relative little progress is the lack of resolution to Sudan’s conflicts such as Darfur 
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and Abyei. According to Hilde Frafjord Johnson, the deputy executive director of 
the UNICEF, the conflicts require a lot of capacity from the international 
community and take away a considerable part of their resources. (IRIN news, 21 
May 2008) Thus, reintegration level of South Sudanese returnees is the lowest 
among case studies of this study. Most importantly, the South Sudanese returnees 
lack ID documents and have also less access to basic services of economic 
security and social integration. It seems that reintegration of the Iraqi returnees 
failed to be sustainable, mainly because of the low internal capacity of the 
country, namely poor access to basic services, lack of basic infrastructure and 
insecurity at the state level.  The next part examines whether UNHCR’s 4Rs 
activities in Sudan have been able to prevent the recurrence of mass flows from 
Sudan.
32
 
 
 
6.4.2. Prevention of the New Mass Flows 
 
The number of asylum seekers between 2005-2007 decreased steadily 
(57%) and began to increase in 2008, as shown in Figure 5. It increased 112% 
during 2008-2011 in comparison with 2007 numbers. In 2011, the number of 
asylum seekers from Sudan was only about 9% lower than the the situation in 
2005.   
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 Though 4Rs activities are conducted in south Sudan, there is no available separate data on the 
number of asylum seekers and IDPs, originated from Sudan and south Sudan for the period 2005-
June 2011. Thus, the study questions the prevention of new flows from Sudan in general. This will 
also enable the study to include Darfur, where international community also conducts humanitarian 
and military activities and to include the transitional areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and South 
Kordofan. 
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In 2009, the LRA rebels’ attack in Southern Sudan forced some 400,000 
people to flee for a second time, especially in bordering regions of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (UNHCR, 2009e: 59). After 
the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, insecurity and worsening humanitarian 
situation in border areas between Sudan and South Sudan, namely South 
Kordofan, Blue Nile states and Abyei caused new displacements. As IRIN (9 
December 2011) reported, some 20,000 people fled South Kordofan and some 
30,000 people fled Blue Nile state to South Sudan since July 2011. It is also 
estimated that another 36,000 Sudanese refugee fled to Ethiopia from Blue Nile 
state. UNHCR (Global Report, Sudan, 2011: 61) reported that conflict in Abyei in 
May 2011 displaced up to 110,000 people into South Sudan. Thus, further 
displacements also caused increase in the registered numbers of asylum seekers 
from Sudan.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Asylum-seekers, originating from Sudan, 2005-2011
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In addition to the prevention of the asylum-seekers, the study questions 
also the change in number of IDPs. Figure 6 illustrates the increasing trend of 
IDPs in Sudan. The number of IDPs in Sudan increased about 57% between 2005-
                                                 
33
 The data for Figure 5 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
 237 
2006. Thus, it had a relative decreasing period between 2007-2009 with a nearly 
22% decrease. However, number of IDPs began a sharp increase in 2010 (almost 
50%). It continued to increase in 2011 with more than 50%. In 2011, the number 
of Sudanese IDPs reached an increase of about 178% in comparison with the IDP 
number in 2005. 
 
 
Figure 6: Number of IDPs in Sudan, 2005-2011
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In Sudan, the insecurity and ongoing conflict have not only caused further 
displacements but also ‘prevented’ humanitarian community to pursue its 
activities to prevent further flows. In 2006, UNICEF estimated that over 100,000 
IDPs in North Darfur and more than 184,000 IDPs in West Darfur were isolated 
by poor security and could not be reached by the humanitarian community (IRIN 
news, 9 March 2006). In addition to poor access to the volatile regions, as IRIN (9 
March 2006) reported, government forces and proxy militias alleged civilians to 
support for enemy group and target civilians, which provoked further 
displacements of thousands of people from Darfur. 70,000 people were forced to 
flee their homes, often for the second or third time (IRIN news, 13 February 
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 The data for Figure 6 has been extracted from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
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2006). Ethnic and armed conflicts also forced people in South Sudan to displace. 
For example in 2008, 187,000 people were displaced in South Sudan (IRIN news, 
26 March 2009). Violence between the Southern army and rebel groups forced 
another 100,000 displaced in the first three months of 2011 (IRIN news, 26 April 
2011). 
In addition to the violence and insecurity as the main cause of further 
displacements, lack of progress in reintegration process in South Sudan constitutes 
also a major case for not ‘preventing’ further displacements. For example, Ayuen 
Samuel, a returnee from northern Uganda, told IRIN (20 April 2006) that “It just 
didn’t feel like home. I felt like going back the same night”. Another returnee 
from Kenya in Jonglei State, James Anyang asked IRIN “how can you bring your 
child if there is no school, no health facility and no road?” (IRIN news, 20 April 
2006). 
In sum, examining the situation between 2005 and 2011 in terms of 
sustainability of reintegration and prevention of further flows, the study concludes 
first that international refugee regime has been ineffective to reintegrate Sudanese 
returnees. A majority of them (about 67%) have not been reintegrated, lacking ID 
cards, security and access to basic social services. The study second finds out that 
the goal of prevention to prevent further flows could not be provided. The number 
of asylum seekers decreased only 9% in comparison with 2005, while the number 
of IDPs increased by 178% between 2005-2011. The study concludes that the 
reasons of failure in prevention are unsustainable process of reintegration and the 
ongoing insecurity. These reasons are also among the main characteristics of 
countries with low internal capacity. Based on the findings of the qualitative 
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analysis, it is concluded that international refugee regime was not effective in 
Sudan between 2005-2011, mainly because of its low internal capacity. In other 
words, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, also the Sudanese case shows that 
the effectiveness of 4Rs activities are hindered by the factors that 4Rs activities 
intended to overcome, namely low internal capacity. 
The next section will first question the main social conditions in Sudan that 
lead the Sudanese people cooperate with or resist 4Rs activities. Identifying these 
conditions will enable the study to provide suggestions to shape them in 
accordance with the regime activities. Second, it will question the nature of the 
relations between the Sudanese government and international community to 
identify factors that shape this bilateral relationship. The aim, here, is to provide 
incentives to international community to increase the cooperative nature of the 
relations with the government. Last, it will examine how 4Rs activities are 
perceived by the Sudanese people again to identify the factors that shape their 
perceptions. This will enable the study to make suggestions to international 
community to increase people’s support for their activities. This qualitative 
analysis aims to provide incentives to UNHCR and its implementing partners to 
increase regime effectiveness in Sudan as a country with low internal capacity. 
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6.5. Conditions to Increase Regime Effectiveness in Sudan: A 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
6.5.1. Social Conditions 
 
This study advocated the importance of the unit level characteristics, 
including social conditions within a state in determining regime effectiveness. 
Because social conditions can create implications for the local people to cooperate 
with or resist the activities of regimes’ institutions. In Sudan, social conditions that 
prevent the effectiveness of 4Rs program and lead international community to 
shape their projects accordingly are identified as economic factors, insecurity 
against women and socio-cultural and religious conservatism.  
It is stated that during the war between the north and south parts of Sudan, 
only one in five children was in school in south Sudan and only one girl in 100 
children completed primary school (IRIN news, 13 July 2009). UNICEF states 
that low female enrollment in south Sudan is caused mainly by economic reasons 
and women’s insecurity. According to UNICEF, girls are seen as a realistic 
primary source of income and girls are married to get a bride price, usually paid in 
cows and once a girl is married, it means the end of her education. (IRIN news, 13 
September 2005) Sexual and gender-based violence is very common in South 
Sudan, where at least four out of ten women have experienced one or more forms 
of violence (UNMISS, 25 November 2012). Accordingly, parents in south Sudan 
may regard early marriage as a protection mechanism for the danger of sexual 
assault or as a care of a male guardian. Thus, the feeling of insecurity is likely to 
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be a factor for low female enrollment. (UNICEF, Southern Sudan, 7 September 
2005)  According to UNICEF, parents are also reluctant to send girls’ to school 
because of the unfriendly environment of some schools, where students experience 
sexual harassment and early pregnancy (Sudan Tribune, 1 June 2010). Thus, 
though in Afghanistan and Iraq, general insecurity can cause low female 
enrollment, in South Sudan, it is mainly the insecurity targeting women in the 
form of sexual assault and harassment that can prevent girls’ attendance to 
schools.  
As a response to the reluctance of parents due to economic reasons and 
women’s insecurity, UNICEF builds girl community schools with the hope that 
female enrollment rate would increase (IRIN news, 19 April 2005). These schools 
deliver basic education at an accelerated pace and provide a protective 
environment for young girls. Within this project, the WFP provides food rations to 
parents as an incentive for girls’ school attendance. (UNICEF, Southern Sudan, 7 
September 2005)  Despite the efforts of international community, UNICEF stated 
that access to education still remains one of the biggest challenges in South Sudan, 
especially among girls. Nearly half of a primary school age girls do not go to 
school (Sudan Tribune, 1 June 2010). As in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
there is feeling of insecurity also within the Sudanese society at the state level, 
which in return is likely to prevent the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime. However, in the Sudanese case, increasing security can not be sufficient 
enough to increase regime effectiveness on girls’ access to education.  Since 
increase in general security can not automatically mean increasing security for 
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women, awareness raising among the Sudanese society on women’s security is 
more likely to increase effectiveness of 4Rs activities on girls’ enrollment. 
In terms of health activities, in 2005, the UNDP launched Fighting 
HIV/AIDS Project in Sudan, where awareness of HIV/AIDS is very low. Only 
53% of the population was aware of the sexual transmission risk in 2002, though 
an estimated of 500,000 people in Sudan live with HIV/AIDS, according to the 
survey in 2002. (UNDP, Fighting HIV/AIDS) Local leaders advocate instead 
marriage as an AIDS-prevention strategy, though many young men could not 
afford marriages because of widespread poverty. (IRIN/PLUS news, 2008: 11) 
Thus, economic constraints are likely to prevent the proposal of marriage to be an 
effective AIDS-prevention strategy. Awareness campaigns on AIDS can become 
also problematic because of cultural and religious conservatism. For example, 
talking about condoms is regarded by many Sudanese as encouraging “illegal” 
sexual activity. UNICEF, together with its partners, also works on prevention of 
HIV/AIDS amongst youth and on care and treatment. Paula Claycomb (2005), 
UNICEF’s Communication Officer in Sudan, stated that principles to address the 
battle against an increase in HIV prevalence should be tailored according to 
cultural, religious differences and traditional practices. Accordingly, UNICEF 
provides information and educational materials on HIV prevention not only to 
children and teachers but also to religious and community leaders. (IRIN news, 13 
October 2010) Indeed, the assistance of religious leaders can become crucial in the 
awareness campaigns to reach out a larger number of the Sudanese population. 
Recognizing the strong influence of religious leaders on the Sudanese social 
fabric, the UNDP and the Sudanese National AIDS Program organized a number 
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of workshops across Sudan on HIV/AIDS in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Religious Guidance and Endowment. (UNDP, 25 May 2009 As the Iraqi case on 
women employment and enrollment, awareness raising campaigns with the 
support of religious leaders on HIV/AIDS prevention can diminish the prejudices 
of conservatism and increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities on health projects. 
Thus, the study argues that as constructivists argue, norms and beliefs can be 
subject to change. Awareness raising activities and involvement of religious 
leaders can increase people’s cooperation with the regime activities.  
In sum, unit level characteristics such as social conditions including 
economic reasons, insecurity against women and socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in South Sudan and lead 
UNHCR and its implementing partners to shape their activities accordingly. In this 
section, education and health are exemplified, namely female enrollment and 
prevention of HIV/AIDS. First, economic reasons and insecurity against women 
prevent UNICEF to increase girls’ attendance to schools. As a response, UNICEF 
established girl community schools to diminish the security concerns of the 
parents and WFP distributed food rations as an incentive for parents, who may 
regard their daughters as an economic income by bride price. Second, socio-
cultural and religious conservatism require international community to tailor its 
approach on preventing increase in HIV prevalence. These implications, derived 
from the analysis of social conditions in Sudan will provide insights for the 
tentative principles, to be proposed in Chapter 7. 
The next part will question the nature of the relations between the 
Sudanese government and international community, namely the UN agencies, 
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international NGOs and their national partners and donor states. While they are 
mostly related with the conditions within state, the factors that shape the nature of 
this bilateral relationship are regarded among the unit level characteristics. 
Because. Identifying these factors will enable the study to provide incentives to 
international community to increase regime effectiveness in Sudan. 
 
 
6.5.2. Nature of the Relations between the Government and International 
Community  
 
In this section, nature of the relations between the Sudanese government 
and international community will be attempted to analyze to identify the factors 
that shape this relationship. However, different from Afghanistan and Iraq, there is 
an important factor in Sudan, which hinders any cooperative possibility of the 
relations from the beginning and makes the relations very complex. The 
government of Sudan and its sponsored groups Janjaweed are alleged for systemic 
crimes of ethnic cleansing and slavery against the southern native black Africans.  
Thus, UN agencies and national and international NGOs raise their concerns the 
involvement of government in violence, both against civilians and against the aid 
workers. They have also self-critiques towards the insufficient level of support, on 
security forces for the ongoing insecurity in Sudan and for neglecting some 
emergencies. On the other hand, as being alleged by international community, the 
Sudanese officials criticize NGOs for not being neutral and for being politicized. 
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This distrust causes their reluctance for the deployment of the UN forces and for 
the humanitarian aid of international NGOs.  
Such as the case in Iraq, insecurity and violence prevent the effectiveness 
of 4Rs activities in Sudan through hindering the operations of international 
community. As discussed in the Afghan and Iraqi cases, the literature on 
international regimes has a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity, to 
provide security within their own borders. However, insecurity seems to be a 
common problem at the states level in states with low internal capacity and it is a 
factor that hinders the regime effectiveness. Jan Egeland, the UN emergency relief 
coordinator, told IRIN (29 March 2005) that Sudan must have a muscular political 
process, by which political groups, including government, ethnic leaders and 
rebels, should be pressured to stick their agreement and to stop attacks against 
unarmed civilians and humanitarian workers. UNHCR (News Stories, 19 April 
2005) has also urged the Sudanese government to provide more protection to 
displaced people in Darfur, since it is the government’s responsibility for its own 
citizens. Human Rights Watch (2005: 1) argued that President Omar El Bashir and 
other senior government officials, the regional administrative officials in Darfur, 
military commanders, and militia leaders should be investigated for crimes against 
humanity. Kolawole Olaniyan, director of AI's Africa program, expressed serious 
concerns about the safety of human rights defenders in Sudan and targeted the 
Sudanese government: “Detaining and harassing human rights defenders is a clear 
violation of Sudan's obligations under international and regional standards, 
including the Constitutive Act of the AU.” (UNMIS Media Monitoring Report, 25 
January 2006) OHCHR (UN Press Release, 18 May 2007) also stated that 
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government has not taken any effective action to prevent attacks or bring the 
perpetrators to justice. A panel of the UN experts accused the Sudanese 
government, together with the rebels and SLA of exacerbating ethnic tensions. 
The panel concluded that the government of Sudan failed to take appropriate 
measures to disarm Janjaweed militia groups. (IRIN news, 28 April 2006) On the 
other hand, the Sudanese government denied any involvement in attacks, stressing 
that it was a partner of the AU to pacify the region (Sudan Tribune, 06 February 
2013). However, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, the AU special representative 
in Sudan, stated in a press briefing (Sudan Tribune, 1 October 2005) that “there is 
neither good faith nor commitment on the part of any of the parties”. That’s why 
AMIS could not be successful in Darfur, though the mechanisms were in place 
and could have been worked if parties had cooperated.  
According to the EU, attacks against NGOs in North Darfur have 
prevented humanitarian workers to operate and the government’s unwillingness 
for the deployment of the hybrid force increased the instability in the region (IRIN 
news, 12 February 2007). When the Sudanese authorities did not allow Jan 
Egeland to visit Darfur in April 2006, Egeland felt being prevented and blocked to 
conduct his visit. He stated that this obstruction was symptomatic of the lack of 
government cooperation in the work of the UN, which is to coordinate the biggest 
humanitarian operation in the world. According to him, as long as the Sudanese 
government does not cooperate with the international humanitarian community 
and prevent NGOs from doing their work, there will be less protection for the 
people in dire need. (IRIN news, 5 April 2006) As a response to the visit 
mentioned above, the government made an explanation, stating that it is in full 
 247 
cooperation with the UN and welcomes Egeland’s visit. According to the 
Sudanese side, the government has just asked him to postpone his visit until the 
end of the Prophet Mohammed birthday celebrations. (IRIN news, 5 April 2006)  
John Holmes, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief Coordinator criticizedthe government to deny access to 
certain areas and to prevent aid workers from doing their jobs (OCHA, 24 March 
2007). A top UN official also urged the Sudanese government to end restrictions 
on humanitarian operations in Darfur, stating that “the denial of visas, the 
harassment of aid workers and other measures, have created the impression that 
the government of Sudan is engaged in a deliberate campaign of intimidation”. 
(IRIN news, 16 April 2007) 
International community has also self-critiques towards international 
donors for insufficient level of support, for the ongoing insecurity in Sudan and 
for neglecting some emergencies. In an IRIN interview (29 March 2005), Egeland 
criticized donor states outside the northwestern corner of the world. According to 
his statement, apart from Saudi Arabia and Japan, the UN did not get financial 
support from Arab and Asian countries for its Sudan operation. For example, in 
2005, the UN could only receive 14% of the required funds and even 95% of the 
US contribution was food, though the UN mission needed cash for non-food items 
and water sanitation. Dawn Elizabeth Blalock, the spokesperson for the UN 
humanitarian coordinator in Sudan, told IRIN (18 March 2005) that US$ 500 
million were required for recovery and development assistance in southern Sudan 
in 2005, but only US$ 25 was received and a further US$ 25 million was 
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promised. By mid-November in 2011, projects related to South Sudan received 
US$ 327 million, which is 53% of the total requirements (OCHA, 2012: 1).  
Egeland have also critiques towards international community for not doing 
enough to improve security in Sudan. According to him, the world should have 
done more than sending humanitarian personnel to Sudan. (IRIN news, 29 March 
2005) Jan Eijkenaar, the Coordinator of the Southern Sudan Program for the 
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Directorate General (ECHO) criticized 
NGOs not to be able to deal with the multiple Sudan emergencies as a whole. 
According to him, Darfur emergency was dealt almost separately, causing 
‘neglect’ for other emergencies, such as transitional areas between north and south 
Sudan. There is a variety of issues and emergencies in the same country and 
dealing with them separately can cause compartmentalized approaches. (IRIN 
news, 18 January 2006) These critiques towardsgether with the conditions in 
Sudan, examined above will provide incentives to the study in proposing tentative 
principles for the regime effectiveness. Since the nature of relationship between 
the government and international community is shaped by both of the parties, the 
remaining part of the section will examine the concerns of the Sudanese officials 
on the policies of international community. 
The Sudanese government regards NGOs as politicized and unneutral, 
mainly because of the arrest warrant, issued by International Criminal Court for 
President Bashir. In 2009, the Sudanese government accused several aid agencies 
of involving in Sudanese politics and working with their own government against 
Khartoum. In March 2009, 13 international NGOs were expelled, including 
Oxfam, Save the Children, the Norwegian Refugee Photo and IRC and 3 Sudanese 
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relief organizations were closed by the Sudanese government. More than 200 
Sudanese organizations would take over the offices of expelled agencies, to fill the 
void. (IRIN news, 12 March 2009)  
The attempt of ‘nationalization of aid community’ has been mainly caused 
by the distrust of the government in international and some national NGOs. For 
example, in 2006, the Sudanese government lifted restrictions on the UN relief 
operations and instructed local authorities in Darfur to suspend all UNMIS 
activities except life-saving operations of UNICEF and the WFP. The Sudanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused UNMIS of allegedly transporting a 
commander of the rebel SLM/A. Thus, the government considered the incident “a 
flagrant violation of the country’s sovereignty and a violation of the agreement 
under which the UN operates in Sudan” (Sudan Tribune, 25 June 2006). In 
accordance with the distrust and control-desire of the Sudanese government, 
Sudan rejected the proposal to transform AMIS in Darfur to a UN operation for 
years, accusing the UN of infringing on the country’s sovereignty (IRIN news, 23 
February 2006). The Sudanese government stated that it would allow AU 
peacekeepers to remain in Darfur only if the troops are not part of a proposed UN 
force (IRIN news, 4 September 2006). The underlying logic of this instant 
rejection was explained by President Bashir as “[the UN] wants to make a pretext 
through the Darfur issue to control us and to recolonise Sudan” (Lobe, 26 
September 2006). It seems that the Sudanese government agrees with 
Mearsheimer (1994-95) in his argument that international regimes reflect the 
distribution of power and operate by the self-interests of the great powers. 
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Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman, Humanitarian Affairs Commission 
chief, stated that some NGOs were governmental and either ambassadors or 
governments involved within these NGOs. (IRIN news, 5 March 2009) El-Gack 
(2012: 201) cited a gender specialist form the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, stating that many members of the national or regional NGOs “are spies 
working against their country and looking after their personal benefits”. In other 
words\ different from the neutrality problem among Iraqi officials in terms of 
distribution of aid, the Sudanese government has a priori assumption on the 
politicized and unneutral character of international community. In Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the critiques towards the neutrality of international community come 
upon the activities of the international community, namely the UN agencies, UN 
security missions, international and national NGOs. However, in the Sudanese 
case, it is found out that the partial and unneutral character of international 
community is already taken as given by the Sudanese government. It seems that in 
addition to Mearsheimer’s argument, the Sudanese government also admits 
Castles (2003) critique on the UNHCR’s root cause approach in the literature 
review, arguing that humanitarian actions should not be treated as neutral. This 
distrust in humanitarian community has also led increasing control on the work of 
the NGOs and civil society, in addition to the nationalization policy. In 2006, 
Sudan approved the voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act 
(National Legislative Bodies, 2006), which increased the level of government 
control over NGO activities. It allows the voluntary and humanitarian commission 
to regulate NGO funding through a governmental-approval system (Art. 7). It also 
paves the way for including limitations on NGO, since the commissioner is 
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responsible for organizing, coordinating and evaluating the organizations work 
(Art. 21(1h)).  
In sum, this section concludes that the Sudanese government hardens the 
international aid workers’ operation or 4Rs activities and the nature of the 
relations between the Sudanese government and international community is far 
from being cooperative. Moreover, different from the Afghan and Iraqi cases, 
there is a mutual distrust between the Sudanese government and international 
community, rather than the feeling of dissatisfaction. International community 
mainly criticizes the government for not providing security to the humanitarian 
community and alleges it by systemic crimes of ethnic cleansing and slavery. The 
international community also criticizes international donors to cut and not release 
the funds, international security forces not to provide enough security in Sudan 
and aid workers not to deal with all emergencies from a unitary emergency 
approach. The government does also not have any trust in the international NGOs 
and UN security forces. This situation causes government’s attempt to nationalize 
the aid community and increasing government control on the NGOs, operating in 
Sudan.  
This study seeks to examine the unit-level characteristics of Sudan to 
derive implications for regime effectiveness in countries with low internal 
capacity. In addition to social conditions, the nature of the relations between the 
Sudanese government and international community are examined so far. The next 
part seeks to examine the perceptions of the Sudanese people in order to give 
incentives to UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase people’s support 
for 4Rs activities. 
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6.5.3. Perceptions of the Local People in Sudan 
 
 Different from the Sudanese government’s attitude towards international 
community, many of the Sudanese people welcome 4Rs activities of the 
international community since they are in dire need of help. However, as in the 
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, local people in Sudan still have distrust in 
international community, which even causes violence against the UN agencies and 
NGOs. In the Sudanese case, the underlying factors that shape the perception of 
the Sudanese people are considerably different from the cases of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The study identifies importance given to personal relations with NGO 
workers and the feeling of distrust in international community due to unmet 
expectations from the existence of international forces and misconceptions of their 
mandates as factors that shape perception of local people in international 
community. 
 Based on the research conducted in South Sudan, Beattie (2011) states 
that participants indicated their good relations with NGOs without exception and 
they stressed the presence of mutual respect among them. The people interviewed 
stressed their awareness that humanitarian community in South Sudan “come and 
help us in our homes just like a friend does” (Beattie, 2011). However the lack of 
basic services and security ‘force’ people to demand more help. Mary Yar Makut, 
a returnee in southern Sudan asked for more help from relief agencies to build 
homes and grow their own food (IRIN news, 19 April 2005). Abisa Anyieth, an 
IDP in South Sudan, told IRIN (2 October 2006) that she appreciates the help from 
UNHCR but the life at the camp is not easy and they need more help at the right 
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time. She argues that people could not get the right medicine when they need it, 
though they hear medicine has been donated for them. In addition to basic 
services, IDPs in Darfur express their concern on limited degree of security, 
despite the presence of the African peacekeepers nearby (IRIN news, 5 September 
2006).  
 In terms of the factors, determinants that shape local people’s perceptions 
in the UN agencies and NGOs, the importance given to personal relations with 
NGO workers and distrust in international community due to unmet expectations 
and misconceptions are found out. According to Beattie (2011), in South Sudan, 
people relate to and respect individuals rather than organizations. Accordingly, 
change in their staffs can cause a deterioration of the relations between the local 
people and the relevant NGO. People can pursue the change in even one staff 
member as being left behind. Thus, in South Sudan, staff attitude towards people 
can affect people’s perception. For example, the report by the Save the Children 
Federation (2011: 5) cited expression of local community informants on the NGO 
staff. According to them, NGOs are here to help them, which is a good purpose. 
However the NGO staff can not be as good as their purpose. In a clearer sense, the 
community feel treated as inferior by the foreigners, especially Ugandans and 
Kenyans. Since only 27% of South Sudanese is literate (CIA, South Sudan, 2013), 
they think that foreign staff and even local staff from South Sudan with an 
education background treat them as inferior, thinking that they are wiser than local 
people. That’s why they would like to have NGO staff for a given project among 
the residents of their own towns or village. (Save the Children Federation, 2011: 
9) 
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 Goodwin-Gil (1999) warns in his critique on the root causes approach in 
the literature review, 4Rs activities jeopardize the impartiality and neutrality of 
UNHCR. As in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, increasing activities in countries 
of origin seem to result indeed in distrust in international community among the 
Sudanese people. However, in the Sudanese case, distrust is mainly directed to the 
military side of international community, rather than humanitarian one. Their 
unmet expectations from the UN missions and misconceptions on their mandate 
seem to lead violence against humanitarian personnel and aid convoys. The 
Sudanese people have a clear expectation from international community to bring 
peace to the region since the government is not capable of doing this. A local man 
told IRIN (5 September 2006) that “We have five additional governments now: 
SLA-Minnawi, SLA-Abdelwahid, JEM, NRF and the Janjawid. That’s why we 
need the United Nations force to come”. In Darfur, there are also unmet 
expectations and confidence in the UN mission. According to local leaders in Abu 
Shouk camp for displaced Darfuris, unlike AMIS, deployment of UN 
peacekeeping force would provide local people adequate level of security. (IRIN 
news, 13 March 2007) Particularly, the presence of large numbers of international 
military peacekeepers, namely AMIS and UNMIS, has created expectations 
among the local people to be protected in case of violence (Refugees International, 
2009: 2). However, their officials remind the lack of military capability with 
UNMIS’ primarily non-interventionist mandate. Thus, UNMIS does not have 
resources to provide such sort of protection to local people. The mission has also 
severe limitations on movement, imposed by the Sudanese Government. 
(Refugees International, 2009: 3) Epimaque Kayitare, company commander at the 
 255 
UNAMID base in Tawila told IRIN (20 October 2008) that the main weapon of 
UNAMID is negotiation, acting as a mediator. An AU commander also said that 
people attach importance to security and the service that the AU mission provided 
but they only investigate and report when something happens, doing nothing about 
it. He stated that the lack of fuel and vehicles hampered even the routine work, 
such as monitoring ceasefire violations. (IRIN news, 5 September 2006) Thus, the 
international missions in Sudan mainly argue that the Sudanese people 
misconceptualize their mandates and capacity. 
 These unmet and to some extent right expectations of local people from 
before AMIS and now UNMIS/UNAMID have caused widespread disappointment 
and distrust among them. As cattle-herder Suleiman Basha told IRIN (20 October 
2008), UNAMID troops have nothing to offer them, not even security. According 
to him, they could not stop the Sudanese government or rebel groups to attack 
civilians. So it is not more than too much talk since promises are not kept. As a 
result, when the expectations of local people have not been met in terms of 
security, UNMIS is regarded as “Unnecessary Mission in Sudan”. (Refugees 
International, 2009: 3)  
 Due to the disappointment among local people in Sudan, armed clashes 
and violence have increased on NGOs. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General to Sudan, stated that the number of attacks on NGOs 
was 75% higher and attacks against the AU peacekeepers went up 900% in the 
first half of 2006 in comparison with the first half of 2005. Attacks against the UN 
decreased by 10%, but the decrease was mainly because the UN personnel moved 
less outside towns due to insecurity. (IRIN news, 10 August 2006) Mike 
 256 
McDonagh, Senior humanitarian affairs officer at the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Khortoum, stated that the main reason for 
increasing attacks on aid workers was the tension and disappointment among the 
local population, together with frustration and lack of hope (IRIN news, 3 August 
2006). 
 In sum, though the Sudanese people mostly welcome 4Rs activities, they 
regard them as insufficient. The factors that lead the disappointment and the 
feeling of distrust among local people are identified as the importance given to 
personal relations with NGO workers and their unmet expectations and 
misconceptions. First, they prefer local hiring for the projects in their own region 
since they feel being treated as inferior by foreigners or the Sudanese outside of 
their local community. Second, local peoples expect international security forces, 
namely UNMIS, UNAMID and AU, to protect them in case of violence, since 
they regard the Sudanese government as a part of the violence within country. 
However, they mostly misconceptualize the mandate of international security 
forces, UNMIS, UNAMID and AU argued. UNMIS states that it has a non-
interventionist mandate and UNAMID stresses its role of acting as a mediator. The 
AU officials also indicate that they only investigate and report in case of violence 
and do not take any action. These unmet expectations and misconceptions cause 
disappointment and distrust among local people and thus, violence against aid 
workers increases. 
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6.6. Results of the Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses 
 
Examining the situation between 2005 and 2011 in terms of sustainability 
of reintegration, the quantitative analysis concludes that international refugee 
regime was ineffective to reintegrate Sudanese returnees. The analysis also finds 
out that the UNHCR’s goal of preventing further flows could not be provided. 
Thus, it is concluded that international refugee regime was not effective in Sudan 
between 2005-2011. In other words, international refugee regime attempted to 
increase its effectiveness in Sudan since the country diminishes its effectiveness 
by being a refugee producing country. In return, the main characteristics of the 
low internal capacity hindered the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Sudan. Table 
8 illustrates the findings of regime effectiveness in Sudan, with the same results of 
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
Table 8: Effectiveness of international refugee regime in Sudan, 2005-
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The qualitative analysis first questions the main social conditions in Sudan. 
Second, the nature of the relations between the Sudan government and 
international community are examined and factors that shape this relationship 
Case 
Sustainability 
of repatriation 
 (Y/N) 
Prevention 
of new 
flows 
(Y/N) 
Effectiveness 
 
Sudan NO NO 
NOT 
EFFECTIVE 
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have been identified. Last, the nature of the Sudanese people’s perceptions in 4Rs 
activities is questioned and factors that shape people’s perceptions are identified. 
The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Sudan are identified as the lack of basic public services and insecurity at the state 
level. While these factors are attributed to the characteristics of the low internal 
capacity, it is argued that Sudan’s low internal capacity created adverse 
implications for the effectiveness of international refugee regime. The chapter 
conducted also a qualitative analysis to identify tentative principles for UNHCR 
and its implementing partners to increase regime effectiveness in countries with 
low internal capacity. 
In the first part, it is concluded that social conditions such as economic 
reasons, insecurity against women and socio-cultural and religious conservatism 
can prevent the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Sudan. Since economic reasons 
and insecurity against women in Sudan prevent the increase in girls’ attendance to 
schools,  UNICEF, as a response, established girl community schools to diminish 
the security concerns of the parents and WFP distributed food rations as an 
incentive for parents, who may regard their daughters as an economic income by 
bride price. Additionally, socio-cultural and religious conservatism requires 
international community to tailor its approach towards preventing increase in HIV 
prevalence. Thus, regarding the implementation of the social conditions on the 
possible ways of increasing the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Sudan, four suggestions are identified. First, when 4Rs activities implement 
projects to increase people’s economic self-sufficiency, parents’ support to female 
education can increase. Second, awareness raising campaigns among parents on 
 259 
the importance of female education can prevent them to marry girls at school age 
to get a bride price. Third, increasing women’s security through awareness raising 
on women’s rights, is likely to increase girls’ access to education. Last, 
involvement of religious leaders and tribal elders on HIV/AIDS prevention 
campaigns can overcome socio-cultural and religious conservatism, which in turn 
is likely to increase the effectiveness of health projects in Sudan.  
 The second part finds out that the nature of relations between Sudan 
government and international community as far from being cooperative and that 
there is a mutual distrust. From the international community side, critiques 
towards not providing security to the humanitarian community and even for being 
responsible for the insecurity are identified as the main factors that cause 
dissatisfaction from the Sudan government. The factors that shape government 
relations with international community are identified as distrust in international 
NGOs and UN security forces. This situation causes government’s attempt to 
nationalize the aid community and increasing government control on the NGOs, 
operating in Sudan. Thus, mutual distrust between international community and 
Sudanese government seems to hinder any starting point for trust-building 
activities and cooperative nature of the relations. However, two suggestions are 
still identified regarding the implementation of the relations between government 
and international community on the possible ways of increasing the effectiveness 
of international refugee regime in Sudan. International community has concerns 
on government responsibility for the ongoing insecurity and violence in Sudan. 
Thus, since general insecurity and violence against NGOs hinder the operation of 
4Rs activities in Sudan as the case in Iraq, if government acts in a way to pursue 
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its responsibility in protecting its own citizens and humanitarian workers, it is 
likely that effectiveness of international refugee regime will increase. First, 
information campaigns on the neutrality of international community are likely to 
increase the willingness of the government officials to cooperate with them. The 
distrust of Sudanese government in international community, critiques towards the 
NGOs as politicized, unneutral and being spies, sprit away any cooperation ground 
with international community. Thus, second, trust building activities can convince 
government on the neutrality and intention of international community to help the 
Sudanese people.   
In the last part, nature of the perceptions of the Sudan people is identified 
as dissatisfied, disappointed and distrusted, namely because of importance given 
to personal relations with NGO workers, unmet expectations and misconceptions. 
Regarding the implementation of perceptions of the Sudanese people on the 
possible ways of increasing the effectiveness of international refugee regime in 
Sudan, two suggestions are identified. First, people give more importance to 
personal relations with NGO workers rather than the NGOs itself. The feeling of 
being insulted can affect their support for international community, which can in 
turn decrease the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. Thus, hiring of local people for 
local projects and giving more importance to personal relations between NGO 
workers and local community are likely to increase regime effectiveness. Second, 
the Sudanese people expect AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID to increase security for 
them as a logical result of their presence. However, their expectations seem to be 
unmet and the widespread disappointment and distrust among local people are 
likely to cause insecurity and violence against NGOs. In other words, people’s 
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unmet expectations are likely to lead negative perceptions in international 
community, far from being supportive for the 4Rs activities. Thus, meeting 
people’s expectations through ‘real’ mandates with ‘real’ capacities and informing 
them on the difficult process of transition in countries with low internal capacity, 
such as Sudan, are likely to increase the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime through gaining their support. 
The case study on Sudan identifies several implications for the regime 
effectiveness, derived from the qualitative analysis. In terms of social conditions, 
providing civilian security, particularly for women and overcoming socio-cultural 
and religious conservatism are likely to increase the regime effectiveness in 
Sudan. In terms of the relations between the Sudanese government and 
international community, information campaign and trust-building activities to 
convince government officials on the neutrality of aid community seem to increase 
the regime effectiveness in Sudan. Regarding the perceptions of the Sudanese 
people, giving more importance to relations between NGOs’ staff and local people 
and information campaigns on the difficult process of transition in Sudan are 
likely to develop supportive perceptions among the Iraqis in international 
community. 
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter first examined the Sudanese political, social and cultural 
structure and then it explored the country’s history to understand the historical 
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background of its fragile political structure. The third part of the chapter provided 
brief information on the 4Rs activities in Sudan. Next, the chapter questioned 
whether international refugee regime was effective in Sudan between 2005-2011. 
It quantitatively measured the regime effectiveness through criteria of 
sustainability of reintegration and prevention of new flows. The analysis found out 
that a majority of the Sudanese returnees (about 67%) have not been reintegrated, 
lacking ID cards, security and access to basic social services. The study also found 
out that the goal of prevention to prevent further flows could not be provided.  
The chapter examined the social conditions in Sudan, the nature of the 
bilateral relations between the Sudanese government and international community 
and perceptions of the Sudanese people to derive implications for regime 
effectiveness in countries with low internal capacity. In this qualitative analysis, 
the study found out that social conditions in Sudan, such as the feeling of 
insecurity and socio-cultural and religious conservatism, diminished the 
effectiveness of 4Rs activities. The nature of the relations between the Sudanese 
government and international community was defined far from being cooperative, 
mainly due to the feeling of insecurity among the UN agencies and international 
organizations and the mutual distrust between the parties. Last, it was found out 
that perceptions of the Sudanese people were not supportive of the regime 
activities, given their disappointment and distrust in the international community. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation questioned how the presence of states with low internal 
capacity create implications for the effectiveness of international regimes and how 
regimes’ institutions should operate in states with low internal capacity to increase 
regime effectiveness. Seeking to answer this research question through studying 
international refugee regime in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, the dissertation 
concluded that international refugee regime was not effective in these countries in 
terms of providing sustainability of reintegration and prevention of new mass 
flows. Based on the findings of the qualitative analysis, the study proposes six 
tentative principles to give incentives to UNHCR and its implementing partners to 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in refugee producing 
countries with low internal capacity: providing civilian security, overcoming 
socio-cultural and religious conservatism, increasing government capacity and 
willingness to cooperate with international community, building trust among local 
people and increasing their support for international community  
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7.1 Theoretical Findings 
 
Based on the evolution of international refugee regime and analysis of the 
case studies, the study identified four theoretical findings. First, the study found 
out that unit level characteristics such as social conditions within states, nature of 
the relations between government and international community and perceptions of 
the local people play a role in determining the effectiveness of international 
regimes. The study extended the definition of unit level characteristics from the 
choices of political leaders and elites to include a variation of socio-political and 
socio-cultural factors. It identified the feeling of insecurity and socio-cultural and 
religious conservatism as common social conditions in three case studies. It is also 
found out that such conditions decrease the effectiveness of UNHCR’s 4Rs 
activities. In terms of the relations between government and international 
community, concerns on corruption, feeling of insecurity among the staff of the 
UN agencies and international NGOs, lack of government capacity and authority 
on aid spending and mutual distrust were identified. These factors are also found 
to create implications for the regime effectiveness in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. 
Regarding perceptions of the local people, disappointment, distrust, aid 
dependency, relations with NGOs’ staff and insufficient level of support were 
identified as the factors that shape local people’s perceptions. The study found out 
that such factors can also create implications for regime effectiveness. 
Second, having a priori assumption on states’ internal capacity, the 
literature on international regimes assumes that states have security within their 
own borders. Accordingly, neorealists argue that the feeling of insecurity among 
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states at the system level prevent them to cooperate with international regimes, 
given the anarchical nature of the international system. (Waltz, 1979) However, 
insecurity within state seems to be a common problem in all of the three cases of 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, as being countries with low internal capacity. The 
cases showed that there can be feeling of insecurity among people at the state 
level, which in return hinders the effective implementation of 4Rs activities. It is 
also found out that there is feeling of insecurity among international community, 
namely among the humanitarian and development workers of international NGOs. 
The feeling of insecurity among people in Afghanistan and Iraq hinders the 
effectiveness of 4Rs activities on disarmament, education and employment. In the 
case of Sudan, the feeling of insecurity among the international staff prevents 
them to operate their activities and restricts their access to the people in dire need. 
In sum, the study found out that in addition to the feeling of insecurity at the 
system level, the insecurity within state can also hinder the effectiveness of 
international regimes. 
Third, neoclassical realists argue the importance of choices, made by the 
political leaders and elites, on the regime effectiveness (Rose, 1998; Taliaferro, 
2006). Haggard and Simmons (1987) identify domestic structure and process as 
factors that can shape the policy choices of political leaders and elites. This study 
found out that political leaders and elites can make choices based on their ethnic 
and religious affiliations and individual interests rather than their concerns on the 
national interests. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq showed that government 
officials can be corrupted and made their choices by giving priority to their 
individual interests. The Sudanese case showed that political leaders can shape 
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their policies based on their ethnic and religious affiliations, as in the example of 
President Nimeiri’s and Bashir’s policies of Arabization and Islamization of the 
local African people.  
Last, in the evolution of international refugee regime in Chapter 3, the 
study found supports for the neoliberal argument that states cooperate with 
international regimes only under restrictive conditions (Hasenclever, 1996; 
Keohane, 1993). In Chapter 3, the study found out that the U.S. was convinced to 
support UNHCR only when its activities would support the American struggle 
against communism in strategic countries. As an another example, the Western 
states supported the broadening of UNHCR’s people of concern only as long as 
the majority of refugees stayed in their region of origin, namely in the Third 
World. During the Cold War, the priority over durable solutions was also 
determined according to the ideological confrontations. UNHCR also shaped its 
policies in the post-Cold War period according to the interests of the Western 
states to gain their support by providing voluntary repatriation as the most 
preferred durable solution. 
  
 
7.2. Empirical Findings 
 
Based on the analyses of the three case studies, the study identified five 
empirical findings. First, the study found out several common characteristics 
among the causes of low internal capacity in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. The 
political history of Afghanistan witnessed short-termed governments due to 
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several coup d’états, ideological divisions between the Communists and Islamists, 
ethnic divisions between Pashtuns and Tajiks and foreign interventions by the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. led forces. Similarly, Iraq has a history of bloody coup 
d’états, ethnic divisions between Kurds and Arabs, sectarian war between Shiite 
and Sunni Arabs, war with Iran and invasion of Kuwait and foreign intervention 
by the U.S.-led coalition forces. The causes of the Sudanese low internal capacity 
are found as three long civil wars between northern and southern parts of Sudan, 
within north Sudan and within south Sudan. The civil wars have been mostly 
based on ethnic and religious divisions. In sum, coup d’états, ethnic and 
religious/sectarian divisions and foreign interventions were found to be almost 
common characteristics of the three cases. 
Second, the study found out common characteristics among the cases, 
attributed to their low internal capacity. Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan have all 
insecurity within their borders, by being unable to provide security of their citizens 
or by being also a part of it, as in the case of Sudan. Their governmental units are 
mostly corrupted and they are incapable of providing basic services to their own 
citizens. Due to long years of wars, they lack very poor and old infrastructures, 
which direcly affects their ability to provide basic public services. Last, socio-
cultural and religious values are considerably strong within their societies, 
particularly in the rural areas with poor economic conditions.  
Third, the study found out that low internal capacity creates adverse 
implications for the regime effectiveness. Insecurity and violence hinder the 
operations of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan both by restricting 
humanitarian access to the people in need and by creating a resistance within local 
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people to cooperate with 4Rs activities, as in the examples of activities on 
disarmament, education and employment. Strong socio-cultural and religious 
values also diminish people’s support for regime activities. The lack of basic 
infrastructure and poor access to basic services also hamper the regime 
effectiveness, particularly in reintegration activities. Corruption within 
governments, as will be explained in the next finding in detail, also decrease the 
effectiveness of regimes by discouraging international community to transfer the 
authority and control over the aid spending and 4Rs projects to the governments. 
Fourth, as assumed in the research design, cooperative nature of the 
relations between government and international community is likely to increase 
the effectiveness of international refugee regime. However, in countries with low 
internal capacity, governments mainly lack the governance capacity to cooperate 
with international community, particularly due to corruption within government as 
a common characteristic. The study found out that corruption can lead 
international community to bypass governments in the allocation of international 
funds and operation of 4Rs projects. This bypass-tendency of donor states and UN 
agencies is in return likely to hinder the capacity-building process of governments 
further, by creating a vicious circle for the regime effectiveness. Moreover, 
lacking sufficient funds and authority in the activities of international community, 
government can develop distrust in international community. In return, this 
emergence of mutual distrust seems to harm the cooperative nature of relations. 
Accordingly, in order to increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime, 
governance capacity of government to cooperate with international community 
needs to be increased despite the presence of corruption. 
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Last, the study found out that increasing involvement of activities in 
countries of origin is likely to jeopardize the impartiality and neutrality of the 
regime’s institution, as Goodwin-Gil (1999) argues. And this jeopardized 
impartiality and neutrality of international community can decrease the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. For example, confidence problem 
among government officials in international community is likely to decrease their 
willingness to cooperate with international community in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
Sudan, government suspicions on the ultimate aims of international community, 
such as the suspicion on its intention to colonize Sudan, caused increasing 
restrictions on the activities of international community and dismissal of several 
international NGOs. The feeling of distrust among local people in international 
community also diminishes their support for the 4Rs activities in all cases. Their 
unmet needs and expectations can also lead local people regard the presence of 
international community as unnecessary as in the case in Sudan. 
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7.3. Tentative Principles for the Regime Effectiveness 
 
Based on the comparative analysis of the case implications, summarized in 
Table 9 the dissertation identifies six tentative principles and suggestions for them, 
as shown in Table 10. These tentative principles are an attempt to provide 
suggestions for the UN agencies, national and international NGOs, donor 
countries and international security missions to shape their policies accordingly to 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime in countries with low 
internal capacity. Each tentative principle offers one or more suggestions, namely 
“Do”s, for the related principle35. 
 
1. Providing civilian security 
The feeling of insecurity among people as a unit level characteristic is 
likely to diminish the effectiveness of international refugee regime in countries 
with low internal capacity. People’s compliance with demobilization/disarmament 
programs in Afghanistan and Iraq and women’ access to education in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Sudan seem to be hampered due to ongoing insecurity and violence and 
particular insecurity against women. Thus, 4Rs activities of international refugee 
regime are more likely to become effective if security for civilians is provided. To 
increase civilian security, there are two suggestions, based on the findings in case 
studies. 
                                                 
35
 It can be questioned why countries would ever agree with such tentative principles and “Do”s. 
Therefore, it is important to remind that international community does not conduct such activities 
in such countries despite the will of them. Thus, international community has already some 
leverage to operate in such countries and the study aims to provide principles to increase the 
effectiveness of its present activities. 
 272 
- Do ensure that international missions are mandated to provide 
improvements in the civilian security  
There are international security missions in the cases, such as ISAF in 
Afghanistan, UNAMI in Iraq, UNMIS and UNMID in Sudan. They have mainly 
either do not have any mandate for civilian security or could not have any real 
improvement in the lives of civilians. NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan has 
primarily the mandate of assisting the Afghan government in the maintenance of 
security. However, rather than having any particular mandate of providing civilian 
security, it attempts to maintain security to enable a secure environment for the 
Afghan authorities and UN personnel to operate. UNAMI’s mandate is to advise 
and assist the Government in political dialogue and national reconciliation, 
facilitating regional dialogue and protection of human rights and judicial and legal 
reform. Thus, it has a political mission in general and does not have any mandate 
for the provision of civilian security. UNMIS mandate mainly includes supporting 
the implementation of the CAP in 2005. It is also authorized to protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence and to coordinate international efforts 
in the protection of civilians. UNAMID, the hybrid operation of UN and AU in 
Darfur, has the mission of contributing the restoration of necessary security 
conditions for its own personnel and humanitarian workers. It has also been 
mandated to protect civilian populations under imminent threat of violence and 
prevent attacks against civilians within its capability and areas of deployment.  
Thus, among three case studies, the only case, mandated with providing 
civilian security is Sudan. Interestingly enough, however, the presence of UNMIS 
and UNAMID, together with AMIS, seems to fail in meeting people’s 
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expectations through increasing security for them, as discussed in the Sudanese 
case. Lmitations on their movements, imposed by the Sudanese government and 
their lack of military capability prevent UNMIS, UNAMID and AMIS to provide 
effective security for civilians. In return, mostly observing and reporting insecurity 
and violence, without any real improvement in civilian security is likely to create 
disappointment and distrust among the Sudanese people. 
- Do increase level of awareness among people on women’s security 
As shown particularly in the Sudanese case, increase in general security 
can not be sufficient enough to increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities on girls’ 
access to basic services such as education. Hence, an increase in overall security 
can not automatically mean increasing security for women. Insecurity targeting 
women mostly takes place in the form of sexual assault and harassment. Thus, 
awareness raising campaigns on women’s right conducted by international and 
national NGOs and in cooperation with government where possible can also 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime. 
 
2. Overcoming socio-cultural and religious conservatism 
Socio-cultural and religious conservatism such as the traditional role of 
women in the society as housewives, fear of identity change by obtaining new and 
modern ideas, suspicions on the fortified nutrition and refraining from talking on 
HIV/AIDS prevention can hinder the effectiveness of activities in increasing 
access to female enrollment and improved nutrition in Afghanistan, female 
employment and enrollment in Iraq and HIV/AIDS prevention in Sudan. Thus, the 
effectiveness of 4Rs activities, mainly in education, employment and health 
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sectors are likely to increase when socio-cultural and religious conservatism can 
be overcome. To overcome such conservatism, the study identifies three 
suggestions based on the findings in case studies. 
- Do increase level of awareness among people on the importance of 4Rs 
activities 
In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, socio-cultural and religious 
conservatism seems to prevent the effectiveness of activities to increase women’ 
access to education and employment. If the level of awareness on the general 
human rights culture and the benefits of female education and employment for the 
development of society is increased through information campaigns, it is likely 
that effectiveness of international refugee regime will also increase in the fields of 
education and employment. Involvement of religious leaders and tribal elders as 
key advocates to convince conservative people can also support activities to raise 
awareness among society. In the Sudanese case, people can refrain from talking on 
HIV/AIDS prevention and resist to become conscious on the transmission and 
prevention methods of the disease, due to conservatism. Thus, assistance of 
religious leaders can be crucial to reach a wide part of the population through 
workshops and information campaigns. 
- Do conduct trust-building activities among people 
Trust-building activities are likely to increase the effectiveness of 4Rs 
activities through people’s acceptance and support in education and health 
projects. In Afghanistan and Iraqi cases, locating schools closer to home and 
increasing numbers of female teachers in schools are likely to increase girls’ 
enrollment to schools by building trust among parents. In the example of fortified 
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nutrition project to improve public health in Afghanistan, involvement of religious 
leaders and tribal elders can also support trust-building activities as well as 
awareness raising ones. People in countries with low internal capacity, where 
conservative values are relatively dominant, can sometimes have more trust in 
religious leaders and tribal elders than their government and international 
communities. 
 
3. Increasing government capacity to cooperate with international 
community 
A government with low governance capacity is more likely to spend aid 
ineffectively due to corruption and international community is more likely to 
bypass such governments during the allocation of international funds and 
providing authority on aid spending. Thus, as a vicious circle, on the one hand, 
lacking capacity in governments to cooperate leads international community to 
bypass the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, being funded 
insufficiently and not given authority on aid spending, government’s ability to 
increase its capacity is likely to decrease. Thus, as a precondition of the 
cooperative nature of the relations between government and international 
community, government needs to have capacity to cooperate with international 
community. In other words, increasing government capacity to cooperate with 
international community is likely to increase effectiveness of international refugee 
regime through building necessary ground for a possible cooperative nature of the 
relations between government and international community. Based on the findings 
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in cases, the study identifies two suggestions to support government in dealing 
with corruption and act in a transparent and accountable way. 
- Do fund government sufficiently to increase its capacity of rebuilding its 
own administration 
Corruption within government is likely to diminish the effective 
implementation of 4Rs activities, both through creating distrust among 
international community and through wasting aid spending. However, different 
from Iraqi government, Afghanistan lack oil reserves and has worse economic 
indicators. Thus, government in countries with low internal capacity, such as 
Afghanistan, can need considerable financial support under the supervision of 
international community to rebuild its own administration. In return, it is likely 
that it would have the capacity to deal with corruption and to provide basic 
services, governance and security to its own people. Thus, government capacity to 
cooperate with international community in implementing its 4Rs program can 
increase through funding governments sufficiently.  
- Do increase government authority on aid spending and 4Rs projects 
Both Afghanistan and KRG in Iraq criticize international community for 
limiting their ability to build public services and strengthen governance systems 
by bypassing them in major aid efforts. International community can indeed 
bypass government with low governance capacity and can not give them authority 
on aid spending and monitoring 4Rs projects, arguing that such governments do 
not have enough capacity for absorption of funding, which can lead further 
corruption within government. However bypassing government can further limit 
its ability to build public services and strengthen its governance system. Thus, 
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instead of bypassing government with low governance capacity, policies to 
increase its authority on aid spending and 4Rs projects under the supervision of 
international community can increase government capacity to cooperate with 
international community. 
 
4. Increasing government willingness to cooperate with international 
community 
As well as increasing government capacity, it is equally important to 
increase its willingness to cooperate with international community. The suspicions 
on the impartiality and neutrality of international community, especially of 
international and national NGOs working directly in the field and international 
security missions, can hinder the cooperative nature of relations between 
government and international community. Thus, based on the findings in case 
studies, three suggestions are identified to increase government’s willingness to 
cooperate with international community. 
- Do convince government officials and militant groups on the neutrality of 
aid agencies  
In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, government officials have critiques 
towards international community for unfair and unequal distribution of aid within 
the framework of 4Rs projects. Such critiques can decrease their willingness to 
support international community in their activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, 
information campaigns on the neutrality of international community are likely to 
increase willingness of government officials to cooperate with international 
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community by making clear the underlying reasons of alleged discriminations, 
such as insecurity and access difficulties. 
 In the Iraqi and Sudanese cases, the suspicions on the neutrality character 
of international community lead even violence against aid workers and increasing 
restrictions in their operations. Militant groups in Iraq seem to regard international 
staff of the Western agencies as an extension of the US-led forces. In Sudan, 
government’s belief on policiticized and unneutral character of international 
NGOs leads increasing restrictions on their activities. Violence and restrictions 
against aid workers can in return prevent international community to get access to 
people in dire need. Such distrusts in international community can also prevent 
any potential for cooperative nature of the relations between government and 
international community. Thus, trust-building activities and information 
campaigns can convince government on the neutral and humanitarian intentions of 
international community. 
 
5. Building trust among local people in international community 
Beliefs of local people on those international NGOs consider their own 
interests rather than the interests of local people and their respective country, 
beliefs on their contact with intelligence services and Christian missionary 
activities, existence of fake local aid agencies and the disappointment from their 
unmet expectations from the presence of international missions can cause distrust 
among local people. In all of the three cases, distrust among local people in 
international community, namely international and national NGOs and 
international security missions seems to diminish the effectiveness of 4Rs 
 279 
activities. Thus, the study identifies four suggestions to build trust among local 
people in international community, which is in return likely to increase the 
effectiveness of international refugee regime through developing positive 
perceptions in 4Rs activities. 
- Do make clear the neutrality of aid agencies for local people 
Afghans and Iraqis seem to have distrust in international NGOs, mainly 
because of their suspicions on their neutrality, serving their own interest or 
intelligence services. Thus, informing local people on the difference between the 
UN and coalition forces, on the civilian nature of their officials and on the 
humanitarian aims of international NGOs is likely to make clear the neutral 
character of UN agencies and international NGOs. 
- Do prevent the activities of fake local aid agencies 
In the case of Iraq, it is found out that the existence of fake local aid 
agencies can harm local people’s confidence on aid agencies. In order to prevent 
their existence and activities, a control mechanism to monitor national NGO’s 
activities can be established before allocating international and national funds. 
- Do inform people on the difficult process of transition in countries with 
low internal capacity 
As the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq show, local people can have distrust 
in international community on unequal distribution of aid in relatively secure areas 
and on the absence of any real improvement in their daily life. In such cases, 
informing people on the difficult nature of humanitarian aid and development 
work in countries with low internal capacity can increase their trust in 
international community. 
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- Do not disappoint local people through ‘nominal’ presence of 
international missions 
As the case of Sudan shows, in the absence of their government ability or 
willingness, local people can have clear expectations from the presence of UN and 
AU security mandates, such as being protected in case of violence. However, as 
discussed in case studies, international security missions, including ISAF in 
Afghanistan, UNAMI in Iraq, UNMIS, UNAMID and AMIS in Sudan, lack either 
mandates or capacity to provide civilian security. They can also have restrictions, 
on their movements imposed by the governments due to their suspicions on the 
intentions of their mandates. The unmet expectations from international security 
missions can cause widespread disappointment and distrust among local people, 
which can even turn into violence on NGOs. Thus, meeting people’s expectations 
through ‘real’ mandates and ‘real’ capacities is likely to increase the effectiveness 
of international refugee regime by building trust among local people in 
international community. 
 
6. Increasing support among local people for the activities of international 
community 
In addition to building trust among local people, it is equally important to 
increase their support for 4Rs activities. Though trust-building activities are also 
likely to increase people’s support, the study still has two more suggestions to 
increase people’s support for international community. 
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- Do give particular importance to the projects that seeks to increase 
people’s economic self-sufficiency 
UNHCR and its implementing partners have already projects to increase 
people’s economic self-sufficiency within the framework of 4Rs activities, such as 
Quick Impact Projects, vocational programs and Food for Work. However, giving 
such projects particular importance and extending them in numbers are likely to 
increase the effectiveness of international refugee regime. Hence, the Iraqi case 
shows that displaced people seem to be dependent on aid assistance from NGOs. 
Thus, in the absence of their own income to survive, people’s perception in 
international community can be affected negatively when this aid is not available. 
In other words, implementing more projects to increase people’s economic self-
sufficiency is likely to increase their support on the presence of international 
community. 
- Do give more importance to personal relations between NGO workers and 
local community 
The Sudanese case shows that people can relate to and respect individuals 
rather than organization. Thus, developing better personal relations between local 
people and NGOs workers is likely to increase people’s support to 4Rs activities. 
Hiring of local people for local projects and training of international staff on the 
sensitivities of local people, such as the inferior feeling of illiteracy as in the 
example of Sudanese case, can help NGOs to develop better personal relations 
with local people. 
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7.4. Suggestions for Future Works 
In terms of future work on the effectiveness of international regimes in 
countries with low internal capacity, several suggestions can be provided based on 
the limitations of this study and the implications from case studies.  
First, this study concentrates on refugee producing countries to provide 
tentative principles for increasing the effectiveness of international refugee 
regime. However, examining regime effectiveness in countries of asylum with low 
internal capacity can also give further insights to increase the effectiveness. 
Future research can have a research strategy of questioning compliance of such 
states with the cardinal principles of international refugee regime, such as non 
refoulement and right of asylum. 
Second, assuming international community as a single body results in 
common tentative principles for international community to increase its 
effectiveness of international refugee regime. Thus, dividing international 
community into groups as UN agencies, international and national NGOs, donor 
countries and international security missions and examining their specific relations 
with the government officials and local people would like to provide insights for 
specific members of international community to increase the effectiveness of their 
activities. 
Last, this study examines the activities of international refugee regime, as 
being an international regime dealing mostly with countries with low internal 
capacity since the beginning of the 1990s. Accordingly, it is an attempt to provide 
insights for UNHCR and its implementing partners to increase the effectiveness of 
 284 
international refugee regime. Tentative principles and suggestions for international 
community can still have implications for international regimes in general. 
However, other international regimes having activities in countries with low 
internal capacity, such as international human rights regime, can also be studied in 
terms of their effectiveness in such countries. This would both provide specific 
insights for a particular international regime and contribute to the accumulation of 
the general knowledge on increasing regime effectiveness in countries with low 
internal capacity. 
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